



Translated and edited with
an introduction by
Donald C. Hodges

Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla

**The Revolutionary Writings
of Abraham Guillén**

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Preface to the American Edition

by Abraham Guillén

I am delighted to take this opportunity to say a few words to my North American readers. My good friend Professor Don Hodges has remarked that my books, though virtually unknown to the North American public, are familiar to the CIA and Pentagon, which have tried to suppress their diffusion throughout Latin America. The *Theory of Violence* (1965), *Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla* (1966) and *Challenge to the Pentagon* (1969) have been repeatedly discovered in the "caves" or hideouts of the urban guerrillas in Montevideo; but the police have tried to withhold this information from the press in order not to give publicity to my writings on the strategy of the urban guerrilla. Without a trace of vanity I can say that these books are prohibited in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and other countries, a prohibition that amounts to an intellectual blockade designed to keep my thought from reaching the public. When these books have been exported to these countries they seldom get through customs: they disappear without a trace or are officially burned to keep them from catching fire. There is no way to reclaim them from the new Inquisition and its *autos de fé*.

Consequently, I am grateful to Hodges for editing these selections from my major works and for presenting the fundamentals of my thought to interested North Americans. Perhaps even I could not have made an anthology as complete and balanced as his; for he has known how to capture my philosophy as well as its economic, political and strategical

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applications. With these selections and Hodges' Introduction, North American readers now have in condensed form the essentials of "Guillenismo."

I have great confidence in the youth, students, laborers, technicians, intellectuals, women, blacks, chicanos and Puerto Ricans in the United States. These popular strata constitute the internal proletariat of the informal economic and political empire of the United States, which directly or indirectly dominates virtually all of Latin America. They are the natural allies of the vast majority of Latin Americans constituting the external proletariat of the North American corporations. When these two revolutionary fronts converge in their thought and action, then the imperialism of the dollar will suffer the same fate as the Roman Empire, whose legions were broken by the combined pressure of the colonial peoples in revolt (Germans, Scythians, etc.) and the internally colonized masses (slaves, Christians, etc.). In this planetary epoch the North American proletariat will not liberate itself from the capitalism of Wall Street until it is assisted in its revolutionary struggle by the Latin American proletariat. For the weakest link in the chain of yanqui capitalism is not inside the conventional territorial borders of the U.S. but on its vast external front, where the superprofits are extracted and the generals of the Pentagon have to "intervene."

Capital is exported to the underdeveloped countries because the rate of return there is comparatively higher. The risks are also greater in the form of social unrest, popular revolution, government intervention and expropriation. Here is where the Pentagon helps to protect U.S. "interests" and to secure the much vaunted domestic prosperity which has come to depend increasingly on foreign earnings. Paradoxically, prosperity under conditions of low profitability inside the U.S. is being achieved through economic stagnation and high profits elsewhere. Thus the external proletariat of the North American empire suffers the heaviest burden of exploitation and has the greatest stake in overcoming imperialism. The weakest link in the chain of U.S. imperialism is in

the Third World and above all in its Latin American backyard.

It is difficult for either Latin or North American revolutionaries to win alone. Just as North American labor and the inner-city ghettos depend on a Latin American revolution to undermine the imperialism of the dollar abroad, so the superexploited subproletariat south of the Rio Grande depends on the blacks, chicanos, Puerto Rican and white workers inside the U.S. to immobilize the imperialism of the dollar at home. These internal and external proletariats are virtual brothers in distress and share a common lot and destiny. Only by working together for their common liberation can they overcome the prospect of a Latin American Vietnam.

The Latin American masses are struggling not for a symbolic sovereignty as in Africa but for economic independence from the United States and for a belated resolution against native oligarchs who have sold their countries to foreign interests. Such a struggle, as in Cuba and Santo Domingo, portends U.S. military intervention and ultimately a continental struggle for liberation. The objective conditions are present for a Second Latin American War of Independence: only this time the struggle will be launched by the oppressed classes and not by the native bourgeoisie and oligarchies. Such a struggle will have for its principal target not only yanqui imperialism, but also dependent Latin American capitalism. And its successful outcome promises to galvanize the North American people into waging a parallel struggle against the Juggernaut that will be sending the cream of its youth to be killed in Latin America as an earlier generation was sacrificed in Vietnam.

The U.S. government is now less transparent and far more cautious than it was during the "incident" in Santo Domingo in 1965. Today it tolerates the socialist government of Salvador Allende; it has responded with moderation to the claims of Peru and Ecuador to coastal waters extending 200 miles offshore; it has remained cool in the presence of con-

tinued harassment by Panamanian nationalists for the return of the Canal Zone; it no longer supports military invasions against popular governments such as the CIA planned against the Arbenz regime in Guatemala and against Castro in the Bay of Pigs. Instead, the State Department, Pentagon and CIA now rely on the Brazilian generals to do their work for them, to suppress national liberation movements in Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Argentina and other South American countries.

But the Brazilian generals are hated by their own people and by the peoples in neighboring states. In the event that they intervene to repress popular insurrections, the outcome is more likely to be defeat than victory. There will be no more Santo Domingos—at least not with subimperialist forces under the direction of Brazilian pretorians. Should Brazil fail in her appointed task, the Pentagon would have to intervene directly. And at that moment a continental war between the two Americas would be a likely outcome: the culminating point in a class struggle between the North American plutocracy and allied Latin American oligarchies on one side and the combined internal and external proletariats of America on the other.

The genial Goethe said of the battle of Valmy, where the French Revolutionary armies defeated the Prussians, that it was not a simple defeat but the triumph of a new society. The North American plutocrats will eventually encounter their Valmy in some part of Latin America. If the undernourished, underdeveloped, pauperized, exploited, oppressed and Balkanized Latin American nation is not revolutionary, then it will never achieve either liberation or unification. It has to discover through revolutionary praxis, through the unity of revolutionary thought and action, where the secret of its emancipation lies: in the combined actions of the North and Latin American proletariats toward the overcoming of feudalism, militarism, capitalism and imperialism in the final decades of the twentieth century.

Montevideo, July 20, 1972

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INTRODUCTION

The Social and Political Philosophy of Abraham Guillén

Basic to Guillén's conception of the philosophical enterprise is Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it." In the past philosophy was considered to be a theoretical venture whose practical application was not itself deemed a philosophical matter. Conceived in these traditional terms, philosophy is an expression of self-alienation, because man is made for action. In this respect philosophy must be transcended, which means that it can be either supplemented through direct action or reinterpreted to include an activist component.

There is a considerable body of evidence that suggests that Marx as well as Engels opted for the first of these two interpretations of philosophy. In the Introduction to his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Marx interprets philosophy in terms of the head rather than the heart, as a spiritual weapon of the proletariat that has yet to be made a reality. In *The German Ideology* philosophy is equated with a fundamentally speculative rather than scientific or experimental enterprise: "When reality is depicted, philosophy as an independent branch of knowledge loses its medium of existence." Or, more strongly: "Philosophy and the study of the actual world have the same relation to one another as onanism and sexual love." In effect, philosophy is a species of ideological thinking by which ideas are invested with a seeming independence of their maker—the reification or fetishism of ideas. Once more, *The German Ideology*:

Just as philosophers have given thought an independent existence, so they had to make language into an independent realm. This is the secret of philosophical language, in which thoughts in the form of words have their own content. The problem of descending from the world of thoughts to the actual world is turned into the problem of descending from language to life. . . . The philosophers would only have to dissolve their language into the ordinary language from which it is abstracted to recognize it as the distorted language of the actual world and to realize that neither thoughts nor language in themselves form a realm of their own, that they are only manifestations of actual life.

Granted that thought and action must be unified in practice, Marx is saying that philosophy is fundamentally contemplative and practice is something added from outside. In this sense Marxism is not a philosophy.

However, there is no compulsion to follow Marx's usage. Without disagreeing with Marx on matters of substance, Guillén reinterprets philosophy in terms of praxis: the unity of thought and action. In this respect traditional philosophy is ideological, but Marxist philosophy is not. Marxist philosophy contains a theoretical component; it also requires action to change the world. Such action is an integral part of the philosophical enterprise. To say that Marxism is a philosophy of praxis means not only that it is about action, but also that it relates theory to practice, i.e., it constitutes a way of life. Guillén's social and political philosophy is not limited to words but is exemplified in deeds. In this perspective the man and his works alike are embodiments of his revolutionary philosophy. The question "What has Guillén done?" can be treated critically or philosophically. His life may be regarded as a philosophical act and can be assessed as such.

1. Who is Abraham Guillén?

Despite his relevance to the urban guerrillas in Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil—and to the CIA—he is virtually unknown in the United States and Western Europe. Although

he was one of the most prolific revolutionary writers in Latin America during the 60's, until now none of his major works has been translated into English. Yet Guillén is Latin America's first exponent and systematizer of the strategy and tactics of the urban guerrilla. It is no accident that urban guerrillas have sprung up in Argentina and Uruguay, countries where he has resided, and in neighboring Brazil, where selections from his *Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla* have been translated into Portuguese. If he is most widely known for this particular work, it is because this book was the first to formulate and anticipate the strategy and tactics of the urban guerrillas who in Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil have been making international headlines since at least 1968. A series of successful bank robberies, the kidnapping and ransoming of key government and diplomatic personnel, and the continuing destruction of U.S. industrial plants abroad have made Guillén's revolutionary strategy the principal challenger to Fidelista and Guevarista insurrectionary techniques throughout Latin America.

Like many Spanish exiles, Guillén retained for a long time his Spanish citizenship. In the dining room of his modest apartment in downtown Montevideo he has a plastic table-cover with a full-size map of Spain printed on it. There, over his meals he refights the major battles of the Civil War with his fellow exiles and guests. The strategic and tactical lessons of the defenders of Madrid are spelled out in his *Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla*, while the historical importance of the Spanish Revolution and of the continuing struggle against the Franco dictatorship is developed in four other books specifically directed to the Spanish problem.

Guillén's writings are a reflection of his revolutionary practice. Born on March 13, 1913, of a peasant family in Corduente, Guadalajara, his revolutionary career began with the outbreak of the Civil War (1936–39). He first took part in the urban struggles of the capital against the local military garrisons loyal to Franco. Joining the anarcho-syndicalist Popular Militias, he then marched into the countryside, taking part in two battles at Somosierra and Montes Universales.

When Franco's armies launched their first attack on Madrid, he returned and fought actively in its defense. Later he participated in a series of major battles including those of Jarama, Guadalajara and Brunete, rising from the ranks to become political commissar in the Fourteenth Division and then the Fourth Army Corps.

Because of his defense of Spanish Trotskyists in the anarcho-syndicalist press, Guillén is sometimes represented as a former Trotskyist. Yet Guillén was never a Trotskyist either politically or organizationally, but a neo-Marxist operating within the anarcho-syndicalist National Confederation of Work (CNT) and the Federation of Spanish Anarchists (FAI). From the beginning of his involvement in Spanish politics, he combined the historical and economic method of Marx with the direct action of Bakunin. In the conviction that the socialists and Communists were not Marxists but opportunists, he never joined a self-styled Marxist party. He dissented from the Trotskyists because they refused to enter the CNT, joining instead the socialist General Union of Workers (UGT) because it gave lip service to Marxism. Guillén considered the CNT to be the sole trade-union organization practicing the theory and strategy of class struggle, and the UGT to be bureaucratic and reformist. If only the Trotskyists had joined the CNT, according to Guillén, then the May Movement in Catalonia (1937), which could have been the Spanish October, might have prevailed and spread to other Republican areas.

Rather than being a Trotskyist, Guillén was a partisan of Buenaventura Durruti, whom he still considers to be the greatest representative of Spanish anarchism. For Durruti the direct action of a fistful of men is more creative than the anarchist individualism which, in the sphere of thought, becomes lost in moral utopias and speculation. Among his accomplishments was to end the use of professional gunmen by employers' associations to assassinate anarchist leaders and to break the strikes organized by the CNT. Durruti's tactic was to reply in kind. The employers' association in

Barcelona was notified that both its president and secretary would be killed should professional thugs continue to murder trade-unionists. The warning was not taken seriously, and a few days later both were eliminated by Durruti's men. That ended the regime of hired guns and gave a new impetus to the CNT. Retaliation is one of the techniques recommended by Guillén for the urban guerrilla; another, the use of firepower to provide protective cover for mass demonstrations, strikes, student rebellions, etc.

At the end of the Civil War Guillén was captured by Franco's forces and condemned to death, following which his sentence was commuted to ten years in prison. He escaped from the penitential colony of Añover de Tajo in 1941, but was recaptured. A second escape from the Carabanchel penitentiary in 1945 was successful, following which he spent three years of political exile in France.

In 1948 Guillén emigrated to Argentina. During the Perón era he worked as an editor for *Economía y finanzas* ("Economy and Finance"), published by the Argentine Ministry of Economic Affairs. His contributions to this review, ostensibly written in New York and published under the pseudonym of Jaime de las Heras, had repercussions throughout the Continent, including the Argentine Congress, where his economic analyses came under discussion on several occasions. According to Guillén, the secret services of the United States made inquiries at the Argentine Embassy concerning the identity of Jaime de las Heras, who continued to sign his articles from the sixth floor of the Ministry of Haciendas in Buenos Aires.

Guillén also acquired notoriety as a commentator on international politics. Under the pseudonym of Fernando Molina he was a regular contributor to the Buenos Aires newspaper *El Laborista*. A few days after the announcement of the Prebisch Plan for currency reform decreed in October, 1955, he began a campaign in this newspaper against the monetary devaluation of the Argentine peso and the abolition of foreign-exchange controls, which would have eventuated in a flight

of Argentine capital abroad. Warning against the inflationary and depressive effects of the Prebisch Plan on the Argentine economy, he also published in December of that same year a book against Prebisch's economic proposals that received wide editorial acclaim.

His two-volume work on *The Agony of Imperialism* was published in 1957. This work provided his own agony: he was dismissed from his job and barred from finding other employment as a journalist. Later, in 1960, he was hired as an economic consultant to the Argentine senate. However, he was fired shortly thereafter for having advised the senators to vote against—and they did vote against—a proposed law relaxing the controls on foreign capital in Argentina.

There followed a period in Guillén's life about which the secret services of Argentina have wanted to know more: they say he was the military assessor of the "Uturuncos" (tiger men in Quechua), a guerrilla movement active in Tucumán and Santiago del Estero in northwest Argentina in 1960–61. The Uturuncos *foco* (guerrilla focal point, center of activity or armed nucleus) had been launched by a group of revolutionary Peronistas under the influence of John William Cooke. A consistent partisan of armed struggle and Perón's trusted personal aide and party leader, Cooke had met secretly with Che Guevara and Raúl Castro in Havana in June, 1960, to work out the details of a Perón-Guevara agreement for setting up guerrilla training camps in Argentina. In 1961 Guillén was imprisoned for three months on suspicion of having been a member of the Uturuncos, although the evidence against him was only circumstantial.

After he was released from jail, but still hounded by the Argentine authorities, Guillén sought political asylum in Montevideo in 1962. In that city he made contact with action groups supporting a Fidelista strategy: they wanted to establish an insurrectionary *foco* in the mountains; but in Uruguay there are only hills. Against the Fidelistas, who concluded that Uruguay was unsuited to guerrilla struggles because it was not in the Andes, Guillén argued that topography is only a passive element, that the revolution is made by men,

and that cities are jungles of cement in which the guerrillas are both safer and logistically better supported than in the mountains.

The first edition of his *Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla* appeared in 1966. The Uruguayan police, as well as Uruguay's Movement of National Liberation (the Tupamaros), credit this work with providing the model for urban guerrilla struggles not only in Montevideo but also in neighboring Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Rosário, São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. It is the immediate predecessor of the *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* (1969) by the revolutionary leader of Brazil's Action for National Liberation, Carlos Marighella, who was ambushed and killed by the Brazilian police on November 4, 1969. In the literature covering the Tupamaros, Guillén's book is consistently cited as an alternative to Che's and Debray's rural insurrectionary strategy.

Guillén also authored the Introduction to the Uruguayan edition of Che Guevara's *Guerrilla Warfare*. During a secret interview with Guevara in 1962, he tried to impress upon Che the limitations of a rural insurrectionary strategy and the comparative advantages of urban-based guerrilla warfare. However, the interview ended by sharpening their differences instead of overcoming them.

In Montevideo as in Buenos Aires, Guillén has been harassed by police investigations. In January, 1967, the assistant chief of police in Montevideo warned the editor of the newspaper *Acción*, at which Guillén worked as a journalist, of his nefarious influence and activities. There followed a public exposure of Guillén as a notorious Spanish anarchist. (Although he continues to work for *Acción*, he now writes for it under the pseudonym of Arapey.) In February of the same year he was detained by the police together with the leader of the Paraguayan Resistance Movement, Carlos Caballero Ferreira—previously implicated in a theft of arms destined for the Paraguayan guerrillas—for presumed involvement in a 1964 assault on the Bank of Cobranzas in Llarañaga y San Martín and on suspicion of being a leader of the Tupamaros. Guillén was acquitted, but his oldest son

was convicted and sent to prison for six months because of a direct connection with a Tupamaro cell discovered in December, 1966. The following year Guillén was again detained, this time on the charge of having instructed the Tupamaros, but again for lack of concrete evidence he was released within forty-eight hours.

2. *Influence on the Latin American Revolution*

Guillén is widely acknowledged to be the intellectual mentor of the Tupamaros. It is not surprising that his *Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla* has been found in the Tupamaros' hideouts uncovered by the police. The nonsectarian program of the Tupamaros was anticipated by Guillén: its appeal to the immediate issues and interests of all classes of Uruguayan society except the landowners and big bourgeoisie; its strategic objective of parallel powers, a people's authority, people's justice and people's armed forces; its strategy of giving priority to urban over rural guerrilla warfare. The original core of this movement consisted of some twenty men from the youth section of the Socialist Party and the cane workers. Led and organized by Raúl Sendic, they did not adopt the name "Tupamaros" until August, 1965, and did not have an articulate strategy until the distribution in mimeographed form of "Thirty Questions to a Tupamaro" in 1967. During the "closed doors" stage of preparation for the guerrillas, between Sendic's first assault on the Swiss Colony Rifle Club in July, 1963, and the first armed encounter with the police on December 22, 1966, Guillén participated in joint discussions with Sendic's men and a nucleus of Argentine guerrillas residing in Montevideo. Guillén's contributions to these discussions appeared in published form in his *Theory of Violence* (1965) and *Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla* (1966).

As the first strategist of the urban guerrilla, Guillén has also had a profound influence on the Revolutionary Popular Organization (OPR-33), a guerrilla detachment of the clandestine Uruguayan Anarchist Federation (FAU). This organization consists of anarcho-Marxists with a political line similar in some respects to that of the Tupamaros. Prior to

the publication of his *Theory of Violence*, Guillén was conducting discussion groups with the neoanarchists of the FAU, who control the movement known as Student Resistance and are also closely tied to the trade unions. Unlike the Tupamaros, OPR-33 undertakes only those actions that are directly linked to mass-resistance movements; hence in time it may become more influential than the Tupamaros. Unlike the classical anarchists in Western Europe and North America, the FAU does not make a cult of individual liberty but engages in action for mass liberation. Wildcat strikes under the protection of OPR-33 have met with greater success than the strikes led by the bureaucrats of the Communist-controlled trade unions in Uruguay.

In a letter to me dated May 8, 1972, Guillén acknowledges his influence not only on the Uruguayan guerrillas, but also on the Argentine Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (Tacuara) whose leaders gave military instruction to the Tupamaros and cooperated with them in several joint actions. The former Uruguayan police commissioner and chief of intelligence, Alejandro Otero, acknowledged at a press conference in Montevideo on January 26, 1967, that of all the guerrilla groups operating in the exterior the Tacuara was the most closely linked to the Tupamaros. Although the underground history of the Tacuara has yet to be written, this press conference revealed the following: that Uruguayan extremists had recourse to the direct orientation and active participation of members of the Tacuara, a paramilitary Peronist organization active in Argentina during the early 60's; that the legendary "Joe" Baxter, a Yugoslav-born Argentine and former commander of the semifascist shock troops of the Tacuara, was the leader of the Argentine guerrillas operating in Montevideo; that Baxter was personally responsible for the Tacuara's brusque turn toward the Left and the virtual elimination of its Right wing, captained by Escurra Urriburu; that Baxter directed the assault on October 29, 1963, on the Policlínico Bancario of Buenos Aires from which the Tacuara appropriated 12 million Argentine pesos; that Baxter used part of these funds to travel to Madrid for

an interview with Perón, after which he visited Algeria, Angola, the Congo, Egypt and North Vietnam, ending up in Montevideo, where he shared an apartment with Violeta Setelich, a top member of the Tupamaros; that with three other Argentine members of the Tacuara who had taken refuge in Montevideo, Daniel Rodriguez, Jorge Cataldo and the notorious José Luis Nell, Baxter participated in several "bank expropriations" in Montevideo; and that the Argentine guerrillas were preparing a new strike in conjunction with the Tupamaros when, following a police investigation of an assault on December 22, 1966, their identities became known and they were compelled to disband.

Here it is worth noting Guillén's connections with Joe Baxter. This man, described as "violent" by Police Commissioner Otero, Guillén considers to be another Durruti: a balanced and reflective man without a trace of nervousness. In the course of his political evolution from Left-wing fascism through Guevarism to a species of neo-Trotskyism, he has consistently engaged in direct action, which means that he is a neoanarchist in deed. He collaborated with the Uturunco guerrillas, of which Guillén was the chief military adviser. In 1962 he abandoned the neofascist Tacuara for its pro-Marxist Left wing and participated with Guillén in discussions on the strategy and tactics of the urban guerrilla, first in Buenos Aires and afterward in Montevideo. Subsequently, he went to Havana and undertook a course of guerrilla training there. He visited China with several comrades, returning to Montevideo in 1964, where his group collaborated with the Tupamaros in a number of coordinated actions.

Tacuara was the first urban guerrilla organization in Argentina. It had the backing of the Peronista labor movement and also Perón's personal support. In a letter to the party newspaper *Compañero*, Perón exhorted the MNR (Tacuara) to unleash a revolutionary war of liberation. In a subsequent letter dated May 1, 1968, to Baxter's companions who had been captured and sentenced to long terms for their role in the 1963 holdup, he offered a personal tribute and expressions of solidarity. The indictment and imprisonment of Ta-

cuara's leading militants, however, effectively broke the back of the organization in Buenos Aires. Patricio Pueyrredón, the national secretary of the movement, stated in a press conference published in *La Razón* (Buenos Aires, June 19, 1965) that Tacuara was the only paramilitary organization then in operation in Argentina; but the evidence indicates that it continued to be active mainly in Montevideo.

After escaping from Uruguay, Baxter was reputed to have settled in Cuba. However, a Reuters dispatch of March 27, 1972, read: "Argentine police today issued the names of three men and a woman wanted in connection with the kidnapping of Fiat executive Oberdan Sallustro. . . . A police communiqué named: José Baxter. . . ."

Since the abduction of Sallustro was the work of the Trotskyist-affiliated People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), Baxter is now evidently collaborating with the Argentine Trotskyists. The ERP is the nucleus of a proletarian army organized and led by the Revolutionary Worker's Party (PRT)—the Argentine section of the Trotskyist Fourth International (United Secretariat) directed by Ernest Mandel, Pierre Frank and Livio Maitan. The ERP came into being following a resolution to engage in armed struggle approved at the party's fifth Congress in July, 1970. Designed not merely as an armed detachment of the party, the ERP is closer to being a mass organization or nucleus of the people in arms. The PRT has a maximum program requiring the establishment of socialism in Argentina; the ERP is limited to a minimum program that is anti-imperialist, antioligarchical and democratic. Although political commissars from the PRT provide the political direction of the various commandos of the ERP, they do not always provide the military direction. Nonetheless, the possibilities of conflict between the political and military leaders of the guerrillas is minimized because all the party militants are incorporated into armed units and directly involved in making both political and military decisions.

It is no accident that of all the armed vanguards now active in Argentina, the ERP is closest to representing Guillén's strategy of the people in arms. In one of its first published

documents, "What is the People's Revolutionary Army and How was it Born?" (1970), even the wording is Guillén's: "We believe we have surmounted the contradiction between city and countryside; we think that the struggle will occur in all parts. The important, decisive factor is man, not the terrain." This document also shares with Guillén a commitment to the mass character of the urban guerrillas as opposed to the elitist character of the insurrectional *foco*. To raise the level of a revolutionary war to that of a people in arms, it proposes the organization and mobilization of the masses for civil war. The ERP has attempted to assimilate the revolutionary strategy not only of Lenin and Trotsky, but also of Mao, Ho Chi Minh, General Giap, Che Guevara and, most recently, Carlos Marighella and the Tupamaros.

Unlike most guerrilla movements in Latin America, it favors armed actions that have a direct rather than indirect impact on the workers. Among its most daring and important actions were the May, 1971, kidnapping of Stanley Sylvester, general manager of Swift in Rosario who also served as the British consul, and the March, 1972, kidnapping of Oberdan Sallustro, general director of Fiat in Buenos Aires. Both actions were in support of major strikes against these companies. Thus Sylvester was exchanged for the following concessions: the rehiring of all suspended workers; reimbursement for lost wages; a relaxation of production norms; an improvement in personnel relations; and the distribution in nearby workers' neighborhoods of food, clothes and schoolbooks valued at sixty thousand dollars. Sallustro was promised a commuted death sentence in exchange for similar concessions: the rehiring of workers who had been fired and the distribution to poor children of a million dollars' worth of school supplies. The management of Swift complied; but in keeping with a policy established by former dictator Juan Carlos Onganía, the Argentine government forbade Fiat from settling matters on the ERP's terms.

Although the Tacuara is extinct, Guillén's influence is clearly visible in the strategy, if not the program, of other Argentine guerrillas inspired by the Peronista-Fidelista line

of John William Cooke and his wife, Alicia Eguren. Baxter's group is the immediate predecessor of these organizations. Both the Montoneros and the Peronist Armed Forces (FAP) trace their origin to the movement of national liberation starting in 1955, when Perón was deposed by a military coup and his followers organized clandestine groups. In interviews with guerrilla leaders published in the Cuban Party newspaper *Granma* (December 10 and 13, 1970), both organizations credit the Uturuncos with one of the first attempts at revolutionary armed struggle. Along with other examples of armed action, FAP cites the assault of Baxter's men on the Policlínico Bancario of Buenos Aires in 1963. Several months before the Tupamaros executed Dan Mitrione, an alleged agent of the CIA, the Montoneros kidnapped and executed in June, 1970, Argentina's ex-president Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, who was heading a broad political coalition hoping to assure for him a second presidency. FAP publicly supported his execution for past crimes against the Argentine people, specifically for having signed the death warrants of twenty-seven prominent Argentines who in 1956 plotted with General Juan José Valle to put Perón back in power. Both FAP and the Montoneros have close connections with the Argentine trade unions and are currently working toward social as well as national liberation, with socialism as their ultimate objective.

Among other activist movements in Argentina that have adopted Guillén's strategy of the urban guerrilla, the most important are the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) and the Argentine Liberation Forces (FAL), both Marxist-Leninist rather than Peronist in perspective and derivation. FAL, whose cadres were initially formed as early as 1962, did not begin the armed struggle until 1968. It is the most doctrinaire or sectarian of the Argentine guerrillas, committed as it is to a specifically Marxist-Leninist program and a direct struggle for socialism as the only viable solution to Argentina's problems. Nonetheless, Guillén has indirectly shaped its strategy: its commandos have publicly stated that the urban form will predominate, although the struggle in the country-

side is also indispensable. FAR, which is deliberately patterned on the Tupamaros, is of more recent formation. In clandestine circles its members used to be known as "Che's men," because they began as a group preparing for Che's Bolivian campaign. Proceeding initially from the premise of military training for waging rural guerrilla war, by 1969 they had adopted the Tupamaros' strategy of urban partisan warfare. The seizure of the town of Garín with 30,000 inhabitants on July 30, 1970, was a military action modeled on the Tupamaros' seizure of the city of Pando on October 8, 1969. Like the Tupamaros, FAR concentrates on bank expropriations, and since the execution of Dan Mitrione in September, 1970, it has begun to apply revolutionary justice to persons responsible for torturing and murdering guerrillas. Thus, in a joint communiqué with the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), FAR assumed responsibility for the execution in April, 1972, of General Juan Carlos Sánchez, chief of the Second Army Corps. Although politically less articulate than the Tupamaros, it is committed to the same objective: winning the population through political-military operations in support of popular demands.

Guillén's impact on the Brazilian guerrillas is likewise of first importance. Brazil's two principal guerrilla movements during the 60's, Action for National Liberation (ALN) and Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (VPR), received international notoriety because of a series of spectacularly successful kidnappings in 1969-70 of diplomatic personnel, who were used as hostages in exchange for captured guerrillas, imprisoned labor leaders and other political dissidents against the military dictatorship. Burke Elbrick, the U.S. ambassador, was kidnapped by the ALN in September, 1969; Japanese consul Okuchi was kidnapped by the VPR in March, 1970; German ambassador Von Holleben was kidnapped in a combined action by ALN-VPR in June, 1970; and Swiss ambassador Bucher was kidnapped in another joint action by ALN-VPR in December, 1970.

The respective leaders of these two organizations, Carlos Marighella and the ex-army captain Carlos Lamarca, both

promulgated the thesis that in Brazil the urban struggle must be a preparation primarily for the decisive strategical struggle in the countryside—although Lamarca was ultimately to dissent from Marighella on this matter. Both were familiar with Guillén's handbook on the urban guerrilla, in which in the later as well as earlier editions he makes an exception of Brazil, arguing that revolutionary war is preferably rural there but with its center of gravity in the cities of the River Plate. Not until *The People in Arms: Revolutionary Strategy* (1972), written at the request of Brazilian exiles, does Guillén argue that urban warfare should be given precedence over rural warfare in Brazil, as he had argued earlier for the countries of the Southern Cone (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay).

Concerning his relationship to Marighella, Guillén says in a letter to me dated April 20, 1972:

He began military operations after the publication of the 1st edition of *Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla*. The Brazilian comrades translated selections from this book for Brazilian students and for the guerrillas of Action for National Liberation. Various comrades came to visit me in Uruguay; I had considerable contact with Brazilian exiles following Goulart's fall. For having been translated by the guerrillas, my books were banned in Brazil. It is a matter of public record. Included in the published list of censored books were *Theory of Violence*, *Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla* and *Challenge to the Pentagon*. Marighella and I were personally acquainted: we met in a European country in the early 60's and were together approximately one month. We were on close terms, but he was a Maoist and I was not. He used the *Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla*, as did Joe Baxter and other Argentine guerrillas: it was this book that gave a new variation to revolutionary strategy in opposition to the rural-mountain strategy of Che and Fidel, and likewise Mao.

With respect to Guillén's connections to Carlos Lamarca, he writes in the same letter:

Marighella favored the creation of an axis of combined mountain and urban struggles along the entire length of the route from Rio to São Paulo. Along this axis Captain Lamarca

went into action. He made more use of my writings than Marighella, because he acknowledged that the liberation of a given zone is impossible when the army can evacuate it. He said this and then fell in the rural struggle, having violated the strategy of the urban guerrilla. He triumphed in São Paulo, but was defeated in the countryside.

And in a follow-up letter dated May 8, 1972:

He was one of those who knew my writings best. The Brazilian exiles from his group told me in Montevideo that extracts from the *Theory of Violence*, *Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla* and *Challenge to the Pentagon* were mimeographed for distribution by Lamarca's organization. Also, on another occasion in Montevideo, I was consulted by personal envoys of Lamarca concerning the strategy and tactics to be used in Brazil.

A short time before his death in September, 1971, Lamarca published a piece entitled "Tribune of Debates on the Guerrilla" that, among other things, defended the thesis that the Brazilian guerrilla must follow a combined urban and rural struggle, which precludes the strategy of encircling the cities from the countryside and also that of an urban mass insurrection. Although still persuaded that the weakest link of the system was in the countryside, he specifically rejected the strategy of a rural guerrilla column as the catalyst of mass uprisings, as the embryo of a revolutionary army and as the chief agency for liberating a given territory. In isolation from the urban guerrillas, the rural mobile column is not a viable military strategy; to be effective, it must be integrated within a broader strategy of combined warfare. Each political region in Brazil should have its own integrated urban and rural strategy, he argued, combining various forms of struggle, including a mobile column in regions with dense forests or mountainous terrain, but not otherwise. In any case, Lamarca held that each mobile column should be regionally integrated with its own urban guerrillas and that each should be recruited from inhabitants within its own area. Contrary to Marighella's thesis, urban guerrillas within a given territory should not themselves prepare to wage rural warfare, but should

strengthen their own urban apparatus and leave the recruitment of rural forces to politicized peasants who have been won over for this purpose. This combined strategy, which shows the influence on Lamarca of Guillén's *Theory of Violence* and *Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla*, integrates regional bases (the intent of so-called liberated zones) with urban struggles in the same political territory—a brilliant conception which the various Colombian guerrillas (FARC, EPL, ELN) have used to great advantage. Finally, Lamarca takes specific exception to Marighella's distinction between strategic and tactical areas (the strategic area of the countryside and the tactical area of the city), arguing that combined warfare requires a broader vision of both strategy and tactics as a function of the conditions peculiar to each political region.

The major newspapers in Latin America have been reporting on Guillén's influence on the urban guerrilla since at least 1967. In October of that year the Argentine *La Prensa* and the Uruguayan *Marcha* noted the official condemnation, seizure and burning by Argentine authorities of Guillén's *Dialectic of Politics*, which suffered the same fate as his *Theory of Violence* and *Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla*. In an article by Herminio Portell-Vilà in the Costa Rican *La Nación* (August 6, 1969), there is a report on a continental subversive plan stemming from Montevideo in the name of an "International Revolutionary Central Committee," a plan to launch urban guerrilla struggles in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela along the lines recommended in Guillén's *Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla*. In a July, 1970, editorial, the Colombian *El Tiempo* of Bogotá reported that Manuel Marulanda, chief of the Communist-organized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), had gone to Moscow for consultations concerning the tactics for converting the armed struggle in that country into the kind of urban operation promulgated by Abraham Guillén and Carlos Marighella. And in a long report in *Arriba* (Madrid, June 14, 1970) from its special correspondent in Buenos Aires, there was a feature article on "El Guillenismo" as the theory and practice of the urban

guerrilla, as the most recent and dangerous form of subversion in Latin America and as the principal successor to the revolutionary theories of Mao, Guevara and Debray.

3. Relation to Che Guevara

In his biography of Che Guevara, Daniel James shows how the Argentine's *Guerrilla Warfare*, his main theoretical work, bears a striking affinity to Sergei Nechayev's *Catechism of the Revolutionary*. Both were revolutionary "Jesuits," for whom the revolutionary is governed by a single all-absorbing passion—to make the revolution. In Chapter I of *Guerrilla Warfare* Che accepts the characterization of the guerrilla as a "Jesuit of war" and in Chapter II makes another priestly analogy also reminiscent of Nechayev:

As the conscious element of the popular vanguard, the guerrilla fighter must display a moral conduct that does credit to a true priest of the reform which he seeks to make. To the austerity imposed by the difficult conditions of war, he must add the austerity born of a rigid self-control which precludes even a single excess, a single slip, no matter if circumstances may permit it. The guerrilla must be an ascetic.

Like a priest, he must win converts by being an example to others; even more, he must be ready to endure any sacrifice including his life in the effort to overcome human oppression and exploitation. Again, in "Socialism and Man in Cuba," Che acknowledges the duties of the revolutionary toward himself in almost the same words as Nechayev:

The leaders of the revolution bear children who do not learn to say father with their first stammers; wives who must be part of the general sacrifice of one's life in order to carry the revolution forward to its realization; the circle of their friends is limited strictly to comrades of the revolution. There is no life outside it.

Because of Bakunin's close association with Nechayev, his temporary adherence to a Jesuitical dictatorship of the Blanqui type, his secret brotherhood and conspiratorial activities within the First International, the internal rules he wrote for

the International Brotherhood and his call for an "invisible collective dictatorship" in flagrant violation of his anarchist professions, Bakunin has been widely credited with having written the notorious Catechism attributed to Nechayev. Whether the author or not, Bakunin forswore his early Blanquism in "The Program of the International Brotherhood," likewise written in 1869, and strongly opposed the revolutionary Jacobinism or elitism of Nechayev and Tkachev. If there is anyone Che resembled, it is not Nechayev but Bakunin. Inspired by national liberation movements, Bakunin tried to create "two, three, many Polands" as Che afterwards tried to foment "two, three, many Vietnams." Like Che, Bakunin was a revolutionary outside his own country, an internationalist who personally directed armed uprisings or otherwise associated in preparing insurrections in Bohemia (1849), Germany (1849), Poland (1863), France (1870) and Italy (1874). He was the inveterate enemy of the three major autocracies of his time: the Tsarist Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Kingdom of Prussia. Because of the many and obvious parallels, there is reason to believe that Che recognized in Bakunin his nineteenth-century equivalent. Otherwise, why in the midst of the Bolivian campaign would Che have entered in his diary on July 24, 1967, the reference to himself as a "new Bakunin"?

Considering Guillén's intellectual debt to Bakunin, it would be surprising were he not to have commented on his relation to Che Guevara. His differences with Che's revolutionary strategy are spelled out in his Introduction to the Uruguayan edition of Che's *Guerrilla Warfare* and in a chapter on the "Theory of the Insurrectional Foco" in *Challenge to the Pentagon*. In the latter work, Guillén makes a special point of distinguishing his intellectual differences with Guevara from his appreciation of Che's heroic and romantic personality and accomplishments as a revolutionary. In an autobiographical sketch on the book's cover he says that Marx is the economist whom he most admires, that Bakunin is the most exemplary revolutionary, that the most practical man of action is Fidel Castro and that the hero of our times is

Che Guevara. Moreover, Guillén supports Che's continental strategy, an internationalist response to the predicament of the Cuban Revolution blockaded by the U.S. and isolated from contacts with the mainland.

In *Imperialism of the Dollar* Guillén had characterized the Cuban Revolution as the initial spark which set the entire Latin American prairie on fire and as the revolutionary Mecca through which with minor variations all the Latin American movements of national and social liberation must pass. Today, however, Cuba's leaders are confronted with a set of problems different from those of the original July 26 Movement. The problems are no longer how to acquire support from the urban workers and petty bourgeoisie or how to divide the enemies of the revolution and undercut them one by one. Because of Cuba's lack of energy resources, the overall unreliability of Soviet economic and military aid and her desperate need to break the U.S. economic blockade, the Cuban Revolution in Guillén's judgment is doomed unless it succeeds in shifting the focus of struggle to the mainland of Central and South America. Cuba needs petroleum in order to maintain her political independence of the Soviet Union, and she needs freedom to trade with friendly instead of hostile countries on the mainland. Either the Cuban Revolution becomes internationalized through the spreading of guerrilla wars to the rest of the continent and the progressive socialization of other Latin American countries, Guillén concludes, or Cuba can be expected to go the way of the Mexican, Guatemalan and Bolivian revolutions by again becoming a dependency of the United States.

The continental strategy elaborated by Che to meet this particular problem was in fact anticipated by Guillén in his *Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla*. Compare, for example, what Guillén says in Chapter II of this work with Che's strategy presented a year later in his *Message to the Tricontinental* (April 16, 1967):

GUILLÉN: While the North American army in Asia is held down by one foot and hand, Latin America must seize the other foot and hand until it lets go its

prey from direct investments, from its humiliating diplomacy and its invasions in the style of Santo Domingo.

GUEVARA: America, a forgotten continent in the last liberation struggles, is now beginning to make itself heard through the Tricontinental; in the voice of the vanguard of its peoples, the Cuban Revolution, it now has a task of much greater relevance: creating a Second or a Third Vietnam, or the Second and Third Vietnam of the world.

GUILLÉN: The peoples of Latin America must have an heroic sense of life; they must abandon a decadent and flimsy nationalism (the province as a false nation); . . . they must cease to be Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean, Peruvian, Paraguayan, etc., in order to become militant soldiers for a unique cause: the union of Latin America against imperialism, feudalism and militarism; in short, they must employ the strategy of revolutionary war in the metropolises, the countryside and the mountains on a Latin American scale.

GUEVARA: And let us develop a true proletarian internationalism with international proletarian armies. . . . To die under the flag of Vietnam, of Venezuela, of Guatemala, of Laos, of Guinea, of Colombia, of Bolivia, of Brazil—to name only a few scenes of today's armed struggle—would be equally glorious and desirable for an American, an Asian, an African, even a European.

GUILLÉN: Confronted by the continental army of repression directed by the Pentagon with the support of the Latin American pretorian forces, one has to create a popular Latin American army of liberation, a central Latin American trade union organization and a multistate party for the liberation of Latin America. Without a continental strategy to expel imperialism and liquidate the oligarchies, the Latin American people are incapable of liberating a single country from their pretorians, the landed aristocracy and yanqui monopolies.

GUEVARA: We must bear in mind that imperialism is a world system, the last stage of capitalism—and it must be defeated in a world confrontation.

Several years before Che made a name for himself as a revolutionary, Guillén was elucidating the central theme of a Second Latin American War of Independence against the phoenician colonies of the United States in Latin America. The domestic struggle of Latin Americans against their native oligarchies and repressive military forces was interpreted as requiring a corresponding struggle against the economic enclaves of the United States. The United States can be expected to intervene in support of its interests, utilizing against the popular forces the destructive potential at its command. Yet for every Santo Domingo, one may anticipate an opposite reaction in the form of new insurrectionary movements elsewhere in the continental chain of U.S. dependencies. War between the two Americas is a recognized possibility in Guillén's judgment, with the ultimate defeat of the United States as the likely outcome. Deprived of its Latin American commonwealth, the U.S. would face an absolute deterioration in its standard of living combined with increased unemployment to the critical point. Only then, Guillén believes, will North American workers be awakened from their political lethargy and forced, if only to protect their hard-won living standards, to take the road of social revolution. This argument is presented briefly in the Introduction to his *Imperialism of the Dollar*, in Chapter IV of his *Dialectic of Politics* and again in the fourth chapter of *Challenge to the Pentagon*.

We have noted the similarities between Guillén's strategy for a continental revolution and that of Che Guevara. Yet the differences between them are just as outstanding. In his *Message to the Tricontinental* Che presents the following dilemma for Latin America: either a socialist revolution through armed struggle or a make-believe revolution tantamount to increased dependency on the United States. There is no third alternative. Guillén, however, insists on a distinction between the national and social revolutions, between a

Second Latin American War of Independence and a Latin American Socialist Revolution. Because of its advanced technology and polarization of classes into a bourgeoisie and proletariat, the United States has only to lose its Latin American commonwealth, Guillén argues, and it will be closer to making the successful transition to socialism than its Latin American neighbor. In other words, Guillén does not foresee, as did Che, the effective identity of the national liberation struggle and socialist revolution throughout Latin America. Accordingly, the strategical problem for Guillén is the union of the great majority of Latin Americans against their landed oligarchs and national bourgeoisie, not on the basis of a doctrinaire program for achieving socialism, but rather for the common purpose of economic independence from the United States.

Che's strategy of continental confrontation differs significantly from that of Guillén. In his *Message to the Tricontinental* he discounts the indigenous bourgeoisie as having lost all interest in or capacity for opposing imperialism. Throughout his writings he uses the expressions "bourgeoisie" and "middle class" interchangeably, which effectively excludes the petty bourgeoisie from the role of potential ally of the revolution. As early as his October, 1960, "Notes for the Study of the Ideology of the Cuban Revolution" and his April, 1961, "Cuba: Historical Exception or Vanguard of the Anticolonial Struggle," Che interprets the bourgeoisie as fearing the socialist outcome of national liberation movements even more than unequal competition with U.S. corporations. The result, according to Che, is a polarization of classes that has narrowed the potential allies of the proletariat to the peasantry and a section of the intelligentsia, with the further result that, since the Cuban Revolution, there is no longer any distinction of importance between national liberation struggles and socialist revolution.

In marked contrast, Guillén contends that the national, as distinct from the social, revolution in Latin America depends for success on the broadest possible coalition, representing politically as much as 80 percent of the population. It must

avoid the formulations of a monolithic political ideology; it must seek the support not only of workers, peasants and intellectuals, but also of the petty bourgeoisie and the new professional middle class inclusive of bureaucratic workers, students and segments of the Catholic clergy. Ideologically, the movement for Latin American liberation must be able to include anarchists and libertarian socialists at one extreme and dedicated Christians at the other, i.e., all groups which have liberated themselves politically from yanqui imperialism and the international representatives of the Soviet bureaucracy. Only in the advanced countries are there only two basic classes confronting each other: the proletariat and bourgeoisie. Under such conditions the only possible revolution is a socialist one. But in Latin America there are, following Guillén's analysis, five clearly demarcated classes: the proletariat, peasantry, middle class, big bourgeoisie and large landowners. There the struggle takes the form of three classes against two: the exploited workers, peasants and middle class against the exploiting bourgeoisie and landowners supported by yanqui imperialism. Furthermore, the revolutionary potential of the lower strata of the national bourgeoisie cannot be discounted altogether, at least not in individual cases. In a nutshell, this is the substance of Guillén's strategy of national liberation presented at the beginning of Chapter III and toward the end of Chapter VI of *Challenge to the Pentagon*.

Che had such an inflated opinion of the role of the guerrilla that he grossly underestimated the tactical importance of the day-to-day urban struggles of workers for improved working conditions, higher wages, full employment, etc. In a posthumous essay on the "Tactic and Strategy of the Latin American Revolution" written in 1962 but first published in the Cuban Army's *Verde Olivo* in 1968, Che argues that the progressive forces of some Latin American countries have confused tactical and strategical objectives: small tactical gains are mistaken for great strategical ones; people prepare during a whole year to achieve small victories at enormous sacrifices, victories that are exposed to the enemy's artillery and can be snatched away at any moment. Among those vic-

tories reputed to be virtually worthless, he includes the right to strike, an increase in wages, a democratic constitution and the liberation of a popular hero—demands which, according to Guillén, have a revolutionary potential under conditions of a political or economic crisis as in Paris 1968. The occupation of factories, demonstrations by the unemployed, the demand for the dismissal of an unpopular minister and a worker-student strike have more revolutionary significance for Guillén than preparing an insurrectional *foco* and going into the mountains.

Guillén agrees with Che concerning the disastrous consequences of confusing strategical with tactical objectives. However, he is far from dismissing the gains from legally based strikes and political coalitions. As long as workers refuse to be seduced by temporary gains, Guillén claims, it is possible to play the treacherous game of politics and still rely on armed action and an extraparliamentary opposition. Since strategy has as its objective the combination of individual and isolated encounters for the purpose of ultimate victory, it must weave together different kinds of tactics, legal as well as illegal, economic and political as well as military. Military considerations must be subordinated to political objectives. Thus Guillén takes issue with Che's armed strategy: first, the reliance on a favorable terrain rather than a favorable population for waging guerrilla actions, for provisioning and concealing the guerrillas, etc.; and second, the encirclement of the cities from the countryside rather than the subversion of the countryside by the cities.

Only since Guevara's death has the strategy of the urban guerrilla rapidly displaced that of rural-based guerrilla warfare, becoming by 1970 the principal strategy of revolutionary movements in Latin America. By the end of that year *Granma*, the official organ of the Communist Party of Cuba, was giving more coverage to the urban guerrillas in Argentina and Uruguay than to news of the rural guerrillas in Colombia and Venezuela. The change in the Cuban assessment of urban guerrilla warfare may have begun as early as June, 1969, with the publication in the *Tricontinental* of

Marighella's *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*. Yet in his *Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla*, Guillén had already anticipated by several years this change in insurrectionary strategy, based on his studies of the revolutionary seizure of Petrograd (1917), the defense of Madrid (1936) and the battle for Santo Domingo (1965).

In an interview published in Aznarez and Cañas' *Tupamaros: The Fracaso of Che?*, Guillén acknowledges his unique role as the theoretician of urban guerrilla warfare in opposition to Che Guevara's role of theoretician par excellence of guerrilla strategy in the countryside. He holds that only in the rare cases in which the rural population amounts to 75 percent or more of the total population, as in Vietnam, does Che's strategy promise success. In Cuba a strategy of rural guerrilla warfare was successful only because it worked in conjunction with urban guerrilla war where, incidentally, most of the casualties occurred. In the Southern Cone of Latin America, where the urban population represents approximately the same percentage of the total population as in the United States and Canada, Guillén's strategy comes close to representing the actual strategy of the Tupamaros and kindred guerrilla movements. Considering the influence of the Tupamaros' organizational model on the Quebec National Liberation Front and on the Black Panthers and Weathermen in the U.S., there is reason to believe that, unlike Che's revolutionary strategy, Guillén's is relevant to insurrectionary struggles in economically advanced as well as underdeveloped countries. Although these movements experienced a revolutionary recession in 1971 (during which both Pierre Vallières and Huey Newton called for a return to legal methods), as long as the U.S. and Canadian governments continue to support a policy of internal neocolonialism one may count on a resurgence of urban guerrilla warfare and the dissemination of "Guillenismo" in North as well as Latin America.

4. The Meaning of "Guillenismo"

We can define "Guillenismo" in terms of Guillén's answers to the fundamental questions he raises. Since his first work

appeared in 1952 he has published more than twenty books. These volumes cover two continuous but distinguishable periods. During the first and longest, stretching from 1952 through 1964, Guillén was preoccupied with economic and political analyses of the effects of U.S. imperialism and native oligarchies on the destiny of Hispano-America. In his own judgment, his most important and original contribution to this subject was *The Agony of Imperialism*, a work mainly of economic analysis whose bearing on specific Latin American countries was further developed in his *Imperialism of the Dollar*. The works of this first period, which cover the area of the philosophy of contemporary history, were all published in Buenos Aires and correspond closely to the phase of his Argentine exile.

Guillén's major intellectual contribution during these years was the elucidation of his central theme of a Second Latin American War of Independence—the anticipation of a coming war between the Americas in response to U.S. satellization, military dictatorships supported by the Pentagon, national deterioration and the protracted economic and political crisis in Latin America since World War II. The titles of his major works are implicitly addressed to the question "What is happening in the world?": *The Destiny of Hispano-America*, *The Oligarchy in the Crisis of the Argentine Economy*, *The Agony of Imperialism*, *Imperialism of the Dollar*, *The Economic Dilemma of Latin America*, *The Rebellion of the Third World*, *The Critical Decade of Latin America* and a work in progress, *The Uneven Development Between the Two Americas*. Several of these were written after 1964, indicative of Guillén's continued interest in the theoretical problems posed in his early writings.

Following Guillén's analysis, the Second Cuban Revolution of 1960–61 broke the first link in the chain of U.S. domination in Latin America. Since then, national liberation movements have mushroomed in almost every Latin American republic in response to economic stagnation and political repression. In view of the objective debilitation or agony of U.S. imperialism resulting from various old and new international antagonisms, the time is approaching for a con-

tinental war of liberation that will achieve unity for the fragmented Latin American nation against U.S. efforts to maintain the status quo of Balkanization. The objective and subjective conditions of Latin American independence, Guillén argues, are tied to the struggle for economic sovereignty—one which cannot be permanently deferred. Moreover, the struggle for national liberation is also a struggle for social liberation from a native oligarchy which retards the expansion of the productive forces through its obsolete system of land tenure and collusion with North American economic, political and military interests.

Underlying Guillén's thesis of a Second Latin American War of Independence is a theory of the economic and political antagonisms between the two Americas developed on the basis of his dialectic of economics and subsequent *Dialectic of Politics*. In the confrontation U.S./Latin America, Guillén investigates the objective antagonisms tending to undermine the international status of U.S. imperialism: (1) interimperialist rivalries; (2) the struggle between labor and capital; (3) the hostilities between the imperialist or neo-imperialist powers and their dependencies in the Third World; and (4) the antagonism between the capitalist and socialist camps. The upshot of Guillén's investigations is that U.S. imperialism has been weakened by the revival of interimperialist rivalries since World War II, notably by economic competition with Japan and the European Economic Community and by the mounting rebellion of the underdeveloped countries against Western neocolonialism as well as traditional forms of imperialism. Yet the agony of U.S. imperialism has been deferred: first, because the generous margin of bargaining made possible by U.S. superprofits abroad has led to a temporary moratorium on violent confrontation between labor and capital in the United States; second, because the nuclear stalemate in the arms race has encouraged a policy of peaceful coexistence between different economic systems.

Guillén also considers two additional kinds of antagonism as yet unexamined by Marxist-Leninists: (1) intersocialist antagonisms; and (2) intrasocialist antagonisms. The basis

of intersocialist antagonisms lies not only in Soviet military and political imperialism, Guillén argues, but also in the economic gap between developed and underdeveloped socialist countries, a gap which makes the difference in standards of living between the U.S.S.R. and China comparable to that between North and South America. Furthermore, he discovers that the basis of intrasocialist antagonisms lies in the emergence of a new ruling and exploiting class in the socialist countries, the technobureaucracy which excludes the workers from managing their own enterprises. On the one hand, these internal and external divisions in the socialist camp have weakened it in relation to the West. On the other hand, Guillén argues, they have helped to challenge bureaucratic rule, to extend the scope of self-management, to internationalize the revolution and to give a new impetus to labor militancy in the United States. The outcome of a Second Latin American War of Independence is a function of these other variables, which are leading to a confrontation with U.S. imperialism and to a showdown in the critical decades ahead.

During the 50's and early 60's Guillén was recognized primarily as an economic and political analyst within the neo-Marxist tradition. Even so, his first book on *The Destiny of Hispano-America* as well as *The Agony of Imperialism* and *Imperialism of the Dollar* devotes at least a chapter or sections of several chapters to military analyses of the strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare as adapted to the conditions specific to different Latin American countries and to the continent as a whole. The *Dialectic of Politics*, his most important political treatise, was not published until 1967. This book and the several economic works written after 1967 indicate that, far from coming to an end, the theoretical concerns of this first period have remained with him to this day.

Nonetheless, Guillén's *Theory of Violence* (1965) marks the beginning of a new intellectual phase in which his continuing interest in economic and political analysis is supplemented by increasing attention to studies of a specifically

military nature. With the publication of this work his research on the economic and political confrontation between the two Americas acquired a strongly activist as well as military dimension. His *Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla* brought him more fame and notoriety than any other work, for having supplanted or otherwise transformed the revolutionary strategies of Mao, Guevara and Debray in a number of Latin American countries, notably Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil.

In contrast to Marighella's *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, Guillén's book is the manual of the urban guerrilla. It was followed by *Challenge to the Pentagon* (1969), also a handbook on urban partisan warfare. Marighella favored a strategy of combined urban and rural guerrillas with strategic emphasis on the role of the rural mobile column. This strategy resembled in important respects that already developed by Guillén in his *Theory of Violence* in which he had not yet given strategic precedence to the urban struggle. A second, unpublished edition of his work contains a new concluding chapter called the "Strategy of the Latin American Revolution" (1970), which brings it into line with his *Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla*. With the single exception of his *Theory of Violence*, which constitutes a bridge between his theory and practice, all of Guillén's works during this second period were published in Montevideo and correspond to the phase of his Uruguayan exile.

Guillén's philosophy of action constitutes an implicit response to the question "What can be done?" But there is more than one context in which this problem has revolutionary significance: (1) prior to the seizure of power; (2) after the seizure of power. Prior to the seizure of power there is the problem of assessing different roads to power, e.g., the comparative effectiveness of electoral politics (peaceful co-existence), mass insurrection (the general strike) and guerrilla warfare in its manifold versions (the party in arms, the insurrectional *foco* and urban partisan warfare). This was Guillén's major preoccupation from 1965 through 1969. With the publication of *Direct Democracy* (1970), however, his interest shifted to questions concerning the ways power may be

deployed once a national liberation movement is successful. This book was followed shortly by *The Socialism of Self-Management* (1972), another contribution to strategy and tactics during the period of the construction of socialism.

Guillén continues to write on problems of military strategy and is currently working on a new book, *The People in Arms: Revolutionary Strategy*, that will include relevant material on the guerrilla struggles in Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala and Brazil. One may also expect more from Guillén on strategy and tactics after the seizure of power. Another book in progress, *Neo-Marxism and Direct Action*, for example, continues to develop the theme of libertarian socialism through self-management. However, he has yet to make a critique of the bureaucratic content of the decentralizing reforms in Eastern Europe, notably Yugoslavia, and of the effects of the neo-Stalinist centralization of economic and political power in Cuba.

At the same time, there are signs that Guillén is becoming interested in the intellectual foundations of his philosophy of history and what he calls his philosophy of action predicated upon it. His first significant effort in this direction is in the opening chapters of his *Theory of Violence*. Here his neo-Marxism is systematically presented in opposition to Soviet revisions of Marxism-Leninism. Although this interest is also developed in Chapter VI of his *Dialectic of Politics*, it did not become of fundamental concern until he began writing on the subject of anarcho-Marxism for inclusion in this anthology. In a letter to me dated March 14, 1972, he considers his projected book on *Neo-Marxism and Direct Action* to be one of his most original works, a judgment to which he adds in a letter dated April 20, 1972, that he also expects it to be his most important work.

In the first chapter of this new work Guillén clarifies the foundations of his social and political philosophy in terms of a synthesis of anarchism (direct action, participatory democracy, libertarian socialism or the socialism of self-management) and Marxism (dialectical method, materialist interpretation of history and the analysis of capitalist accum-

ulation through surplus value). This synthesis is supposed to overcome the agony of the various "isms" that have so long divided the protagonists of revolution. These "isms" represent different assessments not only of what is happening in the world and what can be done to change it, but also of the self-liberating as opposed to self-defeating behavior of those whom Guillén classifies within the so-called party of discontent. Directing himself to this group, which comprises a majority of the population in underdeveloped countries, he examines the entire range of revolutionary options, between Marxism at one pole and Bakuninism at the other. In posing the question "What are your revolutionary interests?" he distinguishes the alienated human situation from the unalienated one, self-liberating behavior from self-defeating, our friends from our enemies. Although Guillén has yet to develop his current intellectual interests in precisely these terms, he is in fact engaged in exploring the revolutionary aspects of what the academy has come to call "philosophical anthropology."

Following Lenin, Guillén holds that the strategy and tactics of the vanguard fighter require the most advanced theory or understanding of what is happening in the world. Thus there can be no revolutionary practice without a revolutionary theory. At the same time, the first chapter of *Neo-Marxism and Direct Action* suggests that there can be no viable revolutionary theory without an informed revolutionary purpose predicated on one's objective, and not merely subjective, interests. Here Guillén confronts a relatively unexplored dimension of revolutionary behavior which he has only begun to plumb. Like Che, he is committed to the development of a "new man" and to a corresponding revolution in daily life—once power is seized and all forms of bourgeois property are abolished. Guillén presumes that a complete reconstruction of society can do more to develop man's potentialities than those revolutionary options that stop short of an anti-bureaucratic revolution, the socialism of self-management and the transformation of daily existence. A presumption, however, is not evidence. Accordingly, Guillén is coming to realize the need to reinforce his theory and practice with

knowledge concerning their foundations. Given a particular revolutionary purpose, the fundamental philosophical questions are, first, "Why revolution?" and, second, "Why one revolutionary philosophy rather than another?"

The revolutionary is no more exempt from the need to know himself than anyone else. In fact, self-knowledge is the ultimate warrant of his social theory and practice. Marx may be right that the most difficult and also urgent form of knowledge covers the balance of social forces at any moment, the self-defeating mechanisms undermining the status quo and the strategy and tactics effective at a given time and place. Nonetheless, the answer to whether a particular revolutionary option promises to maximize the balance of benefits over costs depends on self-awareness: the discovery of one's specific class circumstances as well as common human needs; the chances of recovering the self one alienates through objectified human energies; the precise ratio between what one gives to the world in one form and receives in another form; and the choice of a measuring rod or standard for assessing these transactions. In effect, a philosophical anthropology, however rudimentary, is unavoidable for any revolutionary who expects to move masses and build a revolutionary movement. And this accounts for Guillén's interest in the early as well as late writings of Marx, in Marx's theory of alienation as well as exploitation, in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844* as well as *Capital*.

In reviewing Guillén's literary output in the light of the work he is now completing, it is fair to say that his first period (1952–64) was dominated by what he refers to as his neo-Marxism—a concern with applying Marx's dialectical method, materialist conception of history and analysis of capitalism to current events. His second period (1965–) indicates a somewhat different concern with direct action, a preeminently anarchist preoccupation. In short, the influence of Bakunin tends to become paramount, which accounts for Guillén's self-styled neoanarchism. The questions that are now beginning to interest him are somewhat broader. They include the effort to correlate neo-Marxism and neoanarchism in a single

revolutionary philosophy that will help to overcome future divisions within the Left. Anarcho-Marxism is clearly the best covering term for such a philosophy.

5. *What is Anarcho-Marxism?*

Depending on the mixture and the ingredients, there are different varieties of this social and political philosophy. The most significant and enduring one has combined Marx's historical, economic and political analysis of bourgeois society with Bakunin's critique of bureaucracy and strategy for revolution. Lenin was the first to accomplish this tour de force, notably in *What is to be Done?* (1902) and *State and Revolution* (1917). Among other variants of anarcho-Marxism the following have been influential: Trotsky's post-1927 development of Marxism in *The Permanent Revolution* (1930) and *The Revolution Betrayed* (1936); Mao's Marxism joined to a Bakuninist-type peasant insurrectionary strategy and subsequent struggle against the party bureaucracy; the antiauthoritarian Marxism of Rudi Dutschke and Daniel Cohn-Bendit; Marcuse's combination of Marxism with a quasi-anarchist critique of repressive social institutions; and in Latin America Guillén's own variant of anarcho-Marxism.

Marxist philosophy, according to Guillén, anticipates the revolutionary changes of tomorrow by analyzing today's revolutionary potential. It cannot do so by merely contemplating the world; it must investigate the particular agencies of social change and also contribute actively to making the revolution. Abstract contemplation is not the whole of philosophy; without a philosophy of action it serves for nothing. The materialist philosophy of Marx makes thought relevant to action, thereby nourishing the revolutionary potential of the masses. In contrast, the dialectical materialism of Soviet philosophers, consisting of a philosophy of nature rather than society, is a work of contemplation divorced from mundane affairs.

A clue to Guillén's interpretation of Marxism is given in Chapter XVII of *The Rebellion of the Third World*. There he claims that the most important task of philosophy is not to discover the laws of thought, but to prepare ourselves for

action. The end of philosophy is interpreted as the overcoming of economic and social antagonisms. The alternative, he says, is to isolate philosophical study from the market place and to reduce philosophy to a form of intellectual self-alienation.

For Guillén, then, philosophy is the practical as well as the intellectual arm of the revolution. As a cosmovision of the antagonisms of contemporary society in transition to socialism and as the theory of action required to assist and accelerate the emergence of a new social order, philosophy covers the entire intellectual and practical training of the revolutionary: political, economic, strategical and tactical. In the second edition of his *Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla*, Guillén shows in Chapter VI how each of these forms of training contributes to the making of a professional revolutionary. First, the dialectic of politics provides a relevant analysis of existing social classes and the current balance of social forces; it uncovers the basic antagonisms in society and the conditions of social change. Second, economics serves as the basis of a concrete political program designed to win over the masses; it highlights financial manipulations, speculation, corruption, inefficiency and the means of escaping from the structural crises caused by underdevelopment. Third, strategy and tactics combine to make a revolutionary struggle operational under particular historical conditions and at a given time and place.

A Marxist-oriented analysis of the present as history serves Guillén as the basis of his strategy and tactics. On the one hand, he relies heavily on Marx's abstract model of historical materialism and its economic and theoretical elaboration in *Capital*. On the other hand, he argues that Marx's philosophy of action only partly conforms to the results of Marx's historical investigations. It was Bakunin rather than Marx who developed a revolutionary strategy for underdeveloped and semicolonial peoples corresponding to their conditions of national oppression. Consequently, the time has come not only to rescue Marxism from its Soviet distortions, but also to reconcile Marx and Bakunin.

The rationale for supplementing Marx's historical and economic research with Bakunin's contributions to direct action is briefly presented in the Introduction to Guillén's *Dialectic of Politics*. Lacking in Marx's strategy were the measures of direct democracy and workers' self-management required for overcoming bureaucratic exploitation within so-called socialist societies. Marx failed to develop a theory of bureaucratic exploitation, without which his revolutionary practice was perforce incomplete. At least Bakunin acknowledged the exploitation of ordinary workers by managers and office-holders, and squarely faced the problem of wage and salary differentials as symptomatic of the emergence of a bureaucratic, potentially new, ruling class. Actually, Guillén underestimates the significance of Bakunin's critique of bureaucracy. As he concludes in the last chapter of his *Dialectic of Politics*, the social revolution of the second half of the twentieth century requires the historical and economic analysis of Marx, the direct action and personal involvement of Bakunin, plus a third ingredient consisting of the strategy and tactics of revolutionary war—a reference to his own contribution.

Although Guillén belongs historically to the same revolutionary tradition as Bakunin, his anarchism is distinguished by several special features. On balance it contains a heavy dose of Marxism. Unlike other anarcho-Marxist philosophies, his social and political philosophy is weighted on the side of Marxism rather than anarchism. Furthermore, it is formulated within the context of the twentieth-century scientific and technological revolution, the emergence of a postcapitalist society, under conditions in which the anarchist program coincides with the now dominant antibureaucratic struggle in Eastern Europe.

An interesting feature of Guillén's anarcho-Marxism emerges from his references to the flamboyant guerrilla leader of the Popular Militias, Buenaventura Durruti. According to Guillén's account, Durruti accepted discipline in order to seize power, then abandoned it for new social and economic forms. These consisted of collectives and the comanagement

of enterprises by the National Confederation of Work (CNT) and the General Union of Workers (UGT). At the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War socialists and anarchists were united at the workers' own level. Only above them did their Marxist and anarchist leaders attempt to reach a separate agreement with the government to undo what the workers had decided for themselves. An exception among Spanish anarcho-syndicalists, Durruti sided with the rank-and-file workers against their own leaders. Profoundly influenced by Durruti's example, Guillén argues that a highly disciplined organization of professional revolutionaries is first necessary to seize power—a task which the workers' traditional political and trade-union organizations are ill-equipped to do—and that once power is seized, it lies in the workers' interests to establish a system of direct democracy based on workers' councils and committees of self-management.

Guillén's anarcho-Marxism is indebted not only to Marx and Bakunin, but also to Lenin's adaptation of Marx and Bakunin to the epoch of imperialism and national liberation struggles. Although Lenin's anarcho-Marxism is apparent as early as 1902, his reliance on Bakunin is especially evident in the hectic days following his return to Petrograd in April, 1917. Lenin's "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution" (April Theses) has a distinctly Bakuninist ring: the call for a second revolution that would do more than merely consolidate the gains of the first or February Revolution; the critique of "revolutionary defensism" in favor of ending the imperialist war by any means; the struggle to replace the Provisional Government by Soviets of Workers' Deputies as the only possible form of revolutionary government; and the abolition of the bourgeois state, police, army and bureaucracy without waiting for a prolonged phase of capitalist development. It is known that Lenin directly consulted Bakunin's writings on the state and revolution in the course of writing his own *State and Revolution* and that his 1902 sketch of the professional revolutionary emerged from his involvement in revolutionary circles indirectly indebted

to Bakunin. Although the Leninist concept of the vanguard party was partly influenced by Auguste Blanqui, its immediate sources can be traced to Bakunin's Russian followers.

Lenin's anarcho-Marxism also relies heavily on the critique of state and bureaucracy in Marx's *The Civil War in France*, an instance of Marx's reciprocal but unacknowledged intellectual debt to Bakunin. In that work Marx accepts not only Bakunin's critique of bureaucracy, but also the conditions of overcoming it: all offices to be elective, to be revocable at short term and to be performed at workers' wages. The Paris Commune owed more to Bakunin's followers than to Marx's, so that in pledging support to it Marx was indirectly backing Bakunin. Furthermore, in supporting the Commune, Marx also endorsed Bakunin's scheme of freely associated and self-managed producer's cooperatives as opposed to the state socialism defended by Engels in *Anti-Dühring*.

In view of Lenin's anarcho-Marxism, one might expect Guillén to have a greater affinity for Marxism-Leninism than for most Western European interpretations of Marxism. In fact, the first chapter of his *Theory of Violence* begins with a distinction between the living thought of Marx, Engels and Lenin, on one side, and the sacrifice of its revolutionary content to the national and international political exigencies of the Soviet Union on the other. Guillén goes on to show how both the historical theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism are overlaid with, and to that extent emasculated by, the dialectical materialist formulations of Soviet philosophers. Unlike Soviet Marxism, anarcho-Marxism preserves intact the revolutionary core of Marxism against not only its pre-World War I social democratic deformations, which emptied Marxism of its Bakuninist content, but also its post-World War II Khrushchevite and post-Khrushchevite revisions which effectively nullified its Leninist interpretation. Against these two forms of Marxist opportunism Guillén claims that revolutionary Marxism has found its most consistent contemporary exponents in the Spanish anarcho-syndicalists and Chinese Communists, to which he now adds the Yugoslav Communists.

In his *Imperialism of the Dollar* Guillén argues in favor of

Maoism and the Chinese road to socialism as that most suited to underdeveloped colonial and semicolonial countries, especially those with large peasant populations. In contrast, the reform socialism of Khrushchev and his counterparts in Eastern Europe is criticized for being to the Right of traditional social democracy, and the *détente* with U.S. imperialism for being more counterrevolutionary than the Stalinist policy of popular fronts during the 30's and alliance with Anglo-Saxon imperialism during World War II. East European revisionists, according to Guillén, are basically in agreement with Western social democrats in believing that the bourgeois-democratic revolution must be completed before the socialist revolution begins and that violence must be eschewed in favor of electoral coalitions like those entered into by the French and Italian Communist parties. In the final analysis, he conceives of reform socialism as a retreat, as a convergence on Western European neocapitalism and as the surrender of the few remaining centers of proletarian power within the Soviet Union to a new bureaucratic and technocratic ruling class.

Guillén's anarcho-Marxism has enabled him to overcome the sterile polemics dividing the Yugoslav and Chinese Communists. Despite the polemics, there is a common denominator to both Titoism and Maoism in the anarcho-Marxism of Bakunin. Like Lenin, Mao was deeply influenced by anarchist thought. As a student he read pamphlets on anarchism including translations of books by Bakunin and Kropotkin. Before joining the Communist Party, he was closely associated with anarchists in Peking and corresponded with anarchists in other cities. One of his early articles, "A Broad People's Alliance" (1919), supported the political views of anarchists for having a wider appeal and also for being more profound than those of Marxists.

Yugoslavia's self-managed socialism also testifies to Bakunin's influence. First, there is the direct indebtedness of Yugoslav Communists to Svetozar Marković, the father of Balkan socialism. Although Marković supported Marx in the struggle against Bakunin for control of the First International, his support for worker's self-management and a

federation of associated producers in opposition to German state socialism indicates his intellectual debt to Bakunin. Secondly, many Yugoslav Communists who volunteered to fight in Spain received more than combat experience during the Civil War; they also became influenced by the direct democracy and social reforms enacted by Durruti and his Popular Militias. Although Yugoslav Communists continue to stress the unique character of their system of decentralized socialism, it was first extensively applied in Catalonia, not Yugoslavia.

6. *Assessment of Guillén*

The two most important weapons of the revolutionary are the sword and the pen, and Guillén has used both with effect. He has done more than his share as a cultural guerrilla, and at the age of fifty-nine continues to be active as a political and military adviser to national liberation movements. He is the intellectual author of urban guerrillas in Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil, and has contributed directly to training a new generation of revolutionary leaders in those countries. Not without reason was he harassed by the secret services and hounded out of Argentina. And not without reason did President Jorge Pacheco sign a decree for Guillén's expulsion from Uruguay at the time of the presidential elections in November, 1971. Only the ministers of the new government were able to halt the proceedings.

Guillén has paid dearly for his revolutionary activities: a death penalty commuted to ten years' imprisonment, political exile, dismissal from all his jobs in Argentina, three months in Argentine jails, several detentions in Uruguay and intermittent threats to his life. He complains about being attacked weekly in the press and on the radio and about the prospect of being liquidated by Right-wing elements. Nonetheless, he continues to advise the Uruguayan guerrillas and is now instructing political exiles on how to make a revolution in Brazil. Among these, Colonel Jefferson, a friend of Brizola and former chief of a guerrilla movement in Rio Grande do

Sul, was seized en route to Chile by Argentine authorities, turned over to the Brazilian military and sentenced to a long term in prison on several charges including his connections with Guillén.

Emissaries of the Brazilian guerrillas are being advised by Guillén on a variety of matters: to publicize the conflicts of interests of the generals and their ministers who are directors of subsidiaries of U.S. corporations; to exchange hostages not only for detained guerrillas, but also for imprisoned clergy and political prisoners from all political parties; to require the daily press to publicize the revolutionaries' demand for general elections, the restoration of civil rights and a cost-of-living bonus for all workers victimized by inflation. These are issues behind which all democrats can unite in resistance to the dictatorship. Despite personal risks, Guillén continues to work for the restoration of political rights and democracy not only in Brazil but also Argentina and Uruguay, as the first step toward their eventual liberation.

Guillén's strategy of the urban guerrilla has the advantage of avoiding two extremes: the revolutionary elitism and militarism of the Blanquist conspiratorial *foco* as well as the electoral mass politics of the traditional Marxist parties. On the one hand, Debray's interpretation of the insurrectional *foco* in *Revolution in the Revolution?* underestimates the role of the vanguard class and the revolutionary potential of the oppressed masses constituting Guillén's "party of discontent." On the other hand, the traditional Marxist focus on winning the battle for democracy before initiating a social revolution underestimates the need for fire cover and paramilitary protection for strikes, popular demonstrations, etc. As yet there is no clear example of one of these strategies having made a revolution. Fidel's strategy in the Sierra Maestra was not that of a military-political *foco* but of a party in arms; the July 26 Movement was an offshoot of the Orthodox Party of which Fidel had been a congressional candidate in 1952. And the strategy of Allende's government of Popular Unity is not a traditional social democratic one, but rather a popular front

including the paramilitary forces and underground cadres of Chile's Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR); moreover, it has yet to prove itself in practice.

Modeled largely on the actions of the bolsheviks in 1917, Guillén's strategy is especially applicable to a prerevolutionary situation in which none of the existing Marxist-Leninist parties has mass support or is prepared to wage an armed struggle. Under conditions of underdevelopment such as those prevailing in Latin America, a united front of workers and peasants does not suffice for the struggle against imperialism. A broad front of liberation is necessary, consisting of a bloc of at least three classes including the petty bourgeoisie. A political-military vanguard is likewise indispensable, if not a vanguard party. Unlike the Epigones of Trotskyism, Guillén predicates the success of a Latin American revolution not on a vanguard party centered on the trade unions, but on urban guerrillas recruited from virtually all social classes except the oligarchy and middle-sized capitalists. Moreover, unlike those bound to the heritage of the Russian Revolution and to Marxism in a classic European context, Guillén has strong reasons for believing that the New World, not the Old, is today the epicenter of world revolution. Although as yet there are no examples of a successful revolution made with his strategy, it has had considerable tactical successes in Brazil and the Southern Cone.

Guillén's revolutionary strategy is predicated on his understanding of what is happening in Latin America and the world. In view of the North American struggle for unification, the Civil War in defense of the Union, the struggles for German and Italian unification in the nineteenth century and the current struggle for Arab unity, one may reasonably forecast a comparable struggle in Latin America—at least on a regional basis. For the Spanish-speaking countries in South America, all of which border on the Brazilian subcontinent with the exception of Ecuador and Chile, national unity is imperative in order to contain the economic expansion not only of the United States, but also of Brazil—her subimperialist junior partner. Together these Spanish-speaking coun-

tries represent roughly the current population and area of Brazil, whereas alone none is a match for this awakening giant which now has expansionist designs of her own, notably against landlocked Bolivia and Paraguay. This goal of a single Bolivarian republic for the countries of the Southern Hemisphere has served as an inspiration since their First War of Independence a century and a half ago.

Divided, the banana republics of Central America and their sister republics in the Antilles are even less economically viable than the most backward countries in South America. Since a union of the three Antillean and six Central American republics would represent less than half of the population of Mexico and roughly one-third of her land area, without the latter they would still constitute an insignificant economic and political entity. This condition virtually obliges them to unite with Mexico and to seek national sovereignty on the broader basis of a United States of the Caribbean. Without Mexico the struggle to recover British Honduras, not to mention the Canal Zone, might also take several centuries.

Although Guillén anticipates the imminent unification of all Latin America through a single coordinated struggle for independence against U.S. hegemony and native oligarchs in collusion with foreign interests, his projection appears unrealistic. First, because of Brazil's newly acquired role as the chief sponsor of U.S. interests in the Southern Hemisphere, a role that permits her military and civilian bureaucracy to share in the spoils, there is a strong possibility that the Brazilian national liberation struggle may stagnate at the present stage of urban guerrillas. Secondly, the U.S. policy of "divide and conquer" is buttressed by a fundamental difference between Brazil and Hispano-America—a national opposition corresponding to that between Portugal and Spain on the Iberian peninsula. Third, it is unreasonable to expect Latin America to achieve continental unity under conditions far more difficult and complex than the struggle, on a reduced geographical scale, for Iberian unity. Fourth, since for most practical purposes the Caribbean constitutes a U.S. inner sea, the opportunities for a Second War of Independence in this

area are narrowly circumscribed and the likelihood of a "Second Cuba" in the Antilles or Central America is virtually nonexistent. Fifth, as U.S. economic hegemony overseas faces increasing challenges from Third World peoples, its military forces will tend to concentrate on defending the inner circle of the empire rather than the periphery, South America rather than Southeast Asia, but first of all the Caribbean. Sixth, the geopolitical differences between U.S. hegemony over South America and the Caribbean suggest that a national liberation movement, which may very likely begin in the Southern Cone, is unlikely to spread beyond Colombia or Venezuela. Seventh, and in view of the foregoing, it is unreasonable to base a revolutionary strategy on the prospect of a single coordinated Latin American War of Independence; the most likely prospect is a series of discontinuous wars of liberation. Eighth, a Second or Third Latin American War of Independence may be expected to diverge significantly from the First War of Independence, which, coinciding with Napoleon's occupation of Spain, encouraged the colonies to make use of this unique opportunity by waging a common struggle from Argentina as far north as Mexico. Finally, the imminence of a war between the two Americas because of the alleged critical character of the decade 1970–80 is partly based on wishful thinking. In the *Imperialism of the Dollar* (1962) Guillén identifies the critical decade with the 60's; in the *Dialectic of Politics* (1967) he refers to the critical decades 1960–80; in *The Critical Decade of Latin America* (1971) he identifies the critical decade with the 70's—which suggests that the eventual date of reckoning may have to be postponed again.

These criticisms have a bearing on Guillén's strategy of the urban guerrilla. Without questioning the primacy of urban over rural or mountain warfare, they constitute support for Lamarca's strategy of regionally integrated and autonomous guerrilla struggles as more feasible than reliance on a coordinated continental war of liberation. Like Trotsky, Guillén assumes that the struggle for national liberation leading to socialism must be continental in scope or otherwise unsuccessful.

ful. The Cuban Revolution constitutes prima facie evidence to the contrary.

The prospect of a successful war or wars of independence hinges on, among other things, the changing relation of forces between North and South America. Unless there is a political and/or economic crisis in the United States and a change in the world balance of power unfavorable to the continued maintenance of her overseas empire, the objective conditions of an independence struggle will be absent and its launching may be premature. It is no accident that the Latin American liberation struggle suffered a setback from 1964 to 1966, during which the U.S. economy was experiencing its third major postwar boom and the Sino-Soviet conflict had erupted in fratricidal split-offs from the Communist parties on the Continent. During the brief space of three years Goulart was overthrown by a military coup in Brazil, Paz Estenssoro's government succumbed to a military coup in Bolivia, the U.S. intervened militarily in Santo Domingo, a military coup toppled the Radical government of Illía in Argentina and the revolutionary forces under Luis de la Puente and Guillermo Lobatón were isolated and overcome by the Peruvian military. Nor is it any accident that during the period 1968–70, when the U.S. military was bogged down in Vietnam and its economy was undergoing the most severe financial crisis since 1929 in combination with an unfavorable balance of trade, the revolutionary wave reached a new crest with the self-proclaimed nationalist and socialist military coups in Peru and Bolivia, the election of Allende in Chile, the student rebellions which shook Latin America in 1968, the Argentine "Cordobazo" in 1969 and the spread of urban guerrilla warfare in the Southern Cone and Brazil. However, should the U.S. withdraw from Indochina and reduce its troop commitments in Western Europe, its economy may experience another boom with attendant adverse effects on the revolutionary tide in Latin America. While stressing the interdependence of the two Americas, Guillén underestimates the effect of the foregoing conditions on the ebb and flow of revolutionary struggles south of the Rio Grande.

At a more abstract level of analysis he predicates a Latin American War of Independence on the internal and external situation of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The post-1956 nuclear *détente* and military stalemate between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. is interpreted as a factor tending to defer the social revolution in the Third World. However, Guillén underestimates the revolutionary significance of nuclear stalemate. Prior to the stalemate the socialist camp was on the defensive. Since 1956, stalemate has guaranteed the perpetuity of the new order not only in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but also in Korea, Vietnam and Cuba—a definite gain for the socialist camp and a corresponding loss to the capitalist world. The *détente* with the Soviet Union has shifted the center of international antagonisms to national liberation movements in the Third World, in some instances with Soviet economic and military aid. During the period of the Cold War the socialist camp had extreme difficulty in winning allies among Third World peoples. Now that this crisis is over, the struggle for a population favorable to the socialist road has moved forward by leaps and bounds. Today the unequal contest in Vietnam, for example, condemns the U.S. rather than the U.S.S.R. before the court of international opinion.

Guillén complains that the Soviet Union has not adopted a more aggressive policy of military and economic aid to national liberation movements except in Vietnam. But the Soviet Union still has its own borders and those of its allies to defend in the long-term struggle against world capitalism. The new Third Program adopted at the Party's 22nd Congress in 1961 anticipated that by 1980 the Soviets would catch up to the economic productivity and per capita consumption of the U.S. at levels achieved in 1960—which would still amount to a twenty-year lag. Although now a major economic and military power, the first socialist state cannot afford to risk its security by underwriting the struggle for Latin American independence. That responsibility has to be shouldered by revolutionaries whose principal interest lies not in the consolidation of socialism but in the conquest of new ground. In any revolutionary division of labor it is

necessary to stabilize and strengthen territory already won as well as to win additional population. By exaggerating the present economic and military capacity of the Soviet Union in relation to the United States, by underestimating the effect of the 20 million Soviet dead in World War II on Soviet willingness to risk another major war, by underscoring the emergence of a new ruling and exploiting class in Eastern Europe, it is easy to cast doubt on the revolutionary actuality as well as potentiality of the socialist countries. Evidently, the struggle for national and social emancipation will have to be made without direct assistance from the Soviet camp and with only token aid from Cuba. However, it hardly follows that nuclear stalemate is a liability rather than an asset to the Latin American Revolution.

Underlying Guillén's skepticism concerning the revolutionary behavior of the socialist countries is his particular interpretation of Soviet reality. Following Trotsky's analysis he characterizes the new transitional economy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as socialist in its mode of production, but predominantly bourgeois in its mode of distribution. Departing in other respects from Trotsky, he conceives of the Soviet Union not as a deformed workers' state, but as the state of a technobureaucracy or new ruling class. The class struggle within the Soviet-bloc countries is interpreted as a struggle between this class—the prime beneficiary of the October Revolution—and the proletariat. Since the Soviet state belongs to the bureaucracy, this struggle is at the same time a struggle of the proletariat against the state—from which Guillén concludes that the most viable strategy in Eastern Europe is a neoanarchist one.

Paradoxically, he also characterizes the Soviet economy as a form of state capitalism. Like most European Marxists, he identifies the prospective postcapitalist order with a classless society, i.e., socialism as the lowest stage of communism. In other respects he follows Bakunin in acknowledging that capitalism might possibly have for its successor not a classless communist society, but a new mode of exploitation under the disguised dictatorship of a scientific intelligentsia. The ques-

tion is, How can there be state capitalism without a class of capitalists, if not in command, at least enjoying the bulk of the benefits? Or, How can state capitalism designate a social order in which, following Guillén's analysis, the capitalists have been displaced by a technobureaucratic class appropriating for itself the lion's share of surplus value?

On this question Guillén departs from both Marx and Bakunin. In effect, capitalism is defined in terms of capital interpreted in the most abstract sense as self-expanding value. This usage is given precedence over capital interpreted as a social relation of production expressed in terms of things, specifically the means of production monopolized by a particular class. Unlike Guillén, Marx defines capitalism as well as capital in terms of the class relation between legal owners of the means of production and wage-laborers. If capital were merely self-expanding value which produces or otherwise yields a surplus, then the state of a technobureaucratic class would be tantamount to a form of capitalism. For Marx, capital consists only of a particular mode of self-expanding value, namely, that which yields surplus value to the legal owners of means of production, whether privately or in their capacity as stockholders, in the form of profit, interest and dividends rather than technobureaucratic salaries. Consequently, the elimination of bourgeois ownership of the means of production and the corresponding mode of appropriating surplus value implies, in this usage, the abolition of both capital and capitalism.

Bakunin was likewise more cautious than Guillén in preferring the terms "authoritarian communism" or "state socialism" for the disguised social dictatorship of scientists and experts. Although Marx did not anticipate that bureaucratic exploitation would become in fact a distinguishing feature of socialism, the accuracy of Bakunin's forecasts in this respect is partial evidence for the theoretical superiority of a model of social classes that includes the technobureaucracy as a separate class. Unlike most Marxists, Bakunin did not associate "state socialism" with a lower or initial stage of classless society, but applied it to a possible new order inter-

mediate between capitalism and self-managed socialism. Since in several of his writings Guillén adopts Bakunin's terminology, he thereby indicates a certain dissatisfaction with his own.

At least Guillén applies Bakunin's model of social classes in his interpretation of Soviet society. However, in discussing the potential for revolution in the United States and, for that matter, in Latin America, he makes no reference to a technobureaucratic class. In the advanced capitalist countries, according to his analysis, there are only two great classes: the proletariat and bourgeoisie. Hence in those countries the revolutionary objective is a direct confrontation with capitalism for the immediate establishment of a communist society. In a letter to me dated January 19, 1972, Guillén reaffirms his belief, first presented and defended in his *Imperialism of the Dollar*, that the United States has the opportunity of becoming the first socialist society. For its political consciousness to be brought into harmony with its economic potential, a major political and economic crisis is necessary. This could result from the creation of two, three or more Vietnams in Latin America and the success of a Second Latin American War of Independence, thereby ending the economic tribute which, following Guillén's analysis, accounts for the present high standard of living in the United States. A 20 percent reduction in this standard, owing to the loss of our economic enclaves and tribute from Latin America, would do more to catalyze the slumbering resentments of U.S. workers against capitalism than any other single factor. The presence of a third or technobureaucratic class, however, makes the fate of capitalism also depend upon the continuing stake of this class in the old order.

Actually, there are more reasons for anticipating a socialist or technobureaucratic revolution in Latin America than in the United States—at least in the foreseeable future. In contrast to the economically impoverished Latin American middle class, which implicitly includes the technobureaucracy, its counterpart in the United States is an economically comfortable class. Contrary to Guillén's analysis, the class struggle in

the United States is one in which the technobureaucracy cushions and mediates the opposition between the proletariat and bourgeoisie. It performs the same function in Latin America, but under conditions in which representatives of the proletariat, peasantry and impoverished middle class have been clamoring for a radical social transformation. In Latin America it can continue performing this function only through the direct assumption of political power by the military. Even so, a military dictatorship tends to benefit only that segment of the technobureaucracy directly connected with the state apparatus; it excludes and alienates other members of the same class. Moreover, this privileged segment has difficulty in improving its economic status except by selling out to the United States, the course chosen in Brazil, or by opting for an independent socialist road of development, as in the case of Chile. Unlike the technobureaucracy in the United States, that in Latin America does not have to wait on a generalized political and economic crisis before organizing for action. For crisis has been a continuing reality there since the end of World War II.

As we turn now to Guillén's anarcho-Marxism, it should be evident from the foregoing that he underestimates the relevance of Bakunin's analysis of social classes. Actually, Bakunin developed two different models of social stratification, both of which are useful in refining and completing Marx's unfinished model in Volume III of *Capital*. In *Federalism, Socialism and Antitheologism* (1867) he reduces all social groups to two principal and antagonistic categories: the privileged and unprivileged classes with respect to the possession of the chief factors of privilege, i.e., land, capital and education. The privilege of education represents the power of brain-workers to exploit the labor of millions of manual workers through their monopoly of a particular profession, office, information, science or expertise. Thus education, intelligence or information is tantamount to a fourth factor of production required to supplement the traditional factors of land, capital and labor. And it serves to define a separate class which, in his *Revolutionary Catechism* (1866), Bakunin designates as

an "intellectual-managerial elite" and in his *Letters on Patriotism* (1869) as a "bureaucratic class." When all the other classes have had their turn at ruling, according to Bakunin, this class becomes the last of the privileged classes to assume control of the state.

This model subsequently gave way to a second one in which the term "class," as Bakunin notes in his "Letter to *La Liberté*" (1872), is viewed with repugnance when applied to the exploited proletariat and agricultural workers, who are more accurately designated as a mass specifically lacking any class, power or privilege. This model is first fully elaborated in his pamphlet *Science and the Urgent Revolutionary Task* (1870), in which he reduces society to three instead of two antagonistic categories: (1) the ruling class or estate which exploits other classes without being exploited in turn; (2) the remaining privileged but nonruling classes which exploit the masses, and are in turn exploited in differing degrees by the ruling class; (3) the exploited masses, "toilers" or "drudge-people" who do not exploit anyone. Within this scheme all past revolutions are interpreted as class struggles designed to replace one ruling class by another, not as a mass-class contest designed to abolish classes altogether. The bureaucratic class or "political-scientific class," as he calls it in *Statism and Anarchy* (1873), forebodes a coming dictatorship of scientific intelligence—the most likely successor to the bourgeoisie in the event that a classless revolution is unsuccessful. Notwithstanding at least one reference to education as "mental capital," the owners of this factor are characterized not as capitalists but as bureaucrats or supervisors of the labor of others. Although as late as 1871 Bakunin called for the liquidation of all classes except the urban proletariat and agricultural workers, his original use of the term "class" was largely abandoned after 1870.

We have seen how Guillén has only partially assimilated the intellectual-revolutionary contributions of Bakunin. With respect to Marxism, he underestimates its common denominator with social democracy while overestimating its anarchist component. Marx's overtures to Bakunin in *The Civil War in France* (1871) are interpreted as more basic to Marxism

than Marx's main stress on the electoral road to power. In a series of works including his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State* (1843), the *Communist Manifesto* (1848) and *The Class Struggles in France* (1850), Marx identifies universal suffrage and unlimited voting with "the dissolution of the state but also the dissolution of civil society," with the struggle "to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class and win the battle for democracy." In these works which stress the need for a political revolution to precede the social revolution, his anarchism is a matter of principle rather than practice. Not armed insurrection directly aimed at smashing the state apparatus but the seizure of political power through the electoral process is Marx's preliminary condition of economic emancipation.

Guillén underestimates not only the statist features of Marxism, but also the Machiavellian realism and hardheadedness of its revolutionary strategy. In *Germany: Revolution and Counterrevolution* (1852) Marx and Engels argue that before the proletariat can successfully win and maintain power it must adapt itself to the historical tendency for the different strata of the capitalist class to succeed one another. To attempt to seize power before the various strata of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie have had their turn at ruling is likely to be premature. Thus in the final chapter of their work they note how the social influence and political rule of the financial stratum of capitalists was superseded by that of the manufacturing capitalists and how "two more classes claim their turn of domination, the petty trading class and the industrial working class." Summing up the revolutionary experience of 1848-49, they conclude that "the democracy of the petty traders must first have its turn before the communist working class can hope to establish itself permanently in power."

Given these anticipated stages of the social revolution, the most effective strategy is one of indirect rather than direct action. Thus in the same work Marx argues that the Communists conspire not against the governments of landed oligarchs and the bourgeois governments that immediately follow, but against their probable successors. Being organized to upset

only the revolutionary government of the radical democrats or petty bourgeoisie, Communists participate in insurrections against preceding governments without taking major responsibility for preparing or leading them. Marx had already formulated this strategy in a speech, "On the Question of Free Trade" (1848), arguing that the proletariat must combine with the radical bourgeoisie for the purpose of destroying its enemies one by one. Accordingly, he supported free trade against protectionism on the grounds that it would hasten the social revolution. He anticipated that a coalition of the proletariat and bourgeoisie against the English landowners would be able "to destroy the last remnants of feudalism in order to have only one enemy left to deal with." In effect, Marx favored a strategy of broad political coalitions or popular fronts with the democratic bourgeoisie and radical petty bourgeoisie rather than a Bakuninist united front from below dominated by workers and peasants.

In his synthesis of anarchism and Marxism Guillén combines Marx's conceptual scheme for understanding what is happening in the world with Bakunin's method of direct action against exploitation. In view of his mistaken forecasts and misinterpretations of Soviet and U.S. reality, however, he would be well advised to make greater use of Bakunin's concept of a technobureaucratic class along the Marx's strategy of indirect action. Bakunin's concept of a technobureaucratic class is evident in Guillén's analysis of the socialist countries, but is conspicuously absent from his understanding of U.S. and Latin American conditions and prospects for revolution. Moreover, Guillén fails to recognize the revolutionary content of Marx's method of indirect action and the extent of his own adaptation of it.

With respect to strategy he is actually as much indebted to Marx as to Bakunin. To Bakunin he owes a preference for armed action and for the political and economic general strike over the electoral process. But to Marx he owes, first, his acceptance of a broad front for national liberation including the petty bourgeoisie and, second, the recognition that a political revolution or national liberation struggle must precede a social

revolution, if only in the case of underdeveloped countries still struggling to liberate themselves from imperialism. In the case of advanced countries in North America and Western Europe, Guillén rejects Marx's method of indirect action in favor of a direct confrontation between the proletariat and bourgeoisie—a social revolution directed to smashing instead of capturing the machinery of state. In Latin America, however, he finds Marx's revolutionary strategy to be in some respects more viable than Bakunin's.

Guillén's anarcho-Marxism is not the last word in developing a revolutionary praxis capable of combining Marx's and Bakunin's contributions to revolutionary theory and practice. The importance of Guillén's life and work is highlighted by the theoretical and practical superiority of anarcho-Marxism to the traditional forms of European Marxism, revolutionary anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism. However, only through a different combination of Marx's and Bakunin's contributions to revolutionary theory is it possible to overcome the following intellectual pitfalls: (1) underestimating the revolutionary transformation accomplished in the socialist countries through the abolition of the bourgeoisie as a class and the corresponding capitalist mode of production; (2) overestimating the popular basis of the revolution of the twentieth century to the point of anticipating an imminent socialist revolution in the advanced countries initiated and led by the proletariat.

Marxists continue to scorn anarchist methods of direct action as incapable of setting in motion the larger motor of the social revolution, while anarchists refuse support for the technobureaucratic outcome of contemporary revolutionary struggles. Both are mistaken in their characterization of the revolutionary process as one contributing to the replacement of capitalism by a new socialist order. Historical conditions are as yet unripe for a proletarian revolution. Nonetheless, in simplifying class antagonisms the technobureaucratic revolution constitutes a step in that direction. To interpolate and update the *Communist Manifesto*:

Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other:

[bureaucracy] and proletariat. . . . The distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property generally, but the abolition of [bureaucratic] property. But modern [bureaucratic] private property is the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products that is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few.

PART I

*The Struggle for
a Revolutionary Philosophy*

(Theory of Violence)

CHAPTER I

Materialism and Revolution

1. *The Petrification of Marxism* *

Much is written about dialectical materialism and dialectics without materialism, but comparatively little about historical materialism. The revisionists of Marxism prefer to interpret nature rather than society in order to elude the question of the withering away of the state in the Soviet world—a world full of contradictions and schisms. Revised and mummified, Marxism has become transformed into a state ideology in the U.S.S.R. and into a neobourgeois humanism for the Social Democrats of the “Free World.” In one case as in the other, Marxism has become a mix of bourgeois ideologies for justifying state capitalism in the East and neocapitalism in the West. The living thought of Marx, Engels and Lenin has been sacrificed to the exigencies of the national and international politics of the U.S.S.R., to an understanding with Anglo-Saxon imperialism at the expense of proletarian internationalism, the world socialist revolution and, particularly, Communist China. Thus the Soviet revisionists have chosen the road of ideological speculation and national economic development while renouncing international revolutionary action.

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The paralysis and impotence of the Soviet tendency within communism arises from the petrification of Marxism. Soviet

* *Teoría de la violencia*, Chapter I, pp. 7, 8–11, 12–13, 15–16. (Bibliographical details can be found on pp. 303–305.)

philosophers, economists, political scientists and military experts have fallen victims to a voluntaristic philosophy which takes human wishes for realities. The Soviet version of Marxism has been institutionalized as the official class politics (dominion of the bureaucracy over the workers and peasants) and as the state ideology (priority of economic development) to the advantage of the technocracy which directs the state enterprises without the participation of the working masses.

In becoming the official ideology of Soviet society, Russian Marxism has become separated from dialectics (investigations of those aspects of the contradictory world in perpetual struggle and transformation), only to fall into dogmatism, the cult of the state and acceptance of the petrified class structure of Soviet society. In this respect Soviet neo-Marxism is less adequate than positivism, pragmatism and realism because it negates, even more than these philosophical approaches, the world-in-process. Because of the Kremlin's opportunism which serves the technocracy and bureaucracy of Soviet society, the theory and practice of Marx, Engels and Lenin are absent from the politics and philosophy of Moscow. Soviet philosophers and ideologues have adopted a speculative, one-dimensional and nationalist posture without confronting philosophy with the changes occurring within their own world. In negating the role of violence in history, Soviet revisionists implicitly deny that their power derives from the revolutionary cataclysm of 1917.

A dialectical philosophy must anticipate the revolutionary changes in society not in order to contemplate, but to change the world. Philosophy is not everything; without action it serves for nothing. The dialectical approach of Marx unites thought and action instead of separating them. Marxist philosophy nourishes the revolutionary energy of the masses, encouraging them to overcome human alienation and capitalism through the revolutionary action of the proletariat and oppressed classes.

Because Soviet neo-Marxism is dedicated to investigating the dialectics of nature, it lacks a thorough criticism of contemporary capitalist and Soviet society. To talk only of dia-

lectical materialism, a philosophy not so much about society as about nature, corpuscles, cells, light waves, embryos, is to become estranged from revolutionary practice, from the problems of alienation, from social antagonisms, from a confrontation with the capitalist world. Historical materialism is incompatible with peaceful coexistence, whereas dialectical materialism justifies it. What is important in our revolutionary and contradictory world is not the life of a corpuscle, but rather the action of the working masses against capitalism and for the creation of a socialist society that overcomes the alienation of man from his own products.

Dialectical materialism offers a conception of the universe; historical materialism, an interpretation of society. One is proper to the positive sciences; the other, to scientific sociology. Together they provide Marxism with a philosophical, scientific, sociological, political, economic and historical foundation that is intellectually and humanistically far superior to Christianity and to bourgeois individualism.

Among pseudo-Marxist intellectuals and "socialists of the chair" one frequently finds a mechanistic variant of dialectical materialism unrelated to practice, to work and to daily life. On the basis of the division between intellectual and manual labor, the philosophers justify their ignorance of daily practice. But only through the combined action of work and technique can theoretical errors be corrected. In the last analysis, theory is nothing more than a disciplined practice subject to determinate norms, rules and laws used to shorten the time for socially necessary labor. Before people can reflect, they must work in order to live; only later do they work in order to think.

Of what use is a mechanistic-dialectical materialism if it is not also historical? It does not explain the mechanism of classes, the social infrastructure and superstructure, the economic tendencies inherent in capitalism, its contradictions and their solution, its historicity and, finally, the varied and changing problems of daily life. For that, it is necessary to examine the dialectical development and transformation of our contradictory and antagonistic society—its revolutionary destiny.

Philosophically, Marxism starts from the principles of dia-

lectics elaborated on the basis of praxis (the unity of thought and action), which implies a corresponding reciprocity between, and parallel development of, science and experience, brain and hand, technique and labor, philosophy and economics.

Some philosophers have an absolute scorn for work. They do not realize that theory is a product of a determinate division of labor and an historical division of society into antagonistic classes. For that reason traditional theory is foreign to practice. And for the same reason philosophy tends to be a form of alienation, a deformation of social life and an intellectual expression of the power of the dominant classes—in the same way that religion, morals and politics are expressions of those classes.

There are plenty of commentaries on Marxism, but rarely any scientific understanding of it. Perhaps the most discussed of contemporary philosophies, it is also the least known because of its bourgeois and petty-bourgeois deformations by parliamentary socialists and Soviet revisionists. The latter have made of Marxism a parade of portraits of Marx, Engels and Lenin; the thought behind each is interpolated after the manner of Christian doctrine by certain sects and churches. Thus the images are venerated, but not the substance.

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Everything in nature is in process of becoming. This same process of birth, growth and decay is also evident in society: classes, civilizations, nationalities, modes of production and religions come and go. In this perspective historical materialism has a revolutionary content that cannot be discussed with the president of a North American trust or with the Pope, at least not with the same ease as an intellectual discussion concerning the qualitative transformation of water in response to changes in temperature. Neither the Pope nor the director of a corporation cares to hear about Christianity or capitalism as transient historical phenomena.

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Marxism is negated when the dialectical approach is not applied to the Soviet regime and people's democracies, and when it does not recognize, as Mao Tse-tung does, the presence of contradictions during the initial stage of socialism. Such a Marxism is formalistic, antidialectical and bureaucratic. It is useless for transforming capitalism into socialism because it lacks a critique of bureaucracy and an analysis of the state and antagonistic classes in the process of withering away. It is the expression of a bureaucracy which is incapable of abolishing the state, the nation and the cult of the individual. These are bourgeois institutions that obstruct the transition to socialism and the advent of communism—without frontiers, classes, religions, privileged races and alienations originating in a divisive and antagonistic society.

2. *Revolutionary Praxis and Materialism* *

Reformist and revisionist political groups are frightened by revolutionary violence, by the ascending tidal wave of the masses. They do not want to impose on the historical forces or to become engaged in revolutionary struggle. Action is divorced from revolutionary theory in the application of Marx's dialectic. To help clarify this dialectic there must be an analysis of revolutionary praxis and its material conditions.

Ideas do not produce revolutions. These emerge at a given historical moment in response to new productive forces which are not assimilated by the existing mode of production. Almost invisibly, material conditions generate the seeds of the new society within the womb of the old. When the crisis of the old regime reaches a critical point, the existing antagonisms find a revolutionary outlet: a qualitative transformation occurs and a violent leap disrupts the continuity of the evolutionary process.

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Historically, the objective conditions for the emancipation of an exploited class emerge when an economic crisis issues

* *Teoría de la violencia*, Chapter II, pp. 22–23, 24–30, 42–43, 45–46, 58.

in massive unemployment and paralyzes economic activity. At its height such a crisis generates a spirit of rebellion among the oppressed classes, constituting a subjective condition of their liberation. Economic depressions are the midwives of social revolutions. A continuing depression in Latin America can become the most effective ally of liberation movements against imperialism and feudal survivals. Such is the objective basis of a strategy of a people's war and people's army, combining guerrilla formations in the enemy's rear with an army of liberation supported by a worker-peasant alliance.

A revolution is ripe when the objective conditions of revolution are supported by subjective ones. In this event the actions of a minority become the detonator which sets in motion the majority lulled by petty-bourgeois and Leftist ideologies without a revolutionary content. In Latin America conditions are ripe for movements of liberation; lacking are only audacious minorities who know how to apply a revolutionary strategy combining all forms of struggle in a total war. Given the sociological characteristics of underdeveloped countries, the proletariat has the opportunity of leading a broad national coalition that includes the poor peasants and economically insecure middle class on the basis of a program of agrarian revolution against the landed oligarchs, and the defense of small property against imperialism and the local monopolies.

In the imperialist countries there are not these broad fronts of opposing classes. There is a confrontation between two classes: the proletariat and bourgeoisie. In the semicolonial countries there are not only two classes, but five: at one pole, the landed oligarchy and the native bourgeoisie allied to imperialism; at the opposite pole, the working class, poor peasants and economically unstable middle class.

The form and content of a social class are functions of its economic interests: wages define the worker; ground-rent defines the peasant; interest and surplus value define the capitalist; the appropriation of ground-rent from the peasant defines the landed oligarch. A class is shaped by a common historic destiny, by a common praxis and by a common economic

basis; it is the product not of spiritual kinship or subjective factors. The various classes are objectively antagonistic. Nonetheless, the workers, peasants and economically insecure middle class are able to suppress their petty antagonisms for the purpose of resolving the principal antagonism, i.e., through a revolutionary alliance against the landed oligarchy and the promonopoly and proimperialist bourgeoisie.

During the Great French Revolution of 1789-93, the bourgeoisie fought on the side of the workers and peasants against the Church and the nobility. Today, confronted by movements of social and national liberation in Southeast Asia and Latin America, the bourgeoisie fights on the side of the landed oligarchy, high church officials and the directors of multinational corporations against the workers, peasants and salaried stratum of the middle class. Once it seized power, the unbelieving bourgeoisie of 1789-93 became as hypocritical and reactionary as the feudal nobility. Today in the United States, it supports a front of anticommunist reaction, a holy inquisition under the benediction of Cardinal Spellman, the democracy of the Pentagon's Marines and the capitalism of Wall Street.

In opposition to bourgeois, landowner and imperialist oppression in the semicolonial countries, it is possible to organize liberation fronts that unite several classes under the same revolutionary aspiration. Strategically, a social revolution is ripe when the interests of the most numerous and oppressed class coincide with the national interest and the interests of other oppressed classes.

In 1789-93 the proletariat and peasantry had reason to support the bourgeoisie. The worker wanted to liberate himself from the feudal guild regulations that prevented him from selling his labor power in any part of the country; the peasant hoped to liberate himself from a condition of serfdom and from feudal domination by the Church in order to acquire private property over the land he cultivated. Under these conditions it was possible to create a broad front of liberation against the Church and nobility, and also against the reaction-

ary imperialist intervention by the European powers led by England for the purpose of suppressing the French Revolution.

In our epoch the national interest of the Afro-Asian and Latin American countries in liberation coincides with the class interests of the proletariat, the peasantry and economically threatened middle sectors. The worker already aspires to control industrial production, to establish a socialist economy without unemployment and periodic economic crisis. The landless peasant has an interest in accepting the leadership of the proletariat in order to bring about an agrarian revolution that will give the land to those who cultivate it. An enormous mass of ill-paid functionaries is disposed to follow the proletariat in the struggle against imperialism, feudalism, militarism and indigenous monopoly capitalism. Thus the class interests of the proletariat coincide not only with national interests, but also with the interests of these other oppressed classes. Historically, the social revolution is ripe both objectively and subjectively. At the same time, there is need for a political theory of liberation and for a coherent strategy of revolutionary warfare that can achieve victory with a minimum of bloodletting and material and moral suffering.

Revolutions are interconnected. The English Revolution of 1648 was inspired by the Dutch insurrection against Spanish imperial domination. The Great French Revolution of 1789-93 incorporated the bourgeois ideals of the English Revolution led by Cromwell. The Russian Revolution of 1917 followed the popular ideals and aspirations of the Paris Commune of 1871. The Chinese Revolution of 1927-49 was politically motivated by the Russian Revolution. Contemporary movements of national liberation in the underdeveloped countries have for their sources of revolutionary inspiration the Chinese Socialist Revolution, the Cuban Socialist Revolution and the national liberation struggles in Algeria and Vietnam.

The English Revolution signified the victory of the new social forces that first became prominent during the sixteenth century. The Great French Revolution culminated in the triumph of the bourgeoisie of the eighteenth century over the

nobility of the seventeenth century. The Russian Revolution and the Chinese Socialist Revolution constituted the victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The proletarian revolution led to the displacement of capitalist private property by socialist forms of ownership, the liquidation of the old ruling classes, the breakup of large estates and the overcoming of the anarchy of the market by economic planning. It signified the prevalence of the general social interest over the penurious private interests of the industrial and financial plutocracies and landed oligarchies.

The bourgeoisie seized power through violence, relying on terrorism to destroy feudal power. Today the bourgeoisie condemns the right to strike, represses proletarian insurrections with blood and fire, punishes the violence of the masses, and uses and abuses legal terrorism under the laws of exception against communism. Once in power, the bourgeoisie waxed conservative. The fact of its domination became a right tantamount to a loss of rights for the workers and peasants dispossessed of capital and land. It is now the turn of the proletarian masses to use revolutionary violence to seize power from the bourgeoisie. No class surrenders power to another without violence, without struggle. As long as nations and classes exist, their coexistence will continue to be shattered by wars and insurrections.

The political victory of the bourgeoisie over the aristocracy was the triumph of capitalist property over feudal property, of an urban mercantile economy over a rural, nonmercantile one. With the victory of the bourgeoisie, the nation triumphed over the feudal region, unfettered competition over the closed corporations of masters and officials, commercial agriculture over the anachronistic medieval estates. In overthrowing feudalism, capitalism replaced feudal privileges with bourgeois rights, feudal religion with bourgeois reason, the feudal fief with the industrial city, the right of primogeniture with equal rights to property, and bondage to the land with individual freedom. All of these reforms were achieved by the bourgeoisie through violence, by which it became the dominant class.

Bourgeois reforms overcame the system of estates, but not the existence of social classes. Thus a new kind of oppression emerged that was intolerable to the proletariat, just as the old form of oppression was intolerable to the bourgeoisie during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

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Because the feudal economy precluded the concentration of great masses, the peasants of the Middle Ages and the Reformation were incapable of overcoming the oppression of their feudal lords, who defeated, one after another, the peasant rebellions in their respective districts and villages. However, capitalism has created proletarian armies in giant industries: General Motors alone employed in 1960 half a million workers. On the day these workers adopt a strategy of urban revolutionary warfare, they will be ready to confront the regular armies of the bourgeoisie. The battle of Oran during the Algerian War constituted a strategic anticipation of what proletarian wars would be like in the capitalist metropolises. The unity of the people and its popular army, applying fluid tactics in a war without fronts, can overcome the entrenched power of the bourgeoisie. In the past, dispersed peasant armies were neither large enough nor concentrated enough to defeat the landed oligarchs; village life did not favor a war of the masses. The urban proletariat allied with the peasants can succeed, however, where the peasants alone could not.

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The social revolution becomes an historic necessity when class antagonisms reach a maximum pitch, when there is a combined struggle to liberate the oppressed classes and the productive forces fettered by outmoded property relations. All revolutions subvert the old order, the infrastructure and superstructure of the decrepit society. If the revolution is only political, the sole change will be in the form of the state: monarchy for a republic or vice versa, but without an economic or social revolution.

The anticolonial revolution in America was a political revolution since it left intact the power of the landlords and native

aristocracy, changing only the form of the state but not the structure of social classes. In contrast, the bourgeois revolution led to the triumph of the city over the countryside, of industry over the feudal estate, of firearms manufactured by urban industry over the cavalry, spears, swords, coats of mail and castles of the feudal lords. The exchange of commodities, which gave rise to urban concentrations, contributed to the development of a money economy that did more to destroy feudalism than the "shirtless masses" of the French Revolution. Similarly, urban concentrations consisting of proletarian majorities are today in the process of creating the proletarian shock troops who may ultimately manage industry without the bourgeoisie.

* * *

As long as human society unfolds through class struggles, as Marx noted, violence will be used against classes and political regimes without the possibility of peaceful coexistence between different classes, nations and civilizations. Notwithstanding the pacifism of the Soviet bureaucracy, violence is still the midwife of change. All civilizations, political regimes and classes finally perish through wars or revolution. At a given historical moment, the old and new can no longer coexist. The independence of the Latin American peoples was affirmed at the battles of Maipu and Ayacucho. The French bourgeoisie emerged with the victory at Valmy in 1792. The United States was formed historically at the battle of Saratoga in 1777 and in the Civil War by the victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. The U.S.S.R. owes its origin to the proletarian insurrection of October, 1917. China liberated itself from feudalism, imperialism and capitalism in a prolonged civil war from 1927 to 1949.

3. *The Transformation of Daily Life* *

In its fundamentals, Soviet life continues without change in the same daily way as in the Tsarist epoch: every house has a family for its supreme ideal. There are no new structures that can radically modify the superstructure. Human relations

* *Dialéctica de la política*, Chapter V, pp. 219-222.

are still mediated through commodities and alienated through money because Soviet citizens do not directly manage the forces of production and distribution. Although the Soviet regime has fewer contradictions than the capitalist regime, it is not as free from antagonisms as the Chinese communes.

In the East as in the West, the relations between persons are obscured by the relations between commodities. People are united by money, salaries, surplus value, profits and other economic relations common to both private and state capitalism. However, if daily life is not transformed, the social revolution has not been made. At most, the revolution is a formal one: the state, church, police, army and bureaucratic hierarchies have not been fundamentally altered.

The perpetuation of the old is reflected in daily life: as long as a woman is tied to the kitchen she will remain a slave or, at the very least, a servant. Only lodgings in the style of a grand hotel with a variety of services can socialize daily life, not the familiar and ill-equipped household that condemns the woman to bondage. In the grand hotel, clothes, food, lodging, central heat and air conditioning, washing, cleaning and other domestic chores are social services. Instead of building many small cottages in the countryside, one is better served by constructing large edifices of the grand-hotel type. Women need to be liberated from the home, from the task of supervising and educating children: it is more efficient for a community that one teacher should supervise and educate thirty children than that thirty mothers should do so, who might otherwise work in occupations of their own choosing and be incorporated into the productive process.

Without a change in daily existence there is no socialist revolution: bourgeois praxis is not superseded. On the Soviet collective farms the small cottage is the typical dwelling; the house has its vegetable garden, chickens, pigs and a cow. Except for cooperative production, life is the same as in the West. It is neither communist nor communalist as in China, where many cooperatives are united to form a single commune. Nor is Russia like Spain, where the anarcho-syndicalist collectives inaugurated the self-management of production by the

workers themselves: a libertarian socialism without a bureaucracy as the new ruling class.

By transforming daily life and converting many household functions into social services, the Chinese commune has liberated peasant women from the home. By incorporating women into the collective process of work, the commune has replaced the old division of labor with a new one no longer based on sexual differences. The child-care center, the collective restaurant, public-health facilities, collectivized means of transport and other communal goods and services have enabled the Chinese peasant woman to reduce in part her domestic labor and to dedicate herself to socialist production.

Thus the revolution must become visible through the transformation of daily life, not through the foundation of new factories and workshops. An increase in labor productivity and the volume of industrial output cannot create communism if the human element is missing, if no change occurs in daily existence, if science and technics do not contribute to human disalienation and to the integral liberation of man.

Communism requires that woman should cease to be an object for man, the desire and pleasure of another. But for that it is necessary to overcome the division of labor based on the home, where she is more mother than woman, where life is petty, tedious and sterile in her capacity as governess and chief stewardess.

The Soviets consider themselves fortunate because in 1962 they produced 12 percent more televisions, 42 percent more washing machines and 22 percent more refrigerators than in 1961. Thus life is becoming reprivatized in the U.S.S.R. in the style of bourgeois daily existence. Nonetheless, a socialist country needs to build lodgings on the model of a grand hotel with a public laundry rather than individual washing machines, with central air conditioning instead of personal ventilators, with a television room rather than individual sets, with a common dining room instead of a kitchen for every family, and with everything else necessary for eliminating woman's work in the home. Without the emancipation of women there can be no socialism. Once it is socialized, the

bourgeois grand hotel enables its tenants to liberate themselves from domestic chores and to embark on a praxis other than that of the bourgeois household and family kitchen.

The small private homes on a Soviet collective farm are less conducive to socialism than a single large building with central services that can liberate women from the sordid life of a domestic servant. The Soviets insist on having a washing machine, television, refrigerator, automobile and other objects for private use. However, only a specifically socialist architecture can create a new life-style different from that in bourgeois society, requiring a new division of labor like that on the Chinese communes. There the life-style of the mandarins has ceased to exist, whereas the old Russian family with its orthodox customs and morality continues to survive in the Soviet countryside.

The socialism or communism promised by the revisionists for 1980 implies a class way of life: spontaneous, alienated, because life is not organized any differently. Everywhere the ancestral mode of life prevails: the same art, the same religion, the same customs. Despite the subjective and illusory socialism of the revisionists, life continues as before. Nobody changes the daily routine in the U.S.S.R.; nobody disalienates it. The Party is a kind of Church where Christian honesty, patriotism, the home of one's ancestors and female virginity are venerated. Architecture, education and the creation of social services should help to modify daily existence, but they have not done so. In the Soviet Union the Communist Party and the Orthodox Russian Church share the same morality. Is this how a revised Marxism and communized Christianity are reconciled?

4. *Neoanarchism: Marx and Bakunin* *

The viability of Marxism is greater than that of Leninism because the latter is too closely tied to the formalized politics of Soviet bureaucrats, who are actually worse Marxists than the authentic Christians who follow Jesus' teachings rather than the Church. The Stalinist and neo-Stalinist dictatorships

* *Neo-marxismo y acción directa*, Chapter I, pp. 16, 28-31, 32-33, 37, 44-45.

of unlimited duration, which continue to exist in various self-proclaimed socialist countries, are not the consequence of Marxism.

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At the Congress of Lausanne (1867) the members of the First International reached a compromise resolution on the question of the state agreeable to both anarchists and authoritarian socialists: "Collective property," the resolution states, "belongs to the entire society, but in the form of concessions to worker's associations. The state will consist of nothing more than a federation of these associations." At the Congresses of the Hague (1872), Brussels (1874) and Berne (1876), it was resolved that the management of public services, the railroads, post office, etc., should come under state control or something similar in order that the general interest might be represented and not only collective, trade-union or local interests. The Brussels Congress resolved that public services should be administered by a federal organization or regional groups, by federations of communes functioning under the supervision of regional work councils; in the case of great national enterprises, it recommended supervision by the worker's state, i.e., "a state based on the association of free worker's communes." And at the Berne Congress, the Italian anarchist Enrico Malatesta acknowledged that public services should be administered by a single centralized organization, although not by a state in the traditional sense.

The Russian Revolution teaches the importance of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as it was conceived by Marx and Engels. Lenin gave it greater prominence by identifying it with the essence of the socialist revolution. In his "Theses and Report on Bourgeois Democracy and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" presented at the First Congress of the Communist International, March 4, 1919, he says:

Proletarian dictatorship is not only an absolutely legitimate means of overthrowing the exploiters and suppressing their resistance, but also absolutely necessary to defend the entire

mass of workers against the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie which led to the war and is preparing new wars.

However, Lenin's affirmation is exaggerated with respect to the bounty of a proletarian dictatorship. Whatever may be said for such a dictatorship, it led to the domination of a bureaucracy over the working masses in the U.S.S.R., to the intervention of Soviet troops in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), to border clashes with China (1969) and to support for Indian intervention in East Pakistan (1971).

The "Asiatic despotism" perpetuated by Stalinism raises serious questions concerning the role of the state in the revolution. With its absolute powers the state acts as a fetter or brake on social change, impeding the self-management of socialism. "Stalinist terror," with or without Stalin, demands a reassessment of the anarchist theses concerning the oppressions engendered by an absolute state, even should this be a worker's state. In this respect anarcho-Marxism gains force: a synthesis of the thought and action of Marx and Bakunin. Such a synthesis is indispensable in the twentieth century in order to revitalize Marxism and demystify neo-Stalinism. And it is hardly less necessary to overcome the utopian and unrealistic elements in traditional anarchism: its social moralism, apolitical idealism and economic simplicity, none of which is capable of liberating the workers from monopoly capitalism in the West and state capitalism in the East.

With the automation of production, nuclear energy, the mechanization and industrialization of agriculture, the emergence of great national enterprises and the growth of a student proletariat generated by the technological revolution, all the conditions are present for unifying and applying the thought of Marx and Bakunin. Given an advanced technology and high labor productivity, the material conditions exist for the development of a self-managed socialism. Such a socialism, with another name, is anarcho-Marxism—a new kind of anarchism, not to mention Marxism, that is scientific and realistic in its design for the total disalienation of man.

The anarchist theses on "free municipalities" or "free communes" represent a return to the Middle Ages and are

unsuited to the integration of production and social capital required by the present technological era. To assimilate the computer, the automatic regulator and thousands of engineers, scientists and specialists, it is necessary to organize production on a larger scale than formerly. Economic regions have become more viable units than the ancient Roman or medieval townships or the modern province created by liberal capitalism when the steam engine was the basis of production. Supersonic transportation, artificial satellites and intercontinental missiles have since reduced our planet to the proportions of a small country. Consequently, to remain on the frontiers of the Middle Ages, the Renaissance or the dawn of modern capitalism in the presence of this scientific-technical revolution constitutes a major contradiction between economic-technological progress and now obsolete political structures.

The medieval communes, the old municipalities have to be redistricted, enlarged and replaced by the agrovilles of the future, having all the advantages, comforts, productivity and educational resources of the great cities. These advantages were lacking in the old municipality, no matter how free. Thus Kropotkin's claims concerning the "free communes" have lost their force, like Lenin's exaggerated theses concerning a "dictatorship of the proletariat." Since without private or state capitalism there is no necessity to oppress or exploit anyone, the classic state must be transformed from a government over men into an administration of things. Self-government on the basis of socialized production and coadministration at the top constitutes the scientific socialism of our era.

* * *

Bureaucratic socialism must be overcome. Hence there is need for a "Second Russian Revolution." The Soviet Union is now on the road toward a second socialist revolution which will be made by working-class, peasant and university youth together with those intellectuals, scientists and professionals who have come to realize that "Red Tsarism" is a survival of the old aristocratic tsarism defeated in 1917. Men of science like Andrei Sakharov, men of letters like Solzhenitsyn and

men of arms like General Grigorienko constitute the spearhead of a Second Russian Revolution designed to replace the present authoritarian bureaucracy in the U.S.S.R. with the socialism of self-management.

Under these circumstances the struggle against the bureaucratic state, which abuses its power over the lives of its citizens, has to have an anarchist content. For the first time in history society has undertaken a struggle against the state—not an isolated class or front of oppressed classes but virtually the whole people against the government's system of organized oppression. Because of the automation of production and the emergence of a technobureaucratic state in the West, the fight against neocapitalism also leads to neoanarchist forms of struggle. Attacks are launched everywhere without any fixed front in order to mobilize the population to act in its own liberation and to move toward a socialism of self-management.

In the struggle against the state, Marxism-Leninism is less effective than anarcho-Marxism. Without defining carefully the powers of self-managed workers against the bureaucratic apparatus, Leninism is bound to vacillate or fail in its struggle against state capitalism, which is defended with greater tenacity and cruelty than demoliberal capitalism in the West.

Except for unique historical occasions, this struggle should not take the form of mass uprisings, but rather of guerrilla, erosive actions that undermine the state's authority. Socio-economic antagonisms leading to a military confrontation or collision between two bureaucratic socialist powers may well create the ideal objective and subjective conditions for the antibureaucratic revolution. In the case of the Soviet Union, a defeat in any grave conflict involving foreign powers would tend to unleash all the social, economic and political antagonisms that are currently unable to manifest themselves openly. For that reason the U.S.S.R. could not afford to negotiate with Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Albania and China—negotiations that might facilitate at any moment a Second Russian Revolution. With any major setback in Central Europe or along the Siberian frontier with China, the antilabor and neocolonial totalitarian bureaucracy in the U.S.S.R. could be challenged

internally. And in that event the most likely outcome would not be a return to capitalism and the bourgeois state of 1917, but a revival of the socialism of self-management tantamount to a scientific neoanarchism.

* * *

On these matters the social and political philosophy of Bakunin complements and completes that of Marx. For our part, we are obliged to explain the present epoch without making a fetish of the past. Neither Marx nor Bakunin can explain contemporary developments in response to nineteenth-century problems, even though their works and deeds embody a coherent revolutionary theory applicable to the twentieth century. What survives is anarcho-Marxism, which unites Marx and Bakunin, the philosopher/economist with the professional revolutionary.

Marx was not in principle, but only in strategy, opposed to anarchism. Here are some of his words worthy of an anarchist, words which were written in the middle 40's: "All socialists understand by anarchism this: the goal of the proletarian movement, the abolition of classes and the transformation of state powers and governmental functions into simple administrative acts." Nor was Bakunin opposed to each and every function of the state. In his writings on the International Workingman's Association he accepts the concept of the state under another form, that of the "social collective," "regenerated state," "new revolutionary state," "socialist state" and "national commune," always with the understanding that it represents a delegated power consistent with self-management and direct democracy.

* * *

Anarcho-Marxism is the revolutionary science of our epoch: Marxist in its economic conception of capitalism, the contradictions of capitalism and the means of overcoming them; anarchist in its conception of direct democracy, self-managed enterprises and federations of freely associated workers. Marxist and anarchist forms of socialism are reconciled in the

socialism of self-management, when the organs of production and administration are based on direct democracy and not on the bureaucratic state disguised as an illusory dictatorship of the proletariat.

In the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, Marx says that communism constitutes the negation of private property and, to that extent, human alienation. He believed that with the disappearance of bourgeois property, man would reappropriate his alienated human powers. However, public property managed by the state through a bureaucracy as the dominant elite does not put an end to alienation; it perpetuates it in another form. In order for man to recover his integrity as a nonalienated subject, he must manage his own products through organs of direct socialist democracy and an administration of things rather than men.

CHAPTER II

Between Marxism and Bolshevism

1. *Lenin: Model of the Revolutionary* *

Marx died in 1883, when Lenin was only thirteen. At seventeen, Lenin began reading the first volume of *Capital*. According to his biographers, this book uncovered for him a socioeconomic, political and philosophical world on the basis of the capitalist system, its economic and political contradictions and their resolution through action. Marx considered that the world had already been sufficiently interpreted by classical and modern philosophers. The pressing problem was how to change it, in order to make a better life without exploiters and exploited, oppressors and oppressed.

Lenin experienced the dramatic moments of Russian nihilism: a species of philosophical anarchism, resorting to direct action through small revolutionary groups hoping to arouse the popular masses against tsarism. One of Lenin's brothers was implicated in an attempt against the life of Tsar Alexander III, ending in front of a firing squad in 1887. Nihilism, Lenin concluded, was not the most effective method of overcoming despotism. Besides clandestine paramilitary groups, it was also necessary to create a revolutionary political party, to organize workers into trade unions, to form peasant associations, youth and student movements in an effort to mobilize the revolutionary energy of the masses.

By 1893 Lenin had become well-known for his revolutionary

* *Neo-marxismo y acción directa*, Chapter I, pp. 1-2, 3, 5-9.

activities, for which he was persecuted by the tsarist political police. In exile in Siberia from 1897 to 1900, he began to study the Russian social and national question, Marxism and the dynamics of social revolutions in the past. In distant and geographically isolated Siberia his revolutionary convictions were steeled against opportunism. Subsequently, he launched an attack on the Right wing of the Russian Social Democratic Party, which in 1903 split into two tendencies: bolsheviks (majority) and mensheviks (minority). Lenin became the supreme leader of the bolsheviks or maximalists: socialists opposed to class conciliation and "peaceful coexistence" with the bourgeoisie.

* * *

Lenin was the incarnation of Marxist revolutionary praxis. The French Revolution of 1789–93, the populist insurrectionary movements of 1848 in Europe, the Paris Commune of 1871 and the Russian insurrection of 1905 were minutely studied by him. Thinking prepared him for action: the response to his understanding of social antagonisms, economic crises, capitalist wars, the inhumane in history, which he believed had to be overcome through a socialist revolution.

In exile in Switzerland, he carefully followed the social and political drama unfolded by World War I in the expectation of transforming the imperialist war into a series of civil wars. The unforeseen events of 1917 transformed the revolutionary writer and journalist into a brilliant strategist and tactician. He is the man who made, as well as conceived, the Revolution. Rousseau was the theorist of the French Revolution, but he did not make it. Marx died without seeing his revolutionary ideas triumph in the insurrectionary movements of 1848 or the Paris Commune. Unlike Marx, Lenin has the distinction of being the man who not only programmed the Revolution, but also made it.

* * *

Between February 27 and October 25, 1917, conditions were ripe for a social revolution. From the February insurrec-

tion emerged a bourgeois transitional government that included Right-wing socialists. The socialists contributed to deceiving the Left and providing popular support for the new regime. Later, similar regimes were to appear in Germany and Austria.

During this period a "parallel power" emerged that gave support to a socialist revolution: the soviets or councils of workers, soldiers and peasants. The people were hungry, the soldiers were deserting and disobeying their officers; yet the provisional government insisted on continuing the war in accordance with the terms of the Franco-British alliance. The people wanted bread, peace, land and liberty. And it was Lenin who realized that backing these demands could do more to bring the bolsheviks to power than the formulation of a doctrinaire Left-wing program opposed to the government of Kerensky.

It was necessary to accelerate the revolution since at any moment the national bourgeoisie of the imperialist powers might conclude their hostilities to prevent a worldwide insurrection against the war. Lenin was in a hurry to seize power. But the majority of the Central Committee of his party wanted elections to the soviets, by which they hoped to increase their representation before attempting a revolution. Under these circumstances he had to act in secrecy. He sent secret letters to the regional committees of the party instigating them to a general insurrection. He went over the heads of the members of the Central Committee in order to induce them to accept an insurrection that already had been accepted by the party's membership and regional organizations.

At his disposal for making the revolution Lenin had the Red Guards, the Baltic Fleet (whose sailors were predominantly anarchists), the Peter and Paul Fortress (which had been won over by Trotsky), the cruiser *Aurora* (which remained in Petrograd to help in the revolutionary conspiracy), and strong support from within the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. The revolutionary general staff headed by Lenin had been winning over the people and sections of the armed forces; Kerensky had prepared the ground by his social democratic

protestations against the war but he failed to end it; and Lenin had taken full advantage of the situation by calling for an immediate peace, price controls, the equitable distribution of means of subsistence, land for the peasants, etc. Finally, on October 16, the Central Committee of the party voted favorably on Lenin's proposal for insurrection.

From the 23rd to the 24th of October the government of Kerensky tried to surround the Revolutionary Military Committee. He demanded military reinforcements for Petrograd and suspended the publication of all bolshevik newspapers. By these acts he invited an uprising. The Revolutionary Military Committee was already a "second government": it gave the order for a general mobilization, for the defense of revolutionary legality and for the distribution of arms among the workers. Kerensky denounced the revolutionaries before Parliament, calling for the defense of the liberty of the new Russian state. His words fell on deaf ears. Not even the most reactionary troops dared to take the offensive against the revolutionaries' secret weapon: the slogans of "Immediate Peace" and "Bring the Soldiers Home." Without this political and psychological factor of morale, Lenin could not have made the revolution. Without it, he would never have been more than a brilliant theoretician of Russian Marxism, in some respects inferior to Plekhanov.

On the 24th of October several thousand Red Guards consisting mostly of Baltic sailors, several detachments of the Petrograd garrison and approximately 10,000 armed workers began to occupy the strategic points of the city. The majority of the Petrograd garrison declared for neutrality in the conflict between the Revolutionary Military Committee and the provisional government. The government counted on five thousand loyal troops, but most officers and soldiers favored an immediate peace—the secret weapon in Lenin's strategy against Kerensky.

On the night of the 24th armed workers seized the Central Post Office, the telegraph exchange and strategic bridges across the Neva, leaving the government without communications

with the rest of the country. During the night revolutionary groups seized the railway stations, the central power plant, the port facilities, the printing presses of the daily newspapers, food supplies and all the logistics essential for an urban insurrection. At seven o'clock on the morning of the 25th, the State Bank fell into the hands of the revolutionaries. Only the Winter Palace remained, the refuge of Kerensky's government, cut off from communications with the general staff of the army. Hours later it, too, fell before the assault of the armed workers and Red Guards, supported by artillery from the cruiser *Aurora*.

In the early morning hours of October 26, Russia had a new regime: the government had been overturned by a *coup d'état* masterfully planned and inspired by Lenin. The Revolution came as a gift, since Kerensky could hardly rely on anyone to support his war policy. Notwithstanding the fact that the Revolution was within reach, the bolsheviks by and large favored a continuation of the parliamentary and reformist provisional government. Thus it is possible that only Lenin could have made it.

The government of Kerensky, which had managed to flee the capital, attempted to return on the 30th and 31st of October with the Third Cavalry Corps under General Krasnov. On the outskirts of Petrograd, government troops recaptured the city of Tsarskoye Selo, which left the road to the capital open at a distance of some twenty kilometers. General Krasnov gave the order to advance, but encountered military resistance at Pulkovo from armed workers and the militias of Petrograd. This encounter was the battle of Valmy of the Russian Revolution. Although there were few dead, Krasnov's troops were demoralized and refused to fight; they wanted peace, not war.

Those who sought a continuation of the war were mere tacticians; Lenin, with his slogan of an "Immediate Peace," was a strategist who could win battles almost without fighting them. A victorious revolution requires just such a revolutionary genius with the smallest party, but with a clear political

program and coherent strategy. The two artificers of the Russian Revolution, Lenin and Trotsky, shared these revolutionary prerequisites in abundance.

Between October 28 and November 2 Moscow was taken by the revolutionaries and the "junkers" were subdued. The revolution triumphant in Petrograd and consolidated in Moscow spread rapidly to Yaroslavl', Smolensk, Ryazan, Nizhni Novgorod, Kazan', Samara, Saratov, Ufa and other cities which fell under the power of the local soviets. The Revolutionary Military Committee in Petrograd announced the triumph of the Revolution in the form of a proclamation addressed to all Russian citizens:

The provisional government has fallen. . . . Power is in the hands of the Revolutionary Military Committee, organ of the Soviet Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of Petrograd, at the head of the Petrograd proletariat and garrison. . . . The cause for which the people fought—an immediate and democratic peace, abolition of the great landed estates, worker's control of production and the creation of a Soviet government—is now victorious.

The imperialist war was the great historical occasion on which Lenin had been waiting to make the revolution. If Kerensky had negotiated a separate peace with Germany before the 25th of October, Lenin's revolutionary potential would not have been subjectively and objectively realized in Petrograd in 1917. The war weakened tsarism and also the Russian aristocracy and bourgeoisie; it demoralized the army and police; and it indirectly brought into being the soviets. Yet with all this, without Lenin the revolution could hardly have triumphed. For one of its conditions was the transformation of Leninist thought into practical, revolutionary action.

2. *Kronstadt and the "Makhnovshchina"* *

Consciously or unconsciously, every revolutionary is an anarchist: for he has to have recourse to direct action. Com-

* *Neo-marxismo y acción directa*, Chapter I, pp. 9–10, 10–13.

menting on the Russian Revolution of 1905, Trotsky says: "The activity of the Soviet signifies the organization of anarchy. Its continued existence and development constitute a consolidation of anarchy." In action and thought, the revolutionary encourages disorder and insurrection against the established forces of law and order, having to act in principle as an anarchist.

At the beginning of 1918, before the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets, Lenin said: "Anarchist ideas are now taking on viable forms." And at the Seventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party in March of the same year, he obtained support for the following resolution:

The socialization of production must be administered by worker's organizations (trade unions, factory councils, etc.); civil service jobs must be abolished (police, military, etc.); all wages and salaries must be equalized; all members of the soviets must participate in the administration of the state which will be progressively abolished along with the role of money.

During the period of "war communism" from 1918 to 1920, there was little practical difference between bolsheviks and anarchists in their revolutionary aspirations. The bolsheviks had given more than lip service to worker's self-management and had broken irretrievably with European social democracy. To many revolutionaries, the bolsheviks had become a species of anarchist.

Early in 1918 Lenin had conceived of all enterprises during the transition period as self-governing associations of producers and consumers. The near-chaos of the economy and the exigencies of the civil war, however, convinced Lenin that the state must take a direct role in the administration of Soviet factories. At the First Congress of Economic Councils, May 26 to June 4, 1918, it was decided that two-thirds of the directors of enterprises should be appointed either by regional economic councils or by the state council, leaving only one-third to be elected directly by the workers in each enterprise. A decree of May 28, 1918, transformed freely established

worker's collectives into nationalized enterprises, thereby making the state the sole owner.

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Lenin, who subscribed in principle to neoanarchist ideals, denounced traditional anarchism and anarcho-syndicalism as bourgeois trends irreconcilably opposed to socialism, the proletarian dictatorship and communism. Despite the cooperation between bolsheviks and anarchists during the period of "war communism," the antagonism between them tended to grow more acute and to become a major issue within the revolutionary camp. Like the "Left" Communists, the anarchists bitterly opposed Lenin's program of transition toward a proletarian version of state capitalism. As Kropotkin noted just before he died: "For me, this effort to build a communist republic on the basis of a centralized state, on the iron law of the Party's dictatorship, has ended in a fiasco. Russia teaches us how not to impose communism."

In the first moments of the Russian Revolution, anarchists and bolsheviks operated jointly against their common enemy. Nestor Makhno, a 1905 revolutionary who served many years in prison, took up arms in the Ukraine. He liberated the city of Gulyai-Pole, which became his general headquarters, extended the insurrectionary war to Khar'kov, Kursk, the Crimea and other zones of the Ukraine and, using guerrilla tactics, defeated in several engagements the White generals Denikin and Wrangel. Relying on units of cavalry, infantry and a people in arms, he successfully combined an army and guerrillas against the enemy. Makhno's "free corps" operated as a lash against the forces of Denikin and Wrangel; without them the Red Army would have faced a critical situation in the Ukraine.

In the zones liberated by Makhno the workers introduced a libertarian socialism based on self-management; the lands confiscated from the oligarchy were cultivated by communes or "soviets of free workers"; men, women and children had to work in proportion to their capacity, age and training. The communes were governed by the principles of equality and fraternity. The leaders elected by the popular assemblies held

their jobs temporarily; in order to forestall bureaucratization they could not be reelected until after the lapse of a definite time. Positions of leadership were for short terms in order to give others a chance to fill them. The communes were federated into districts and these into economic regions. The "free soviets" were integrated into a collectivist economic system on the basis of social equality and independence from all political parties.

The difference between anarchists and bolsheviks on the question of the economic organization of postcapitalist society did not interfere with their temporary coalition against the common enemy—as long as the Makhnovists were militarily strong and the White generals were threatening the Ukraine. In 1920 the Makhnovists signed an agreement with the bolsheviks, a *modus vivendi* in which one of the clauses of the agreement stated:

In the regions where the Makhnovist army is active, the worker and peasant population will create its own free institutions of political and economic self-administration; these institutions shall be autonomous and federated by separate agreement with the governmental organs of the Soviet Republics.

In 1919 the Makhnovists declared against political participation in soviets which, on the authoritarian and centralized basis of the state, had ceased to be representative organs of direct democracy. Later, Makhno rejected a proposal by the Commissariat of War which would have placed his armies under its orders. Since Makhno refused to integrate his forces with the Red Army, he was denied logistical support against the White generals. Several Makhnovist delegates to a Soviet Congress were subsequently detained and imprisoned. In 1920 Makhnovist officers in the Crimea were invited by officers of the Red Army to a military reunion, where the bulk of them were detained and shot. The bolsheviks then besieged Makhno's fortress city of Gulyai-Pole in an operation that lasted nine months. Confronted by superior forces, Makhno had to abandon the city and take refuge in Rumania. Ill and penni-

less, this outstanding guerrilla leader finally migrated to Paris, thus ending one of the most brilliant chapters of the Russian Revolution.

In 1921 the sailors and workers in the dockyards at Kronstadt began to protest against the scarcity of goods and also against the bolshevik dictatorship. This resulted in an outbreak of strikes in Petrograd and Moscow which were repressed. In a protest meeting in Petrograd, ten thousand workers congregated. The sailors of Kronstadt resisted control by political commissars and the presence of Red Guards in the shipyards. Sailors and workers at this naval base rejected the incorporation of the trade unions, soviets and popular organs of direct democracy by the bolshevik state. They defended the worker's right to organize against state capitalism, demanded freedom of expression and association for anarchists and "Left" Communists and socialists, and protested against the dictatorship of a single party. In their slogans they urged a "Third Revolution." The conflict between the sailors and workers of Kronstadt and the bolsheviks had not long to wait for a resolution.

As Commissar of War, Trotsky was in charge of suppressing the insurgents. On March 7, 1921, he sent Tukhachevsky, later to become a Marshal of the Soviet Union, to attack the fortress of Kronstadt. Because of superiority in numbers and firepower, the fortress was taken by the Red Army. Thus perished the workers and sailors of Kronstadt—an anticipation of the events in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). Subsequently, Marshal Tukhachevsky was himself executed along with other leaders of the Red Army for allegedly plotting against the totalitarian policies of Stalin.

The Russian anarchists were defeated, physically liquidated or imprisoned. The libertarian Fanya Baron with eight other comrades was executed in the underground cellars of the Tcheka in Moscow. The "proletarian state" of Lenin did not show much consideration for the revolutionary anarchists of Kronstadt and the "Makhnovshchina."

Nonetheless, Lenin and Trotsky in principle were neoanarchists. How, then, could they have exterminated politically the Makhnovists and the workers and sailors of Kronstadt? Al-

though at the beginning of the Revolution bolsheviks and anarchists worked together against a common enemy, the antagonisms between ideologies ultimately tended toward a head-on collision. For the bolsheviks there was no room for a "state within a state." In 1920 and 1921 Russia had not one-fifth of the agricultural and industrial production of the pre-war years, which may explain the bolsheviks' turn toward strengthening the state. Only in industrially advanced nations, which have a high level of productivity and do not suppress human freedom, is it possible to resolve the antagonisms between ideologies through self-managed enterprises, communes or other nonideological organisms of popular power. Not every country has to pass through the same conditions as Russia, especially not the industrially developed ones of North America and Western Europe.

3. *Vicissitudes of Leninism* *

The crisis of Leninism has become more acute during the past two decades. The successors to Stalinism continue to subordinate proletarian internationalism to changes in Soviet foreign policy: the *détente* with imperialism, the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, armed conflict on the Siberian frontier with China, a mutual aid pact with India possibly against China, etc. The Communist parties loyal to Moscow have suffered catastrophic political losses within their respective countries by their abrupt turns on domestic policies to suit the shifting winds of Soviet international politics. Since the Kremlin's directors never tire of repeating that they are Leninists, Leninism has lost credibility as a revolutionary praxis. Now that it is invoked by powers with very different policies, by China and the U.S.S.R., it is even less viable than before. In becoming a state ideology acceptable to the ruling bureaucracy, Leninism has lost much of its force as the theory and practice of proletarian revolution.

In a planetary world a socialist revolution that fails to break down national barriers, that coexists with the capitalist world

* *Neo-marxismo y acción directa*, Chapter I, pp. 18, 20–23, 34–35.

without federating with countries making a transition to socialism, has to deteriorate politically. The Soviet Union used the Third International, the Cominform and other international agencies in the interests of its own diplomacy and national policies. When these organizations had to be dismantled as concessions to the Soviet Union's allies during World War II, they were abolished unilaterally by the Soviet bureaucracy.

* * *

Leninism has suffered most from those who have most proclaimed it as their revolutionary praxis. It has been reduced to an expression of power politics, planned economic development and technobureaucratic authority. Coexistence with imperialism, peaceful competition with the capitalist countries, socialist emulation through piecemeal, the domination of the ruble over the countries belonging to the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (Comecon), the repression of efforts toward workers' self-management in Czechoslovakia, the border conflicts with China—in broad outline these are the policies adopted by Lenin's successors in the Kremlin.

What historical irony! Now that the Pope is no longer infallible and the Vatican has ceased to be the absolute power it was during the Middle Ages, a pro-Soviet Communist has less freedom of action, less political discernment than a debourgeoisified and reformist Roman Catholic. Just as there are few formal Catholics faithful to the original teachings of Jesus, so it is safe to say that there are few Marxist-Leninists committed to the revolutionary praxis of Marx and Lenin.

As a consequence of the formalism, dogmatism and opportunism of the Soviet bureaucracy, Leninism has degenerated from a universal revolutionary praxis to a Russian national cult: the veneration of Lenin's mummy in the Mausoleum on Red Square. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the dictatorship of the ruble in Comecon and the cultural accords with the United States made during the strikes over Vietnam belie the Leninism of the Kremlin bureaucracy. Inasmuch as Soviet petroleum is sold at 16 to 19 dollars per ton to the countries of Comecon and at 7 to 8 dollars to the members

of the European Economic Community, proletarian internationalism and the division of labor between socialist countries are tantamount to the "good neighbor policy" adopted by the United States toward Latin America.

If the U.S.S.R. militarily abandoned Castro in 1962 by withdrawing Soviet missiles from Cuba and today stands passively by while the United States bombards the socialist state of North Vietnam, it is because she refuses to take risks that are not in her narrow national interests. The U.S.S.R. accepted 750 million dollars in capital investment from Fiat, yet accused Czechoslovakia of wanting to return to capitalism in 1968, without the Czechs having received any capitalist investments up to that moment. Evidently, cynicism rather than Leninism governs the politics of the Kremlin. If the world is divided with the United States into spheres of influence, it is because the Soviet bureaucracy rejects Lenin's theory of imperialism.

If the countries of Eastern Europe have not formed supranational organizations like the European Coal and Steel Community or Euratom and have yet to achieve the degree of unity of the European Economic Community, it is because their "socialism" is neither Marxist nor Leninist. State capitalism is the rule, a bureaucratic authority that interferes with the state's withering away and indicates that the U.S.S.R. has taken exception to the revolutionary praxis of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

If all this has transpired in the U.S.S.R. during half a century of "socialist society," what shall we say of its much vaunted "road to communism"? It is difficult to understand how communism can be built under conditions of wage-labor, commodity production, interest payments, foreign investments, peasant collectives, bureaucratic dictatorship, a repressive state, unequal exchange between town and country, and incomes that are ten times higher for bureaucrats than for ordinary workers and peasants. It is evident that Marxism-Leninism has undergone a profound deterioration in the Soviet Union. Accordingly, anyone in Latin America who claims to be an authentic revolutionary must beware of identifying himself

with Marxism-Leninism. It is more important that he study and apply Marx and Lenin to the national or continental reality of Latin America. Otherwise, to become involved in semantics, like the Soviet opportunists, is to risk losing the support of the masses and unleashing a barrage of capitalist counterpropaganda that would effectively isolate any revolutionaries who might resemble Soviet bureaucrats.

Marx said that his theory was not meant to be repeated verbally, but to be applied concretely. The same may be said of Leninism: it must be dissociated from the Soviet bureaucracy. In order to make the Latin American Revolution, its vanguard and masses must liberate themselves from three counterrevolutionary influences: the national bourgeoisie (who hope to lead the national revolution), the imperialist bourgeoisie (who extract a large part of their profits from the Third World) and the Soviet bureaucracy (which seeks a *rapprochement* with imperialism). In making history, we need not be dictated to by anybody, neither by our own bourgeoisie nor by the imperialists nor by Soviet opportunists.

In nationalizing the Russian Revolution, Leninism suffered a major political setback. Leninism could no longer be invoked as the sole revolutionary praxis when the Soviet bureaucracy appealed to it daily as the basis for coexistence with imperialism and as justification of an intolerant bureaucratic power which, after fifty years of "socialism," condemned novelists to years of imprisonment for discreetly questioning moral, social and political aspects of Soviet society.

At this moment Lenin cannot tell us how to make the Latin American Revolution. Our world is different from his: Latin American problems are not the Russian or European problems so brilliantly analyzed by Lenin at the beginning of the century. Each man is a representative of his own time. Once he dies, history poses different problems as the world continues to change. Yet there are aspects of the old society which survive alongside the new. In this respect Marx contributed the most enduring of the economic and political classics of the nineteenth century. He gave us a total vision of capitalist society, but one that must be completed and adapted to the

present in order to overcome the antagonistic and alienated condition of man.

Marxism aspires to become obsolete. The day on which the historical and economic conditions that gave birth to it no longer exist, Marxism will cease to offer the most comprehensive explanation of the inner workings of modern society. Without private or state capitalism, Marxism would become a matter of history: the history of philosophy, political theory, economics and sociology. With the coming of socialism on a planetary scale, there will be new philosophers, political scientists, economists and sociologists who will offer scientific explanations of its objective tendencies. To be a Marxist is to be a doctor of capitalism, but not in order to save it.

Marx had little to say concerning socialism and even less about communism. He was too scientific for that, investigating instead the laws of capitalist development, the self-defeating mechanisms passed over by bourgeois economists and the means of resolving the resultant antagonisms. Lenin, a keen student of Marx and Engels, showed for the first time that the working people could seize political power, that the bourgeoisie was no more imperishable as a class than the slave-owning aristocracy and feudal nobility and that the capitalist mode of production is historically short-lived—even though, after his death, the Soviet bureaucracy failed to transcend the phase of state capitalism by rejecting the socialism of self-management.

* * *

The degeneration of the Russian Revolution can be explained within the framework of Lenin's own theory of the state or, better still, of the dictatorship of the proletariat. At the end of Chapter II of *State and Revolution* he says that "the dictatorship of a single class is necessary not only for every class society in general, not only for the proletariat which has overthrown the bourgeoisie, but also for the entire historical period which separates capitalism from 'classless society,' from communism." In a literal sense, this formulation concedes to the dictatorship of the proletariat a finite political duration. At the same time, it opens the door to another interpretation.

Because a "classless society" can be interpreted in different ways, it may be postponed indefinitely, i.e., the dictatorship may become a lasting one. Stalin elaborated a political theory according to which the class struggle persists and increases in intensity during the entire period required to build and consolidate the new society. Thereby he helped to establish a dictatorship of the bureaucracy in the name of the proletariat. Post-Stalinism is no different from Stalinism in this respect. Any conflict, difference or opposition between the masses and the party, between society and the state, and between factions or dissimilar groups within the party is interpreted as an expression of the class struggle. This makes political repression necessary in the name of socialism, but in the actual interests of a totalitarian bureaucracy or new ruling class.

The concrete content of this Stalinist and post-Stalinist dictatorship is not socialism but state capitalism, which separates the worker from his means of production and leaves untouched the system of wage-labor. To maintain its privileges, the statist bureaucracy imposes its dictatorship over the proletariat. It replaces capitalist surplus value with state surplus value. It freezes real wages, raises the prices of goods and services sold in state-owned shops and makes strikes illegal that might otherwise raise real wages. Thus the worker is doubly exploited as producer and consumer. This permanent repression of the population is possible only under a cruel dictatorship not of, but over the proletariat.

The cancer of this dictatorship of the bureaucracy, of its Thermidorian directorate linked to Stalinism, objectively resides within the system of state capitalism whose exaggerated apology was given by Lenin. Basic to this apology was his distinction between two kinds of state capitalism: one in which political power belongs to the bourgeoisie, another in which the proletariat uses the state power to its own advantage. In " 'Left-Wing' Childishness and the Petty-Bourgeois Mentality" (1918) and "The Tax in Kind" (1921), he argues that state capitalism constitutes a transitional regime between private capitalism and socialism in the interests of the proletariat. Again, in his report on the tactics of the Russian Communist

Party at the Third Congress of the Communist International (1921), he says: ". . . the development of capitalism, controlled and regulated by the proletarian state (i.e., state capitalism), is advantageous and necessary in an extremely devastated and backward small-peasant economy."

Lenin's thesis that state capitalism is compatible with a proletarian state has grown old and is now outdated. It has been belied by the facts. In the Soviet Union state capitalism is beneficial less to the proletariat than to the statist bureaucracy whose economic, political and juridical privileges are as scandalous as those in the West.

4. *Trotsky or the Revolution Betrayed* *

To understand the first three decades of the twentieth century, one must study Lenin; to understand what happened from 1924 (the death of Lenin) to 1940, one must study Trotsky; to understand capitalism as a social and economic system, Marx is still the greatest of all; to understand our epoch since the death of these great men, one must do so on one's own. Trotsky cannot reply to the Trotskyists concerning the problems arising since his assassination, nor can Lenin tell us how to make the revolution under new circumstances, nor can Marx explain all the developments of contemporary capitalism. One must complete the work of these great men: worship must give way to analysis in order that one may go beyond the limits of their thinking in all that no longer survives the ravages of time.

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In *The Worker's State, Thermidor and Bonapartism* (1935) and *The Revolution Betrayed* (1936), Trotsky analyzes the turn of the Russian Revolution toward Bonapartism, bureaucratism and terrorism. The dictatorship of Stalin was not initially a form of personal power, but an instrument of the party bureaucracy and the military command which sprang from the Revolution. In returning from the battlefronts these

* *Neo-marxismo y acción directa*, Chapter I, pp. 27, 40-43.

military cadres assumed positions of political importance with high-paying salaries, thereby separating themselves as an economically privileged elite from the masses.

Stalin played a centrist role: he suppressed the remnants of the bourgeoisie and the rich peasants on his Right, but also turned against the Left wing within his own party. According to Trotsky's analysis, Stalin created a new aristocracy on the basis of salary differentials and other privileges. Then, supporting himself on the top layer against the bottom layer of the new social hierarchy and occasionally on the bottom layer against the top, he managed to concentrate all powers in his own person. What kind of regime is this, Trotsky asks, if not a Soviet Bonapartism?

The Left opposition challenged bureaucratic methods and demanded greater equality and direct democracy at the level of the local soviets and individual enterprises. However, it was mainly verbal, ideologically weak and incapable of maintaining a coherent position on economic problems until 1927. Owing to the low volume of production and the scarcity of investment capital, the opposition then focused on the absence of "primitive socialist accumulation." But it delegated the task of socialist accumulation to the state instead of society, which led to replacing the factory councils with a general director vertically appointed from above. In failing to counterpose the socialism of self-management to the regime of state capitalism, the opposition challenged Stalinism with words instead of deeds. Thus it fell into a trap, leaving the political apparatus of the state free to develop a Bonapartist bureaucracy with the virtual consent of the opposition.

In accepting centralized economic planning, Trotsky had no objective, coherent, political and economic alternative to the power of Stalinism. Far from precluding a dictatorship of the bureaucracy, centralized planning tends to generate one because the state plans everything, and society nothing. Moreover, centralized economic planning is not the most efficient way to stimulate economic growth. State capitalism can be out-produced by self-managed socialism which allows for a wider margin of competition between producer's collectives.

Lenin died before the dictatorship of the Soviet bureaucracy had time to flower. Yet he understood its consequences better than Trotsky:

The bureaucracy and the standing army are "parasites" on the body of bourgeois society [and on so-called socialist society], parasites engendered by the internal antagonisms which rend that society. . . . The more the functions of state power devolve upon the people as a whole, the less need is there for the existence of this power.

In these comments from Chapters II and III of *State and Revolution*, Lenin is clearly oriented toward a socialism based on direct democracy and self-management. In order to overcome the counterrevolutionary threat posed by a bureaucracy during the transition period, Lenin proposed that the proletariat replace the old state apparatus with a corps of workers and employees on the basis of the following conditions: "(1) not only elections, but also recall at any time; (2) pay not exceeding that of ordinary workers; (3) immediate introduction of control and supervision by all, so that all may become functionaries without anybody becoming a bureaucrat."

In these respects a scientific anarchist, Lenin anticipated the bureaucratic danger and formulated the measures for overcoming it. Applying these measures, the mechanisms of the state would be transformed from agencies over the people into servants of society. To combat bureaucracy Lenin relied on the socialism of self-management, without which there can be no assurance that a proletarian revolution will not degenerate into a bureaucratic regime, extracting surplus value from state enterprises instead of stock companies and private business.

Confronted with Stalinism, Trotsky lacked a clear economic and political alternative. Tito did not make that mistake, but boldly differentiated himself from Stalinism through his formulation of the socialism of self-management. Unlike Trotsky, he escaped the predicament of being ideologically opposed to Stalin and at the same time a supporter of centralized economic planning within the framework of state capitalism. Fidel Castro had serious differences with Stalinism, as in the

Escalante affair, but in matters of planning adopted a neo-Stalinist position. Thus he failed to open the stage of worker's self-management in Cuba, which cost him substantial support from an otherwise favorable population in Latin America, for whom direct democracy is preferable to bureaucratic methods.

Trotsky not only denounced the Soviet Thermidor, but also sought to explain it in terms of the following factors: the exigencies of socialist development, the low level of the productive forces in the Soviet Union, the continuing capitalist encirclement and the existence of classes and class antagonisms in the U.S.S.R. In part, his explanation also provided a justification of the Bonapartism of the Stalinist epoch: "The existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat is still a necessary condition of the socialist development of the economy and culture of the U.S.S.R." In making this defense of the dictatorship of the proletariat instead of arguing for its replacement by the socialism of self-management, he indirectly justified its material basis in the form of state capitalism. The terrorism and Bonapartism denounced by Trotsky derive from a defect peculiar to the Soviet system which he never ventured to examine either during the struggles of the Left opposition until 1927, when he was expelled from the U.S.S.R., or afterward during his exile.

PART II

*What Is Happening
in the World**(Dialectic of Politics)*

CHAPTER III

Interimperialist Rivalries

1. *Antagonisms between the U.S. and Western Europe* *

At the international level capitalism is not a unified system. The struggle for markets and sources of raw materials, above all in the underdeveloped countries, gives rise to profound economic, diplomatic and strategic contradictions among the imperialist powers. The law of uneven economic and technological development from country to country produces great fissures within the so-called capitalist bloc, which is not unified but disjoined.

The fact that the countries of the European Common Market export their manufactured products at international prices about 30 percent lower than those of the U.S. causes an acute commercial antagonism between the capitalism of Wall Street and the capitalism of the European Community. European commodities are capturing markets from North American goods in Asia, Africa and Latin America. This implies a sordid economic war which could lead in the long run to military actions in Africa and the Middle East, where petroleum and markets could become the motive for struggles between Western Europe and the United States. There is little doubt that behind the capitalist wars across the world there hides the fetishism of commodities.

The European Common Market is producing as much steel

* *Dialéctica de la política*, Chapter I, pp. 27-30, 31-33.

as the United States; in 1961 its gold reserves of 16.2 billion dollars exceeded the 16 billion in gold reserves of the North Americans; and it exports annually a value of 29.7 billion dollars as compared to only 20.8 billion dollars' worth exported by the United States. During the last twenty years the law of uneven economic development has favored the European Community at the expense of the United States. The countries of the European Community or European Common Market have enjoyed an annual rate of growth of about 5 percent as against less than 3 percent in the United States. Discounting the depressive factor of economic crises, the growth of the U.S. during the last few years has been only slightly better than 2 percent.

The U.S. banks had credits and deposits or capital of other countries worth 26 billion dollars in 1964; yet their gold reserves amounted to only 13 billion dollars. Should those countries have withdrawn this capital deposited in North American banks, then Uncle Sam would have lacked reserves to pay his creditors in Europe and elsewhere. This indicates a dollar crisis, developing since 1958, as a result of which the U.S. deficit in international payments has sometimes been as high as 4 billion dollars annually. The weakening of the dollar alongside the strengthening of the European Community signifies that the grand strategy of the Pentagon has run into serious economic and military difficulties in confrontation with the Bonn-Paris axis of the European bourgeoisie, their political-military spokesmen and their opposition to the diplomacy of the dollar in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The crisis over the leadership of NATO, formerly a military monopoly of the North Americans, indicates that the French and German generals may go on capturing the strategical positions within the Atlantic Alliance until the North American military is left with a merely symbolic role. Thus the European Community presents itself historically and militarily as a powerful counterforce, on the one hand, to the United States and, on the other hand, to the Soviet Union.

A dialectical investigation of current political-military tendencies projected into the future gives reason to believe that

the epicenter of future history and the center of gravity of a Third World War will most likely be in the European Community. If it should pressure the U.S.S.R. on the question of German unification or the matter of Berlin, it would have behind it the United States. In contrast, if the European Economic Community were to have a military confrontation with the United States in the Middle East or Africa, the U.S.S.R. would remain almost surely neutral.

De Gaulle wanted a Carolingian Europe. He needed Mao Tse-tung against the United States. But it is already too late for a world strategy to be the exclusive monopoly of the bourgeoisie.

The national bourgeoisie of Germany and France, who in the past went to war for the coal of the Rhine valley and the iron of Alsace-Lorraine, have resolved their differences with the creation of a European pool, i.e., the European Coal and Steel Community. This supercartel of iron and steel alongside the gradual emergence of the Common Market tends to unify the French and German bourgeoisie after the manner of their North American cousins living in New York and San Francisco. But the solution of the French-German conflict signifies the creation of an even greater contradiction whose unresolved problem has its central locus in Berlin: the struggle for German unification may make inevitable a war between the U.S.S.R. and the European Community when the latter becomes a major nuclear power. The antagonisms originating from economic inequalities between nations and between classes can only be resolved through the establishment of socialism on a world scale and not only in a single country; and until this occurs, every antagonism resolved at the national level tends to generate a still greater conflict at the international level.

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The contradictions of the capitalist world have contributed to undermining the economic power of Wall Street and the strategical capacity of the Pentagon. In general, these contradictions have the following configuration for the capitalist bloc

on a world scale: first, the contradiction between the United States and Western Europe; second, the contradiction between England and France within Western Europe.

On the economic plane the contradiction between the U.S. and Western Europe takes the form of a struggle for control over the investments, markets and sources of raw materials in the underdeveloped countries, principally in Africa and Latin America, which divides more than it unites the imperialism of the dollar and the imperialism of the European Community.

On the strategic plane the United States did not support France and England during the Suez incident in 1956, because their action was opposed to U.S. oil interests in the Middle East. On the other hand, the European powers do not support the United States in the Formosa Straits and the Caribbean. It is some time since the European powers abandoned gun diplomacy in Asia and Latin America. And for that reason the United States cannot count on the Atlantic Alliance against China, Cuba, Vietnam, etc.

This shows that in determinate zones the economic and strategical interests of the United States and Western Europe are at loggerheads. The capitalist world is not a monolithic bloc: a war may still arise within it as in the case of the First and Second World Wars. It is noteworthy that France aspires to a nuclear reprisal capacity of its own, without accepting the North American monopoly of the so-called multilateral nuclear forces of NATO and unlike Great Britain in this respect. And this indicates that in the event of European and North American tensions produced by economic rivalries in Africa, the Middle East or the Mediterranean, the European Community might resort to war against the United States, once it becomes a nuclear power, in defense of its economic and strategical interests opposed to the diplomacy of the dollar.

The United States wishes to use its monopoly of nuclear arms to arrive at a direct understanding with the U.S.S.R. and at the same time to prevent the countries of the European Common Market from becoming a separate atomic power, which might be used against the United States as well as the Soviet Union. Having a monopoly of nuclear arms, Washing-

ton and Moscow can reach an agreement in principle, provided that the Kremlin shares neither its nuclear weapons nor the basis of its atomic industry with China.

Until now the U.S.S.R. has fulfilled this condition at the behest of the United States. It has not assisted China in developing a nuclear capacity, since this would make her a great international power and, above all, the only Asiatic one capable of carrying the socialist revolution to Oceania, Asia, Africa and even Latin America. This prospect suits neither the Soviet revisionists alienated by atomic terror and the myths of peaceful coexistence nor the yanqui imperialists for whom the frontiers of the United States are in Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, Laos and South Vietnam. As an independent power, however, France has a different opinion from England's about these matters.

In its economic aspect the contradiction between France and England shows itself in the following ways. If England enters the European Common Market without assisting its own agriculture with subsidies and protective tariffs, it must suffer the effects of unfair competition with French agricultural products ruinous to British farmers, on whom the Conservative and Labor parties depend for votes. If France permits England to enter the European Community with such privileges afforded to English farmers and the countries of the British Empire, it must face the prospect of a dissolution of the European unity which France and Germany supported by the Vatican wish to oppose to the Soviet Union. But if England remains outside the Common Market, it will lose its major export market and be confronted with an almost insuperable economic crisis at home. For France, England is not part of Europe because it is tied to the British Empire and does not share its atomic weapons with the European Economic Community.

On the strategic plane England accepts the atomic leadership of the United States, while France wants to have its own nuclear forces independent of the Pentagon and NATO. England does not want the European Community to become a great atomic power because that would involve in a short time

the risk of war with the Soviet Union over the problems of Berlin, German unification or the Balkans as an economic and strategic zone of influence. It is evident that England wishes to undermine the European Community in collaboration with the United States, in order to maintain the advantages London enjoys from the British Empire and from the subsidies and protective tariffs covering British agriculture.

Nonetheless, the pressure of the Vatican through the medium of the European Christian Democratic parties and the political accords between Bonn and Paris provide support for the European Community, with or without England, contributing to its development into a major industrial, nuclear, and military power equal to that of the United States and the Soviet Union.

2. *Dynamic of the Antagonisms among Capitalist Countries* *

In the dialectic of present world contradictions the existence of supernations like the United States, the U.S.S.R. and China virtually forces Western Europeans into constituting a community of their own. In every dialectical contradiction there are two opposing poles whose reciprocal action imposes on each of them a struggle that does not exclude revolutionary violence or war.

The West has adopted certain forms of economic planning, thereby abandoning liberal capitalism in order to create a superpower through the European Community that can stand up to the Soviet Union. As long as the proletariat of Western Europe passively accepts the bellicose clatter about a Carolingian Europe, while refusing to seize power in order to constitute a Socialist United States of Europe, the outbreak of another world war is a strong possibility in the short run. The ideal prospect of a long period of armed peace, representing the aspiration of certain revisionists of Marxism, has little chance in view of existing antagonisms between the socialist

camp (China) and the imperialist camp (U.S.) and between imperialism and the Third World.

If the dollar were devalued up to 50 percent, which is not improbable, the prices of North American exports in turn would be reduced by 50 percent. Such a measure would immediately cause an economic crisis in the countries of the European Community should they not also devalue their currencies. However, that would mean a reduction in wages and salaries in Europe, tending to aggravate the social and political crisis favorable to a proletarian insurrection. Faced with this prospect, the imperialism of the European Community would find it economically and strategically convenient to opt for a conflict with the U.S.S.R. or the U.S. in order to cover up through war and the exaltation of a misplaced patriotism its own class contradictions.

It is a commonplace that social questions and the struggles of the working masses become marginal in time of war. Consequently, either the proletariat of the European Community undertakes the struggle for socialism or it may have to pass through a Third World War or a series of limited wars culminating in a world war. Disarmament might seem to present a way out of this impasse, but it is impossible under capitalism as long as war industries contribute to saving capitalism from its own periodic crises.

Two world wars have shown that the antagonisms among blocs of capitalist countries are irreconcilable and that these are periodically resolved through violence and the infernal cycle of war on an imperialist scale. Despite the interminable and utopian conferences on disarmament, the Second World War is evidence that the national bourgeoisie belonging to rival blocs (the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis and the Washington-London-Paris axis) were enemies and that war could not be avoided. Throughout history war has been a product of class struggles, private property and economic inequality among nations. Until these antagonisms are resolved, and notwithstanding the illusions generated by astronautics and cybernetics, men will continue living under prehistoric conditions. As

* *Dialéctica de la política*, Chapter I, pp. 34-36, 37-39, 41-42.

the most cruel and inhuman form of behavior, war is a mode of alienation behind which lurks the exploitation of man and the oppression of poor nations by imperialism. Only the establishment of socialism on a world scale can assure perpetual peace and overcome the antagonisms and alienations peculiar to capitalism. The capitalist economy has its own dynamic independent of bourgeois statesmen and the presidents of industrial monopolies; for they cannot prevent economic crises, in recent years the prelude of all imperialist wars.

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The dramatic history of capitalism contradicts the pacifism of modern revisionists: intercapitalist antagonisms and the antagonism between the bourgeoisie and proletariat constitute the motor of history in the contemporary world.

During the Second World War (1939–45) the principal antagonism in the capitalist world was the collision of interests involving the bloc of Anglo-Saxon countries against the Nazi-Fascist powers. The war showed that the antagonism between the imperialist powers in 1939–41 was more irreconcilable than that between the capitalist countries as a whole and the Soviet Union. In this connection it is worth recalling that the U.S.S.R. signed a nonaggression pact with Germany prior to the outbreak of war in 1939 and that afterward, when Hitler had mastered Europe and launched a war against the U.S.S.R., the Anglo-Saxon powers signed a treaty of mutual assistance with the Soviets for the purpose of defeating the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis.

In 1940, when the antagonism between Nazi-Fascist and Anglo-Saxon capitalism was the principal or most violent antagonism, Churchill and Roosevelt considered the conflict between Soviet socialism and Anglo-Saxon capitalism to have only secondary importance. Between the immediate danger of Hitler, who might have invaded England and the British Empire, and Soviet socialism in a single country, Churchill and Roosevelt decided for an alliance with Stalin in the war against Hitler; and with good reason, since in no way did the Soviets

at that time present a political threat to the historical and economic existence of the Anglo-Saxon bourgeois democracies.

In contrast, the principal antagonism from 1917 to 1933, before the period of popular fronts had gotten under way, was that between capitalism and socialism. To such an extent was this the case that the liberal democracies invaded Russia in support of the White generals: England and France in the West; and the United States, symbolically, in the Far East. After 1933, with the rise of Hitler to power, the policy of popular fronts or class collaboration permitted a *rapprochement* between the demoliberal bourgeois powers and the Soviet Union.

In the midst of the great economic crisis of 1929–33, when many millions of laborers were without work, the principal antagonism might well have become that between bourgeoisie and proletariat. Since capitalism was in ruins, conditions were then ripe for a proletarian insurrection and the establishment of socialism. Afterward, a policy of broad alliances excluded the possibility that the principal antagonism would involve a confrontation between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Instead, it contributed to making the antagonism between the Anglo-Saxon and Nazi-Fascist capitalist powers the dominant one. Even in Spain during the Revolution of 1936–39, the Kremlin was opposed to the introduction of socialism.

In failing to undertake the struggle for power during the Great Depression, the proletariat was dragged into a Second World War without being able to save the Soviet Union from that conflagration. Beginning in 1933, interimperialist rivalries emerged as the principal world antagonism; because the Social Democrats and Communist supporters of popular fronts, primed by the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, subordinated the interests of the world proletariat to bourgeois-democratic governments and big-power politics.

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Toward 1945 the Italian and French guerrillas had effective power in their hands; but the policy of class collaboration in

Italy and France implied a surrender to revisionism. Poorly directed, the proletariat renounced the revolutionary struggle for socialism, thereby allowing the bourgeoisie to regain power in Western Europe. Once again, as in 1917–23, the proletariat contributed to the recovery of the bourgeois state. In 1945 Thorez and Togliatti were committed to the same policy as Otto Bauer and Kautsky after World War I. With the action of a Bakunin or a Blanqui, socialism would have triumphed in Europe in 1917–23 and in 1945–46.

If the bourgeoisie maintains itself in power in the industrialized countries, it is not because Marx was mistaken in claiming that socialism would triumph first in the advanced countries; it is because neither the socialists in 1917–23 nor the Communists in 1945 struggled to take power from the bourgeoisie. Nonetheless, the revolution which was not made in the imperialist countries is beginning today in the underdeveloped or semicolonial ones. But this does not mean that socialism will triumph in the underdeveloped countries before it does in the advanced ones. Socialism is a function of economic and technological progress and of a given level of development of the productive forces; and this level cannot be invented or multiplied like the loaves and fishes of the New Testament.

Some have said that in 1945 Europe was not ready for socialism. Accordingly, it would have been utopian to attempt to follow Lenin by transforming an imperialist war into a civil war. Others affirm that in 1945 the United States was strategically prepared to apply to a socialist Europe the bombs it had used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But nuclear weapons would have been ineffective against a dispersed guerrilla army. Moreover, in 1945 the U.S. reserve of atom bombs could have been counted on the fingers of one hand. The Red Army had available an enormous number of divisions, and the Italian and French guerrillas had control over most of Italy and France. Everything seemed to point toward the triumph of socialism in Europe. Yet at that moment Stalin sought an accord with Churchill and Roosevelt by which the national interests of the Soviet Union, England and the United States

were given precedence over the interests of proletarian internationalism and the triumph of socialism in the Old World.

3. *The Financial Colonization of Europe by the Dollar* *

The United States suffers a continuous drain of dollars in search of a higher margin of return in Western Europe than on Wall Street. The deficit in the U.S. balance of payments is attributable in part to this drain to the countries of the European Economic Community, which are benefiting from a comparatively high rate of economic growth under conditions of a higher rate of interest than that payable in the United States, e.g., 6 percent as compared to 5 percent in 1965–66.

The European Common Market is approaching a climax. Yet its member countries are still behind the United States in the production of automobiles and radios. Since its currencies are strong and interchangeable, U.S. enterprises are more interested in investing capital in the European Economic Community than in the underdeveloped countries that have neither gold nor foreign exchange for repatriating the profits of U.S. subsidiaries.

The dollar is invading Europe because its average return there is 40 percent higher than in the United States. In Europe dollars are indirectly invested in the form of corporate securities, whereas in the underdeveloped countries they are directly invested in mining and industrial enterprises controlled and managed exclusively by U.S. citizens. Dollars are placed in the trust and management of European capitalists, but in Latin America this trust extends only to North Americans.

Despite the high return from U.S. capital invested in the European Economic Community, in 1963 this capital amounted to barely 10 percent of total U.S. investments abroad. But the percentage is increasing. U.S. investments increased from 600 million dollars prior to the emergence of the European Economic Community to 2.6 billion in 1960.

* *Dialéctica de la política*, Chapter I, pp. 70–73; *La rebelión del tercer mundo*, Chapter XVIII, pp. 188–190.

By 1961 investments had reached the sum of almost 3.1 billion, increasing to 3.7 billion in 1962 and to 4 billion dollars in 1963.

The fusion of U.S. and European capital is especially evident in West Germany. In many German enterprises North American capital has acquired strong positions in the exploitation of the expanding European market, without having to pay customs duties on its capital imports from the United States. The assault on the European Common Market contributes to covering part of the U.S. deficit in European currencies through U.S. control over European capital. In this way the United States is not obliged to pay its deficit to European banks in gold, which would challenge the supremacy of the dollar within the International Monetary Fund. Nonetheless, the dominion of the dollar is being challenged.

Although the degree of labor productivity in Western Europe is practically the same as that in the United States, the cost of labor in Europe is somewhere between one-third and one-half of its cost in the United States. . . . Because the cost of labor is so much higher in North America than in Western Europe, profits are higher in Europe. The European capitalist can pay interest on borrowed capital as high as 6 or 7 percent because his gross rate of returns is usually more than double the interest rate. In contrast, North American industry cannot afford this level of interest because its gross rate of profit averages to only a little more than 10 percent. If we subtract from this gross rate the taxes on corporate profits, interest, dividends, etc., the net returns are too small to stimulate rapid economic growth.

Confronted with the specter of financial tragedy, dollar diplomacy has frequently gained support for the dollar from the governments and central banks of Europe. England and the member countries of the European Economic Community have lowered their interest rate to around 5 percent in order to help contain the flight of U.S. dollars abroad. To some extent this policy has succeeded; but it is only a temporary measure and cannot be maintained for long.

With an interest rate of 5 percent and wages much lower in

Western Europe than in the United States, European industry tends to expand beyond the capacity of the world market to absorb its products, thereby launching a crisis of relative overproduction within the countries of the European Economic Community. In fact, Western European industry has already outgrown the limits of the European Common Market. Accordingly, the interest rate might be raised as high as 7 percent in order to discourage this excess growth and capacity. In this event, Europe would again be flooded by an invasion of dollars seeking a higher rate of return than in the United States, while the dollar deficit in balance of payments would increase. To overcome this predicament, the United States would have to devalue the dollar, perhaps as much as 50 percent, in order to lower the prices of its exports and to recapture the gold it has been losing to Europe.

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Since European enterprises are generally smaller than their North American counterparts, the abrogation of customs barriers within the European Common Market favors competitively the economic and financial Gibaltars erected by the United States in Europe. Moreover, these small European enterprises do not absorb the enormous mass of European savings, the 13 to 20 billion Eurodollars owed by the United States, which are loaned by the central European banks to North American firms. Through issues of European bonds, the yanqui Trojan horse is expanding its empire with the money of Europeans. This indicates that the old European capitalism, propped up by bourgeois socialist and Christian democratic regimes, has outlived its usefulness. Europe needs to assimilate its own savings without lending them to the yanqui invader; it needs to modernize its industries in order to win the economic battle with the North Americans both in Europe and throughout the rest of the world.

The Americanization of Europe with the assistance of Eurodollars is the most disgraceful example of financial colonization the capitalist world has known. Those responsible include prominent political figures like Harold Wilson, Guy Mollet,

Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Ludwig Erhard, Willy Brandt, Paul-Henri Spaak, Ricardo Colombo, Francisco Franco, Antonio Salazar and virtually the entire spectrum of European political parties: liberal, conservative and socialist. All this has occurred in the space of a few years with the complicity of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties and the passivity of socialists and Communists, particularly in Italy, France, Belgium, Holland and Germany.

Soon after its monopolization of the Latin American economy, the imperialism of the dollar moved toward the financial colonization of Europe. To this end, it manufactured anti-communist propaganda favorable to its own Carthaginian mercantile expansion. Subsequently, it substituted for the anti-communist propaganda of the Cold War a nuclear pact with the Soviet Union for their joint benefit: the monopoly of nuclear energy. Soviets and North Americans have signed a series of other agreements covering cultural exchanges and the conquest of outer space, which indicates that the anticommunism of the White House and the anti-Americanism of the Kremlin are only skin deep. Actually, this propaganda contributes to the misleading of third parties about the East-West conflict, which is currently less heated than the North-South antagonism between industrialized and underdeveloped countries.

With its anticommunist scarecrow, yanqui imperialism has remained in Europe with supreme military command over NATO and financial dominion over the European Economic Community. Following Germany's defeat, the yanquis prepared to conquer Europe economically through the Marshall Plan: tons of supplies (steel, petroleum, machinery, grain, cotton and other primary products); loans for the purpose of buying only from the United States; sales of armaments; and leases of naval, air and missile bases, particularly during the height of the Cold War between 1946 and 1957. During this period the balance of foreign payments was favorable to the United States; but after 1957 this balance became negative through the loss of from 2 to 3 billion dollars annually. Nonetheless, the dollar continued its policy of economic expansion in Europe, thanks to the central European banks which loaned

to North Americans the equivalent or more of the deficit in dollars owed by the United States. In other words, the yanquis purchased industrial enterprises, commercial establishments, banks and other strategical economic assets in Europe with European money even more than with their own capital exports. That a debtor power should become the greatest single investor within the creditor countries of Europe was an anomaly that had never occurred before short of direct reliance on military force. Such an outcome was made possible by Christian democrats and bourgeois socialists misled by the anticommunism of NATO, a policy subsequently annulled by the Soviet and Anglo-Saxon nuclear accords in Moscow.

The 13 to 20 billion dollars owed by the United States to Europe, representing the accumulated deficit in the U.S. balance of foreign payments, is exigible in gold. Yet an equivalent in value has been loaned by Europeans to U.S. bankers and captains of industry, with the result that Uncle Sam now directs the basic European industries concentrated in monopolies: virtual states within the states of the European Economic Community, constituting neocolonial space for the republic of the dollar.

General Motors has captured key industrial positions in almost every European country, such as Opel (Germany) and British Motors (England). IBM has acquired command over Olivetti (Italy) and Bull (France). Yanqui enterprises have acquired an interest in Fiat (Italy), which in turn has invested 600 million dollars in the Soviet Union. Boeing sells transatlantic aircraft to the European countries, which have the material capacity to produce competitive aircraft of their own. Financial conditions, modes of investment, types of exchange, capital transfers, stock markets, capital markets and the absolute power of money all favor the capitalism of Wall Street over its European rivals. Unless present trends are halted or reversed, Europe is in danger of becoming financially colonized by the United States within two decades (1960-80).

The economic war waged by the dollar in Europe for the purpose of controlling the key sectors of the European economy dates fundamentally from the year 1958. From then until

1967, the yanquis invested there close to 10 billion dollars. Of a total of six thousand businesses formed by North American capitalists abroad during this period, approximately one half were started in Europe where the currency is sound, the rate of profit is high and the market for consumer goods is expanding at three times the rate in the United States.

4. *The Disintegration of NATO **

The European Economic Community has given rise to new factors of world power in the postwar period. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) captained by the Anglo-Saxons no longer dominates the world strategy of the West in confrontation with the Soviet bloc.

NATO embraces too many rivalries which it does not constrain with nuclear arms. Should the Franco-German alliance push for the immediate reunification of the two Germanys, it would constitute a force independent of NATO. Actually, NATO is less significant as a multinational military and political alliance than the Franco-German agreement of January 22, 1962. Moreover, after the Anglo-Saxons and Soviets signed the nuclear accords in Moscow in 1963, which partially proscribed atomic tests, the North Americans and British also emerged as a military and political bloc independent of NATO.

The flaccidity of the Anglo-Saxons in Berlin has prompted an understanding between West Germany and France. Washington and London have shown considerable flexibility in Berlin, while Bonn and Paris have adopted a less compromising position. The Anglo-Saxons want to achieve German reunification through diplomatic negotiations. On the contrary, the French and Germans believe that the unity of the two Germanys will never be accomplished through legal channels. Thus the Bonn-Paris axis constitutes a dramatic consequence of the politics of the status quo tacitly agreed upon by the Anglo-Saxons and Soviets.

The thawing of the Cold War has wrecked not only NATO in the West, but also the Sino-Soviet alliance in the East. The

partially resolved or postponed antagonisms between Moscow, London and Washington have contributed to releasing new antagonisms between Peking and Moscow and between Paris and Washington. What suits the strategy of the Anglo-Saxons is unsuited to the French and Germans. In like manner, the national interest of the Soviet Union does not coincide with the political interests of the Chinese, Albanians, Koreans, Vietnamese or the masses belonging to the Communist parties in other parts of the world.

With no end in sight to the Anglo-Saxon negotiations over Berlin, France offered its unconditional support to Bonn for the purpose of reunifying the two Germanys. In effect, Paris offered to Bonn the French atomic bomb as a means of exerting pressure on the Soviet Union. For the first time, the parade of nuclear arms has threatened Soviet and Anglo-Saxon schemes for maintaining the status quo on the eastern frontiers of Europe. Consequently, the Anglo-Saxons and Soviets have resisted the French policy of testing atomic weapons and building France into an independent nuclear power.

The hot line between Moscow and Washington is an anticipation of nuclear problems of the future. Since there are now more than three nuclear powers, should an atomic bomb explode in Moscow or Washington, the hot line could communicate immediately that the bomb had neither a Soviet nor an American origin. In that event nuclear retaliation would be directed against neither Moscow nor New York, but against some other nuclear power, possibly France or China.

Leaning on the European Economic Community and the Franco-German pact, the French bourgeoisie have the destiny of Western Europe in their hands. The Germans will side with France, not with England and the United States, if they have to make a choice or elect their international allies. In West Germany there are several million Germans from the East who want to return to the land of their origin because of economic and class interests as well as sentimental reasons.

These refugees from the East had more faith in de Gaulle than in Erhard, for they saw in the French general a new species of Charlemagne. The West German military also had a

* *Dialéctica de la política*, Chapter I, pp. 80-82, 84-85.

better understanding with de Gaulle than with the German prime minister, who placed the interests of the German industrial and commercial bourgeoisie before the unification of the two Germanys with France's assistance.

In foreign policy, Erhard followed a neutral course between the French and the Anglo-Saxons, but very shortly fell from power. West Germans looked to de Gaulle to help Germany again become a great power, both in the East and the West. The Franco-German pact of January 22, 1962, was a resolution which Erhard could not avoid, notwithstanding the pressures from London and Washington. If Bonn had not definitely chosen France for its principal ally, de Gaulle would have left the Germans isolated in Berlin, denounced the European Common Market and turned toward a global politics in alliance with China, that is, in the event Peking could have accepted the hand of Paris.

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France has made an alliance with Germany and has allowed her traditional friendship with England to deteriorate. . . . Thus the grand lines of international politics no longer pass only through Moscow and Washington. The European Economic Community is in the course of becoming a supranational economic and nuclear power independent of the Soviets and Anglo-Saxons.

CHAPTER IV

The Antagonism Bourgeoisie-Proletariat

1. *The Role of Revisionism in the Social Revolution* *

Since 1917 conditions have been ripe for a socialist revolution in the capitalist countries. Following the armistice of 1918, the German and Austrian socialists could have followed the example of Lenin, but the Social Democratic governments consisting of petty-bourgeois socialists and the liberal bourgeoisie saved the capitalist order. If Germany and Austria had followed the road of the Russian Revolution of 1917, socialism would have been consolidated in Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland, with its inevitable extension to France and the rest of Europe, including England.

Kautsky's academic socialism, which was only nominally revolutionary, contributed to saving the German bourgeoisie when, between 1918 and 1923, the proletarian revolution was in the streets within reach of the working masses. The socialists of the robe, with Noske as minister of war and Hilferding as director of the German economy, returned to power the German bourgeoisie, thereby cheating the working people out of a proletarian socialist revolution.

If the working masses have not seized power in capitalist Europe, it is not for lack of revolutionary conditions both

* *Dialéctica de la política*, Chapter II, pp. 87-91, 108-111.

subjective and objective, but because the revisionists of Marxism betrayed the socialist revolution through their policy of class collaboration.

Austro-Marxism with Otto Bauer at the helm and German Social Democracy under Kautsky's leadership gave to European capitalism the historic opportunity of overcoming the socialist revolution throughout the decade 1920-30. Thanks to the Social Democrats, by 1929 the German and Austrian bourgeoisie had managed to reestablish their repressive power.

Following a period of prosperity, the European level of industrial and agricultural production in 1928 reached unusual heights. However, since every period of prosperity is followed by depression in accordance with the contradictory tendencies of capitalist development, in 1929 Europe suffered a total economic collapse. In North America, where the Depression hit even harder, almost 30 percent of the available labor force was without work.

In Germany as many as five million workers were unemployed in 1933. Under those conditions there was an enormous revolutionary pressure from working-class organizations. Yet the Social Democrats and Communists did not seize power or introduce socialism as a way out of the economic crisis. Without a revolutionary party or program and unwilling to use violence as a means to power, the Marxist parties failed to offer armed resistance to National Socialism, to Hitler and to the foundation of the Third Reich.

The German bourgeoisie, who had used the Social Democrats to quash socialism between 1917 and 1923, subsequently used the National Socialists to destroy the Communists and Social Democrats. Compulsory labor brigades and the bases laid for a war industry and subsequent remilitarization offered an alternative to socialism as a way out of the economic crisis. Hitler became Chancellor of the Third Reich following a normal political crisis, without an insurrection and without revolutionary opposition as a prelude to social revolution.

The acceptance of a National Socialist regime was a master stroke of the German bourgeoisie against the opportunist leadership of the German proletariat. On the pretext of the

Reichstag fire, Hitler legally dissolved the Social Democratic and Communist parties. Thus Nazism rose to power in Germany under conditions of a proletariat without work, insurrectionally motivated but with leaders made of straw.

During the Great Depression of 1929-33 the European proletariat, consisting of enormous armies of unemployed, had a militant class consciousness and was morally prepared to take power from the bourgeoisie in Germany, Austria and Spain. Nonetheless, the policy of class collaboration favored by the Social Democrats, and the Communist strategy of popular fronts following Hitler's rise to power in 1933, subordinated the struggle for socialism via a proletarian insurrection to the opportunist policy of electoral fronts in alliance with the moderate bourgeoisie and liberal middle class. The strategy of popular fronts, reformist rather than revolutionary, was motivated by the struggle against Nazi-Fascism and in expectation of deterring aggression against the Soviet Union, but in conformity with the national interests of the Kremlin rather than proletarian internationalism.

The events of 1939 showed that an imperialist war could not be forestalled by the creation of popular fronts without passing first through a socialist revolution and that it was imperative to take advantage of the favorable conditions presented by the continuing economic depression, which lasted until 1939. Following the example of the Spanish anarcho-syndicalists, the only revolutionary socialists in Europe during this period, millions of workers without jobs could have been mobilized for direct action toward the establishment of a socialist regime.

The alliances with the democratic bourgeoisie and liberal petty bourgeoisie did not represent, except mistakenly, the class content of Social Democracy and of communism during the popular-front period. Owing to political confusion, the workers in 1933 had less class consciousness than those in 1848, when insurrections occurred throughout all of Europe. In 1933 the workers could not distinguish clearly their friends from their enemies; in 1848 they knew better. The strategy of the *Communist Manifesto* was clear and to the point con-

cerning alliances with the bourgeoisie. Thus in Part IV Marx and Engels declare:

In Germany the Communist Party fights with the bourgeoisie whenever this class acts in a revolutionary way against the absolute monarchy, the feudal landowners and the reactionary petty-bourgeoisie; but never for an instant does it cease to instill into the workers the clearest possible understanding of the antagonism between the bourgeoisie and proletariat in order that the German workers may transform the social and political conditions, which the bourgeoisie must introduce along with its supremacy, into so many weapons against the bourgeoisie, and in order that the fall of the reactionary classes in Germany may lead immediately to a struggle against the bourgeoisie itself.

A century ago the struggle for a socialist revolution was clearer than today. Alliances with the democratic bourgeoisie were undertaken, but only for limited objectives. By contrast, bourgeois socialism and communist opportunism now stay within the limits of class collaboration, constituting the tail end of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois politics of Atlee, Thorez, Togliatti, Guy Mollet, Willy Brandt, Wilson *et al.*

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The socialists have yet to adopt a political position independent of imperialism and their respective national bourgeoisie. For the most part, they are dogmatically anticommunist because they are unreservedly proyanqui. Although openly revolutionary in their language, once in power they adopt the politics of the bourgeoisie.

Socialists in the West coincide in their policies with the political diplomacy and imperialism of the dollar. Or, like Guy Mollet, they carry the war to Indochina and Algeria; or wag the tail of Degaulism from fear of a proletarian revolution. Within the trade unions they follow a policy of perpetual bargaining with bourgeois governments. In this way they save themselves from jail or exile, and continue to enjoy their bureaucratic stipends. In Argentina, for example, the bourgeoisie must relinquish 1.5 percent of all wages to the trade-

union bureaucracy, depositing this sum monthly to the account of the trade unions.

The revisionists of communism are hardly more independent than the socialists. Since the popular-front years, they have adopted positions compatible with those of the national bourgeoisie and Soviet reformists. They are antiyanqui only inasmuch as they are vehemently pro-Soviet. In this respect they constitute the antithesis of the European Social Democrats. Nonetheless, within the capitalist countries and with the possible exception of Czechoslovakia, they have invariably failed to carry the antagonism bourgeoisie-proletariat to its ultimate consequences: a socialist revolution. They speak ill of the yanqui imperialists, but do not consider arming themselves for liberation; their policies begin and end within the demobourgeois framework of governments with a national bent. Within their respective countries, whether inside or outside the law, they coexist with their national bourgeoisie; and toward other countries they practice a policy of peaceful coexistence. As apologists of the Soviet system, they are incapable of taking a position independent of the Soviet Union and its allies among the national bourgeoisie. Within the trade unions they are reformists like the socialists, concentrating their energies on sporadic and isolated strikes, on peace demonstrations and the organization of cooperatives. Thus in Argentina in 1966, the military could dissolve 200 political parties in a move toward totalitarianism without firing a single shot.

The Communist parties committed to revisionism eschew the class struggle and proposals for seizing power: they are prepared to coexist with their bourgeoisie until 1980, when the Soviet Union will have become presumably the major world power. They are more Russian, then, than the Estonians or Lithuanians; they are the voice of their master, but against the revolutionary leaders in their own countries.

The Social Democrats and Communist revisionists coincide in their counterrevolutionary reformism: they agree on first making the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and only afterward a socialist one. They concur that the road to social-

ism must be evolutionary and nonviolent through electoral coalitions within the framework of capitalism—notwithstanding the postwar bankruptcy of this strategy in France and Italy. They bend before the prospect of atomic terror in favor of peaceful coexistence, while capitalism continues its aggressive policy against national liberation movements throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America. They subordinate the aspirations of proletarian internationalism to the interests of the big powers: the Social Democrats supporting the yanquis, the revisionists supporting the Soviets. But the bourgeoisie practice an internationalism of their own, above all against socialist Cuba. The Social Democrats and modern revisionists are more easily persuaded by bourgeois parliamentarianism than by the Maoist strategy of revolutionary war and the immediacy of socialist revolution. Having abandoned Marxism, their policy is to wait and see. To wait and see what?

In the midst of inflation when currencies lose up to 90 percent of their purchasing power annually, the socialists, Communists and trade-union bureaucrats exhaust themselves in struggles to keep wages abreast of price increases. Actually, what the workers gain through a painful strike of several days can be taken from them in a matter of minutes by bourgeois ministers through a new issue of currency designed to halt an increase in wages by a reduction in the value of money.

Since the bourgeoisie control the banks, the state budget, exchange rates, credits and the distribution of the national income, the proletariat wastes time in pursuing side issues only distantly related to the basic struggle for political, military and economic power. Although a government may redistribute income through raising taxes and wages, it can always nullify the results by arbitrarily raising prices. Accordingly, the politics of reformism and trade-union struggles for limited objectives are compatible with liberalism, not with revolutionary socialism.

Socialists, Communists and trade-union bureaucrats act in such a way as to perpetuate the antagonism bourgeoisie-proletariat instead of overcoming it. Perpetual negotiations

over wages is their alternative to the seizure of power, to the establishment of socialism on a world scale.

2. *Capital Accumulation and Class Struggle* *

In the decades 1960–80 the tension between the bourgeoisie and proletariat will tend to become more acute the longer peace endures. Perhaps it is peace which the bourgeoisie most fear, above all those associated with yanqui heavy industry, which cannot forge ahead without sustenance from a war budget. In this manner the tension between East and West constitutes the *raison d'être* of capitalist large industry geared to programs of national defense.

The necessity of capital accumulation becomes a continuing incentive to the bourgeoisie, obliging them to renovate the means of production in the interest of greater mechanization and automation of work. Thus the accumulation of capital produces unemployment among technical workers, changes the social relations of production, renders archaic the old mode of production, generates the conditions of a socialist revolution and creates a general climate of insecurity or alienation. Finally, it contributes to a self-defeating or regressive progress, because the process of production turns against both capitalists and workers by squandering large amounts of capital and labor through repeated or cyclical economic crises.

Confronted with this revolutionary climate created by the capitalist process of production, bourgeois socialists and modern revisionists have dedicated themselves to forming coalitions on the Left for the purpose of winning elections, but not revolutions. Accordingly, the antagonism between bourgeoisie and proletariat, which in our epoch is the principal antagonism within the capitalist countries, is overshadowed by parliamentary cohabitation. This is above all true of Italy and France, where the Communists act like Russian nationalists, inasmuch as their domestic politics tend to change with the Kremlin's foreign policies. In this way they cannot lead the

* *Dialéctica de la política*, Chapter II, pp. 96–98.

proletariat of their respective countries toward the social revolution.

In both East and West the rate of capital accumulation regulates national politics and foreign policy. Presaging an advantage of one system over another, a high rate is wanted above all by the European Community and the Soviet Union. The rhythm of economic growth and accumulation is much less in the United States than in the countries of the European Common Market and the U.S.S.R., and still less in comparison with China. The bureaucratization of the economy is a retarding factor of Soviet economic growth that is virtually absent in China.

With or without passing through periods of economic crisis and war, North American capitalism has more productive forces than it can profitably use. A North American steelworker, for example, whose productivity is the same as that of a Japanese or German worker, nonetheless earns almost three dollars an hour, compared to less than fifty cents an hour in Japan and less than one dollar an hour in Germany. This has produced a crisis in the North American steel industry, with the result that only 50 percent of its workers were employed from 1960 to 1964, and these at an average of less than thirty hours a week.

In 1958 steel produced within the United States was valued at 180 dollars a ton, as opposed to 120 dollars on the international market; accordingly, the United States now imports steel. Thus international competition currently favors the European Community against the United States. This antagonism cannot last long without a possible devaluation of the dollar designed to cheapen North American exports. Otherwise, North American workers will continue to remain unemployed; or more domestic steel will have to be produced for the U.S. military machine; or the North American workers will rise up against their bosses in order to insure the right to work. In the latter eventuality, the principal and immediate antagonism would be the struggle between the proletariat and bourgeoisie within the United States. But quite possibly this

may not occur as long as the standard of living of U.S. workers is derived in part from Latin America.

If the commercial antagonism between the European Community and the United States became especially tense on the world market, a possible devaluation of the dollar by 50 percent of its value in gold in 1965 would put pressure on European capitalism to devalue its currencies in order to maintain its competitive standing with U.S. products in Asia, Europe, Africa and America. Should the Europeans not devalue their currencies, then they would be faced with an economic crisis, a great mass of unemployed workers and a reduced rate of capital accumulation. This would be tantamount to a revolutionary situation or acute antagonism between the European proletariat and bourgeoisie. Its resolution might involve a military confrontation with the U.S.S.R. or even the United States in Africa and the Mediterranean. Otherwise, the alternative would be the breakup of the European bourgeoisie and the disintegration of the Common Market through a great depression, which would have a profound effect on the entire world and put to the test the existence of capitalism.

3. *Displacement of the Struggle between Labor and Capital* *

The policy of peaceful coexistence carries with it a passivity on the part of the proletariat toward events favorable or unfavorable to a socialist revolution. Consequently, what would have become the principal antagonism of the present—that between proletariat and bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries—has been reduced to peace demonstrations, non-violent strikes for higher wages and negotiations by political pressure groups.

As early as 1848 the struggle between the proletariat and bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries had become the principal world antagonism. In 1870–71 the Paris Commune

* *Dialéctica de la política*, Chapter II, pp. 99–101, 101–102.

carried this antagonism forward in the direction of a socialist revolution. In 1917 the Russian, German, Hungarian and Bulgarian revolutions were the prelude in Europe to a socialist revolution of continental dimensions. In 1929–33, during the Great Depression but prior to the emergence of popular fronts, the principal world antagonism again became that between the proletariat and bourgeoisie. Afterward, only Spain persisted in the struggle for a social revolution through the direct action of the masses. There even the Marxists thought like anarchists.

From 1933 to 1945 interimperialist rivalries became the principal antagonism dominating world politics. This displacement of the antagonism bourgeoisie-proletariat was the combined result of the politics of class collaboration, the passivity of the German Social Democrats and Communists, and, in the final analysis, the submission of the proletariat to the international politics of the Western democracies. During this period Soviet foreign policy changed from a nonaggression pact with Germany signed in 1939 to a mutual-aid pact with the Anglo-Saxon democracies directed against the Nazi-Fascist powers.

In 1945–46 the Italian and French guerrillas were disarmed to make way for governments of liberation in which Communists participated, after the manner of the German and Austrian Social Democrats from 1918 to 1923. The European bourgeoisie were thus saved a second time. If socialism has not triumphed in Europe, the blame does not rest on the bourgeoisie but first on the socialists and then on the Communists. Under these conditions, the principal and immediate antagonism has passed from the advanced capitalist countries to the semicolonial countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, which cannot support the double burden of exploitation by their own landed oligarchies and foreign economic imperialism.

The triumph of the Chinese Revolution in 1949 gave an impetus to the socialist revolution in underdeveloped countries, above all in Asia. The revolutionary war of the Chinese people under guerrilla leaders brought feudalism and im-

perialism to a violent end in China. However, by 1963 even the Soviet Union was involved in the partial blockade of China, because the Chinese leaders supported people's wars rather than peaceful coexistence with imperialism.

At the end of World War II the U.S.S.R. signed a pact of assistance with the government of Chiang Kai-shek to the detriment of the Chinese Communist government, to which it recommended the formation of a popular front with Chiang. If Mao Tse-tung had fallen into this snare, the Chinese socialist revolution would have been decapitated, as occurred during the Spanish Revolution of 1936–39. The Kremlin tried to maintain the demoliberal character of that revolution, when the Spanish people were pushing for guerrilla warfare and a socialist revolution against their bourgeois leaders. If guerrilla strategy and tactics had been extensively applied in Spain, the revolution would not have been lost to Franco and the Nazi-Fascist reaction in Europe.

The truth of the matter is that, with the possible exception of the Czech Revolution of 1948, all social revolutions directed or inspired by Moscow have failed: the Central European Revolution of 1918–19; the Spanish Revolution of 1936–39; the Greek Revolution of 1946–48; the Iranian Revolution of 1948, etc. Even with a Socialist-Communist majority in France and Italy in 1945–48, these countries were respectively governed by General de Gaulle and the Christian Democrats. In contrast, the Asiatic revolutions triumphed. Those that were not altogether successful were held back by the Soviet-imposed peace in Indochina in 1954 (Geneva Agreement) and by the Laotian compromise of 1962. Throughout the world the Soviets have made concessions to the yanquis and imperialists even when these were on the defensive. Because they have not wanted to exasperate the United States, they have preferred to compromise with imperialism rather than push for a socialist revolution.

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As long as the leadership of the proletariat does not become independent of its own national bourgeoisie, of West-

ern imperialism and of Soviet revisionism, there will be no further socialist revolutions in any country. Ideologically liberated from these alien social forces, with a socialist program, militant leaders and a strategy of revolutionary war, however, the working class joined by the peasantry and the impoverished middle class can achieve political power in the underdeveloped countries, which at the moment are most ripe for a popular antifeudal and anti-imperialist revolution.

Revolutionaries must liberate themselves from the traditional dogma of revolution by stages: first, a bourgeois-democratic revolution; afterward, the socialist revolution. The Spanish, Cuban and Chinese examples indicate that the bourgeois-democratic revolution is made at one leap, violently rather than by elections, thereby immediately opening the stage of proletarian revolution. The demoliberal politics of the French and Italian Communist parties, placing them to the Right of Christian Democracy, constitute thus the agony of the labor movement.

4. *Dynamic of the Antagonism between Bourgeoisie and Proletariat* *

In the effort to affirm itself historically, politically and economically through the expansion of its capacity for capital accumulation, the bourgeoisie brings about its own negation. The more capital it accumulates, the greater become the masses of the proletariat which enter the legions of its undertakers. Within this dialectical framework anticipated by Marx and Engels, economic and personal alienation will determine the destiny of capitalism in the years ahead, decisive ones for the socialist revolution. However much the modern revisionists prefer the precarious peace of capitalism to the perpetual peace of socialism, the latter can be achieved only through overcoming by violence the power of the bourgeoisie.

It is possible for socialist reformism and national communist revisionism to coexist with imperialism until 1980 for the purpose of helping the U.S.S.R. to become the first

world power. But the dialectical interplay of forces within capitalism testifies that history will not be tailored conformably to the Kremlin's intentions. The denouement of capitalism will be revolutionary and warlike, in short order within the European Community as in the United States: the antagonisms of capitalism will not wait for the modern revisionists to resolve them peacefully. Thus it is imperative to return to the revolutionary tradition and to combine a Marxist economic and dialectical understanding of contemporary events with an anarchist style.

In the capitalist countries as in the underdeveloped ones, when alienation becomes unbearable for the workers the socialist revolution becomes inevitable. A socialist revolution carries with it the risk of world war provoked by a civil war on an international scale; but the latter could begin imperceptibly in the vast spaces of Latin America through a strategy of revolutionary war against indigenous feudalism and the imperialism of the dollar.

Although the modern revisionists of Marxism-Leninism are fundamentally conservative, the prospect for the world is nonetheless revolutionary. The bourgeoisie, whose internationalism is not coexistent with but directed against socialism, is incapable of harnessing the powers it sets in motion. Because of the dialectic of alienation and the interplay of forces beyond its control, the alternatives before it are a world economic crisis, war or socialist revolution. Everything considered, it will be in the West that the great socialist revolution will finally bring down the capitalist international system; not in the East where the Soviet Union is pledged to realizing the chimera of socialism in a single country without ever sallying beyond its national frontiers. . . . The conditions of bourgeois existence indicate that the struggle for socialism is today even riper in the West than in the East.

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The economic crisis grows nearer in the countries of Western Europe and the United States. If the army of unemployed is not transformed into a revolutionary army with a strategy

* *Dialéctica de la política*, Chapter II, pp. 102-104, 104-106, 106-107.

of revolutionary warfare, once again as in 1929–39 the crisis will be resolved through sterile demonstrations, untimely strikes and, finally, an imperialist war. The apparently revolutionary or demagogical slogan “Let the rich pay for the crisis!” is negative, self-defeating and unsuited to a period of general depression, when both the objective and subjective conditions are present for a socialist revolution.

During a period of crisis it is pointless to demand from the capitalists what they do not have to give. It is demagogical and hardly revolutionary to demand that the bosses shoulder the burden of depression when the workers are being locked out or dismissed as supernumerary. A work stoppage is a consequence of the overproduction of wealth by an economic system based on the dictatorship of capital over labor. Among other causes, an economic crisis is produced because of the disparities resulting from the social character of capitalist production for the whole people, but for the purpose of ultimately benefiting a few. This structural antagonism between social production and private appropriation sharpens the class struggle to the point of revolution: it becomes the principal motor for the transformation of capitalism into socialism.

In a capitalist regime a crisis is always paid for by the poor, i.e., the workers. Consequently, instead of demanding the impossible, that the rich pay for the crisis, the workers should insist on a definitive solution through the socialization of the means of production and exchange. In times of depression the Marxist parties which understand what is happening, and the revolutionary trade unions which are not bureaucratized, must elaborate an economic, political and social program for moving the economy forward as the basis for introducing a socialist system and guaranteeing the right to work. In contrast, the Social Democrats and the modern revisionists, who practice the coexistence of classes, propose to nurse depressions instead of applying surgery. . . .

As long as the worker is not the owner of his instruments of production, he is a producer but not a proprietor; the capitalist, a proprietor but not a producer. In this capacity the worker is alienated from his product, estranged from his laboring

activity and victimized by his own work. The more he produces the smaller becomes his relative share. The objective antagonism or property relationship dividing as well as uniting the bourgeoisie and proletariat determines the diminishing participation of the laborer in his product; it implies a structural cause of the cyclical economic crisis from which capitalism is suffering as a kind of infirmity endemic to its system.

* * *

The cyclical economic crises endemic to the capitalist system are conditioned by the existence of private capital, i.e., by the disparity between almost unlimited powers of production and limited distribution outlets. Although this antagonism between social production and private appropriation can be definitively resolved only through the establishment of socialism, Social Democratic reformism and Marxist revisionism have favored partial solutions compatible with political, trade-union and parliamentary coexistence with the bourgeoisie. In 1967 the U.S.S.R. preferred to give credits for 100 million dollars to the fascist regime of Castelo Branco rather than assist the Brazilian proletariat in their struggle against it.

In the capitalist countries the antagonism bourgeoisie-proletariat has produced historical moments favorable to the seizure of power by the proletariat. In 1932–33, with millions of workers lacking jobs, they could have taken power; instead they asked the rich to pay for the crisis. Later they became confused by the reformist policies of popular fronts. Because they failed to push for a violent socialist revolution during the decade 1924–33, they had to suffer through an imperialist war as pawns in the political game of power of Nazi-Fascism and Anglo-Saxon imperialism.

CHAPTER V

Rebellion of the Third World

1. *The Fundamental Antagonism of the Decades 1960-80* *

The policy of concessions which betrayed the socialist revolution in 1945 prepared the way for the violent U.S.-U.S.S.R. confrontation of 1948: the Berlin airlift marked the culminating point of this antagonism. From 1945 to 1949 the principal international antagonism consisted of rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States; but with the triumph of the Chinese Revolution in 1949 the antagonism between the capitalist and socialist camps was displaced from Europe to the Far East, particularly during the war in Korea and now that in Vietnam.

At present, the principal antagonism of our world is not that between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, nor between the European Common Market and the U.S.S.R., nor between China and the United States, nor between England and France; the fundamental antagonism pits the imperialist powers not against one another, but against the underdeveloped or semicolonial countries. Despite Vietnam, the principal antagonism during the decades 1960-80 would appear to center on the relations between the United States and Latin America. In this perspective, a revolutionary war between the two

Americas, between the plutocratic North and the proletarian South, is virtually inevitable. As the tragic finale of capitalism, the struggle between the two Americas should constitute the most intense drama of the twentieth century. But for that, it is necessary to raise the level of the direct action of the masses to that of a revolutionary war against capitalist imperialism.

To contain the coming socialist revolution, the imperialism of the dollar resorts to the strategy of nuclear blackmail for the purpose of immobilizing the U.S.S.R. and China, so that these two countries may be dissuaded from offering moral and material aid to the wars of national liberation mushrooming in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The U.S. has successfully neutralized the U.S.S.R. not only by threatening nuclear retaliation, but also by taking advantage of the political and tactical errors of the revisionists. The fact that the Soviets give precedence to the struggle for peace over the socialist revolution has facilitated the military actions of imperialism in Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America.

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Despite the revisionists of Marxism-Leninism, every unresolved antagonism seeks a resolution through some form of struggle or cataclysm in history no less than in physical nature; hence wars between the imperialist and underdeveloped countries cannot be put off forever.

The flowering of small wars of liberation may in time create the objective and subjective conditions for the outbreak of a great war from which the Soviet Union may not be able to escape. To avoid that historic possibility the modern revisionists have refused to defend the underdeveloped countries, particularly the Latin American, against the imperialist Moloch of the dollar. The tactic of the revisionists consists of the ingenuous surrender of the underdeveloped countries, in the hope of saving a precarious peace shaken by the Berlin airlift, the Korean War, the struggle between the two Chinas and two Germanys, the imbroglio of the Congo, the drama of Cuba, Vietnam, etc.

* *Dialéctica de la política*, Chapter I, pp. 43-44, 44-46.

Should several small anti-imperialist wars and the sum of many small but violent encounters add up to a great war, then the fundamental antagonism could change its character, which is to say that the antagonism between the imperialist and underdeveloped countries might become subordinated to that between the capitalist and socialist camps.

Nonetheless, the contest between the Latin American countries and the U.S. may constitute the drama of human history during the decades 1960–80. Should the Latin American people succeed in establishing socialism after a bloody period of wars with their native oligarchies and imperialism—without these battles culminating in a Third World War—then the U.S. would have reached the threshold of a great socialist revolution. Deprived of its markets and sources of raw materials, the United States would be confronted with a sizable reduction in its standard of living.

Under such deteriorating conditions the North American workers would be pressed to seize power from the capitalists. The principal world antagonism would consist no longer of the struggle between the imperialist and underdeveloped countries, but rather between the bourgeoisie and proletariat within the United States. In this order of ideas, the American socialist revolution begins in Latin America and ends in the United States, following which the residual bourgeoisie of European capitalism would be isolated and cease to constitute a major power. The revolutionary struggle in the Latin American countries can become the base of socialist revolution throughout the world. Such is the great historical mission which the Latin American workers and peasants have to accomplish through the strategy of revolutionary war: Marxist in conception and anarchist in deed.

If the revisionists of Marxism do not launch a revolutionary struggle against yanqui imperialism in Latin America, they will be exposed to the risk of a Third World War between the socialist and imperialist camps. For peace to prevail there must be socialism in the United States; and that is impossible without a revolutionary triumph of the Latin American peoples over the North American trusts.

2. *Decolonization or Neocolonization?* *

Following the formation of great national industries, capitalist economic development required ever larger markets to dispose of the commodities that could not be absorbed within the narrow limits of the national economy. In response to this predicament economic imperialism was born: the formation of a world market dominating the national markets of the underdeveloped, semicolonial and colonial countries. Capitalist production became production for a world market, but appropriation remained national, i.e., profits were monopolized by the industrial powers. This new antagonism, absent from an earlier capitalism producing mainly for a national market, has come to dominate international relations since at least the beginning of the twentieth century.

The last two world wars were the expression of the antagonisms between those blocs of imperialist powers that disputed dominion over the world market, sources of raw materials and spheres of capital investment in the colonial or semicolonial countries.

The approximately 2 billion inhabitants of the underdeveloped countries had in 1960 a gross income of 100 billion dollars as against 180 million U.S. citizens with a gross national income of 500 billion dollars. These figures indicate with objective eloquence the great gulf existing between the colonized world and the imperialist countries. For example, in 1960 the per capita tax revenue in the United States was more than \$600, while the per capita income in a country like Ecuador was less than \$100. In 1967, approximately 70 percent of the world's inhabitants represented by the underdeveloped countries received only one-fifth of the annual gross income of the United States, representing only 6 percent of the world population. On this scale of economic inequalities, without socialism there are bound to be wars and revolutions.

How can these economic antagonisms between the imperialist and semicolonial countries be overcome? What is the

* *Dialéctica de la política*, Chapter III, pp. 123–128; *La rebelión del tercer mundo*, Chapter VI, pp. 53–57.

solution to the economic crisis of underproduction in the underdeveloped countries and to the crisis of relative overproduction in the technically advanced ones? Only violent struggle in the form of revolutionary war can resolve these economic antagonisms.

The disparity of income between the semicolonial countries and the republic of the dollar is partly accounted for by U.S. investments in the Third World, the long-range effect of which is to decapitalize the underdeveloped countries through indirect plunder passed on to Wall Street. For example, in 1950 the total direct investments of the U.S. in the rest of the world amounted to 11.7 billion dollars, from which the annual return was 1.7 billion. In 1961 these investments reached as high as 34.7 billion dollars, with an annual return of 3.7 billion. The growth of these direct investments was the result not so much of net exports of U.S. capital as of profits reinvested in the countries of their origin, because of the lack of gold and foreign exchange required to repatriate these gains in dollars. The total amount of unrepatriated profits from U.S. subsidiaries operating abroad amounted to 11 billion dollars between 1950 and 1961. This enormous mass of capital had a snowball effect in decapitalizing the semicolonial countries and impoverishing them from year to year.

During the period 1950-61, the U.S. extracted 34.1 billion dollars from its direct foreign investments, that is, three times the initial value of those investments in 1950. Of this amount, approximately 11 billion dollars were reinvested and 23 billion repatriated. Since the world production of gold did not exceed an average of one billion dollars annually, how could total profits have been repatriated from the underdeveloped countries in view of their lack of sufficient gold reserves?

The reinvestment of profits from foreign capital in Asia, Africa and Latin America underlies the progressive decapitalization of those countries. From 1950 to 1961 the amount of new capital exports in the form of direct foreign investments by the United States amounted to 14.2 billion dollars. However, the amount of profits repatriated during those years was 23 billion, which is to say that the underdeveloped countries

faced a net capital deficit of 8.8 billion dollars at the end of that period.

The drama of increasing misery in the underdeveloped countries is a consequence of their economic relationship to the imperialist powers. For example, between 1949 and 1959 Brazil received approximately 900 million dollars in the form of direct capital investments; but the profits from this foreign capital amounted to 1.2 billion. During that same period, Mexico received an estimated 600 million dollars in direct foreign investments; but the corresponding profits amounted to 900 million.

On reaching a particular level or volume, foreign capital produces decapitalization, i.e., more dollars leave than enter a given country. This is the situation in the majority of Latin American countries impoverished by the dictatorship of the dollar. Foreign capital invested but not digested is tantamount to decapitalization rather than a net capital addition. Thus for many underdeveloped countries the future tends to be worse than the present.

The underdeveloped countries become economically and technically downgraded under the oppressive rule of their native bourgeois and landed oligarchies supported by foreign imperialism. The outworn class structure, the excessive bureaucracy, the high percentage of servants and the enormous mass of unemployed in underdeveloped countries contribute to depressing domestic investments to an average that seldom exceeds 12 percent of the national income. Thus in 1960 the total amount of new investments by Third World countries was only 12 billion dollars.

For any being or class of beings to continue in existence it has to be reproduced periodically. In this respect, economic and biological life are similar: any mode of production or species that does not reproduce itself necessarily dies.

In the case of the Afro-Asians and Latin Americans, the capital consumed annually is only partly reproduced. Accordingly, there is a tendency toward a revolutionary confrontation between the popular masses in the underdeveloped countries and their native oligarchies allied to imperialism. These coun-

tries cannot develop any longer within a capitalist framework; their economic growth is nullified by their enormous loss of profits to foreign capital, not to mention their chronically unfavorable terms of trade with the imperialist countries since roughly the end of World War II.

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In 1964 there were ninety-five underdeveloped countries in the world, only a third of which had a rate of real economic growth of 5 percent or more. But if we discount the effect of population increases and the mass of wages and salaries for unproductive work, this real economic growth was practically nullified. Actually, the per capita wealth increased at an average rate of less than 1 percent annually in the countries of the Third World, most of whose per capita incomes varied between \$120 and \$170 yearly, according to data presented by the president of the World Bank in September, 1965.

Since the industrialized countries buy cheap and sell dear in their commerce with the underdeveloped ones, the gain from the terms of trade favorable to the industrialized countries is substantial, amounting to as much as 15 percent of the total value of their exports. Such exchange relations unfavorable to the Afro-Asian and Latin American countries represent more dollars appropriated gratis by the imperialist countries than those received by the underdeveloped ones in the form of loans, credits, direct capital investments and so-called economic and military aid. Consequently, underdeveloped countries are virtually prevented from escaping their condition of poverty.

Foreign capital appropriates in the form of profit approximately one-fifth of the revenue from its exports to the underdeveloped countries. Other things being equal, whenever there is a fall in the price of primary products on the world market, the aid received by the underdeveloped countries is indirectly canceled by an amount corresponding to the losses through trade to the industrialized ones. Moreover, the bulk of this aid has to be repaid. In receiving a dollar in loans for every dollar lost through unfavorable terms of trade, the Afro-Asian and

Latin American countries are compelled to escalate their debt burden; and in that respect also they become progressively impoverished.

In 1956 the foreign public debt of the underdeveloped countries was an estimated 10 billion dollars, as compared to 41.1 billion in 1966. In 1966 the annual amortization and interest payments on this debt were 3.5 billion dollars, as compared to an average of only 800 million annually during the period 1956-64. More than 20 percent of the revenue derived from the annual exports of the Third World is destined to cover these payments.

In Latin America the public foreign debt advances with gargantuan steps. In 1965 it was estimated that 3.1 billion dollars was needed to cover the annual amortization and interest on this debt. Of this amount, Argentina, Chile and Brazil were responsible for 1.4 billion dollars. Argentina alone had a foreign public debt of 3.5 billion dollars; Uruguay, a debt of 400 million. The financial drama of Latin America is already a tragedy, a profound crisis. Between 1955 and 1961 a capital of approximately 800 million dollars was received by Latin America from abroad; but during the same period unfavorable terms of trade resulted in a loss to Latin America of approximately 10 billion dollars. If we compute the amortization and interest payments on the foreign debt plus the profits from foreign capital, it is evident that Latin America is already ruined by economic imperialism: it cannot digest or afford additional foreign capital. Yet even this estimate does not take into consideration the cost of unfavorable terms of trade, which is the most decapitalizing factor of all in the Third World.

Since 1951 and the end of the economic boom produced by the Korean War, the prices of primary products exported by the neocolonial countries have had a tendency to decline continuously. By contrast, the price of steel, iron and petroleum—the primary products exported by the industrialized nations—has risen appreciably. The price of German steel, for instance, increased almost 60 percent, while that of wool fell more than 50 percent. The so-called miracle of Germany's

postwar recovery was itself an instance of economic imperialism involving a leonine exploitation-through-trade of the underdeveloped countries.

The world is one, but its wealth and population are unevenly distributed. The resulting antagonisms have given rise to wars between nations and power blocs and to social revolutions within each nation, because of the existence under capitalism of exploiting and exploited classes.

The social wealth is unevenly distributed between the industrialized and underdeveloped countries. Toward the middle of the twentieth century, of the total mechanical energy available to man from coal, petroleum, electricity, etc., almost 50 percent was in North America, 25 percent in Western Europe, approximately 17 percent in the Soviet Union and the remaining 8 percent in the Afro-Asian and Latin American countries representing more than 70 percent of the world population.

With millions of tractors and thousands of harvesters in North America, one agricultural worker there produces more than fifty such workers produce in Peru on minifundia or postage-stamp plots under quasi-feudal conditions of land tenure. The output of an agricultural worker in an underdeveloped country barely exceeds the requirements of his own subsistence. Although in some underdeveloped countries 60 percent of the population is engaged in agriculture, less food is produced than in North America with only 14 percent of the population on the land. Here lies the great economic disparity of our epoch: the inequality between nations and between classes, leading to eventual conflict and the danger of wars and social revolutions. As long as 70 percent of the world's population disposes of only 20 percent of the world's wealth while the remaining 30 percent living in the industrialized countries controls 80 percent of all disposable goods and services, the struggle between plutocratic or imperialist powers on one side and poor or proletarian nations on the other must culminate in national wars of liberation united to class struggles: the principal motor of human history in the final stages of capitalism during the closing decades of the twentieth century.

Far from being a reason for pessimism, the realization of the direst Malthusian predictions must bring about the fall of the capitalist regime. The scarcity of food relative to population growth is a consequence not of purely biological causes but rather of social ones, notably the role of landed oligarchies and economic imperialism in the underdeveloped countries. At one leap socialism could bring about the industrialization of the Third World, thereby overcoming the domination of the landowners and the monopoly of national and foreign capital.

In order for the disintegrating capitalist regimes to survive in the neocolonial countries, they would have to provide before the year 2000 tens of millions of new jobs in industry and services. But they cannot accomplish this within the framework of a quasi-feudal system of land tenure and semiartisan industries or with the help of large industries created through direct foreign investments, which are tantamount to financial colonies or states within a state.

3. *Third World: Capitalism or Socialism?* *

The stage of bourgeois society can be leaped over economically and politically in the development of the underdeveloped countries. In fact, the formation of a strong bourgeoisie occurs only late, if at all, in the semicolonial world. With the application of the steam engine and the emergence of liberal capitalism, to become bourgeois was not only an aspiration, but also an economic reality for the peoples of Western Europe and the United States. But to bring about a strong bourgeoisie in Asia, Africa and Latin America is like trying to make rivers run uphill. Imperialism precludes the formation of a powerful native bourgeoisie; the latter is contrary to its economic, political and strategic interest.

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The emergence of a fully developed capitalist society along Western lines would appear to be historically impossible for the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America

* *Dialéctica de la política*, Chapter III, pp. 133-134; *La rebelión del tercer mundo*, Chapter XVII, pp. 155-160.

and the Mediterranean basin (Spain, Greece, Turkey and southern Italy) because their native bourgeoisie are weak and without the requisite economic, technological and social power.

Those recently decolonized countries in Africa and Asia, which now have their own flag and are also comparatively free of financial neocolonization, hesitate between a quasi-Marxist socialism after their own manner and a quasi-socialist reformism à la Nasser or Boumedienne. Some theorists estimate that only a socialist revolution can economically and technologically produce in the underdeveloped countries the conditions for a great leap forward. The problem is to bridge the economic gulf and the disparity in incomes between the Third World and the United States. Is there any antagonism of our times greater than this one, which has still to be resolved through a social revolution in the Third World?

The order of events and an understanding of the economic forces behind them indicate that the bourgeois stage of development is historically unnecessary and economically and politically useless to the underdeveloped or semicolonial countries dependent on economic imperialism. For these countries to strive to become economically independent by taking the capitalist road testifies to political subjectivism. A fully developed capitalism does not depend on a state of mind; above all, it is the outcome of objective economic processes rather than acts of will.

In creating one-crop economies in the tropical and subtropical belt, imperialism impedes their development into full-scale capitalism. Periodic economic upsurges in the semicolonial countries constitute a form of political showmanship when they are not supported, as in Cuba, by structural changes in social classes and property ownership and by the dissolution of giant industrial and financial monopolies. Economic planning, as in Spain from 1964 to 1967, comes to nothing without a structural transformation.

Since the Second World War the ruling bourgeois classes in the underdeveloped countries have shown themselves incapable of accelerating the rate of industrialization. Instead, they have taken advantage of monetary inflation, currency devalua-

tion and other kinds of differential exchange to transfer the major part of their national income to privileged groups in which they have included themselves, the landed oligarchy and representatives of foreign capital. This is true of Brazil, Argentina and the majority of other Latin American countries.

The decolonization of the Third World is a matter of appearances: when there is no break with indigenous feudalism and economic imperialism, decolonization is a slogan more than an economic and political reality. The order of events is more eloquent than words. Thus from 1952 to 1962 the physical value of agricultural exports from underdeveloped countries increased by approximately 30 percent; but the value of these products in dollars increased by only 15 percent. This type of exchange chronically unfavorable to the underdeveloped countries resulted in a greater loss of revenue than the amount received from the imperialist countries in the form of loans, credits, so-called aid and direct capital investments.

An increasing decapitalization is evident in the underdeveloped, undernourished and undereducated countries of the world. Confronted by the internal failure of these countries to create strong national industries, to mechanize agriculture and to develop national culture, the native bourgeoisie have either surrendered outright to the representatives of foreign capital or have become junior partners of economic imperialism. In Spain the bourgeoisie have sought an accord with foreign capital in order to share in the spoils surrendered by Franco to imperialism: strategic bases and economic Gibaltars consisting of 304 yanqui enterprises.

Mediterranean Europe is being recolonized, while Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia speak the language of decolonization. Spain is an open door to the capital of the European Economic Community and to the strategic investments of the Pentagon and Wall Street; actually, it is more dependent on imperialism than North Africa. How times have changed since 1936, with Spain today a sanctuary of lucre for foreign capital!

Throughout the underdeveloped world, in North Africa, the Middle East, various Asiatic countries and some European ones, significant sectors of the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia

(physicians, lawyers, economists, engineers, public administrators, etc.) have passed over to the National Revolution. Disillusioned by the incapacity of the industrial bourgeoisie to make the great leap forward, these technocratic sectors now imitate Soviet, Yugoslav, Chinese and other socialist models of a planned economy, or otherwise develop their own programs of national industrialization and liberation, as in Algeria.

The Third World is moving toward profound structural changes: (1) the elimination of feudal relations in the countryside that fetter the development of agricultural production and limit the size of the internal market; (2) the mobilization of peasants in the National Revolution by means of a program of agrarian reform; (3) the reduction of the role of the comfortable middle class and export-import bourgeoisie, whose Westernizing mentality is proimperialist and counterrevolutionary; (4) the formation of nationalized or mixed industries designed to force industrialization, to put to work the unemployed and to mechanize agriculture with native equipment; (5) the organization of a strong chemical industry for providing raw materials and fertilizers to native manufacturing industries and agriculture; and (6) the liberation of national economies from the fetters of imperialism.

Altogether the changes that have occurred during the last few years indicate that the road toward an industrial and socialist society in the underdeveloped countries passes through different stages and transitional regimes, and that these preclude coexistence with residual feudalism and the economic enclaves of foreign capital. Nonetheless, in Spain the contrary occurs: Franco is a loyal gendarme of imperialism and a protector of the great landowners. And similar conditions prevail in many Latin American countries.

Recent history is rich in examples of major structural transformations: it exhibits three revolutionary roads toward socialism and five different variants of socialist society. The three revolutionary roads are: *coup d'état* (Czechoslovakia); civil wars (China, Korea, Vietnam, Cuba); and wars of national liberation or their popular equivalent (Algeria, Egypt, Zan-

zibar, Syria, etc.). Through these different variants of war, revolutionary leaders have adopted a Marxist perspective in the conviction that Marxism offers the only means of guiding the revolutionary process toward an industrial society. In this light Marxism is not so much a philosophy or economic and political body of knowledge as a method for economic, technological and cultural development. Accordingly, it bears little resemblance to bourgeois European socialism and to the ideological limitations of neo-Marxist reformism already assimilated by the bourgeoisie and by imperialism through the efforts of Harold Wilson and Willy Brandt.

After almost half a century of Soviet society, the five variants of socialism consist of the following: (1) the Soviet model of centralized state planning; (2) the Chinese model of popular communes; (3) the Yugoslav model of workers' councils sharing authority with the directors of enterprises; (4) the Romanian model, neutral in the Sino-Soviet conflict and critical of Comecon; (5) the Cuban and Algerian model, likewise independent of the Soviet and Chinese blocs. A revolution has to choose between one or another of the foregoing three revolutionary roads and five forms of socialism; the alternatives are either to risk making mistakes or to struggle for the full implementation of workers' self-management, the only revolutionary road leading beyond state economic planning to communism.

In both East and West the contemporary world is moving toward new forms of property that will not be impediments to accelerated economic and technological growth. This process of popular liberation has just begun. The coming years until the close of the twentieth century will be decisive for the struggle between the surviving capitalist and emerging socialist systems within the underdeveloped world. Spain, a country distorted by residual feudalism, militarism, retrograde clericalism and an undernourished capitalism, has to escape from her historical predicament through a thoroughgoing revolution which will not lose itself in words as in 1936-39. Latin America suffers under analogous circumstances, oppressed as it is by feudalism, militarism and imperialism.

4. *Dynamic of the North-South Antagonism* *

Under the imperialism of the dollar Latin America is a colony: the U.S. absorbs 46 percent of her foreign commerce; the Organization of American States (OAS) is the ministry of colonies for Uncle Sam; the votes of the Latin American countries in the United Nations are more favorable to yanqui diplomacy than are the votes of the British dominions to the United Kingdom. Objectively and subjectively, Latin America is the Commonwealth of the United States. But the Latin American workers and peasants denounce the colonial pact with the dollar made by their native oligarchies. They want colonial disalienation through a revolution against indigenous feudalism, aboriginal capitalism, sepoyan militarism and yanqui imperialism.

Of 87 raw materials indispensable to the United States, 80 are derived from Latin America and cornered by direct U.S. capital investments there. In 1961 these investments reached the figure of 8.2 billion dollars, or 23.5 percent of her total foreign holdings, having procured in that year earnings of 910 million dollars, or 24.6 percent of the corresponding returns. By 1966 the earnings from U.S. trusts in Latin America had exceeded one billion dollars annually.

But the Latin American countries cannot remit 910 million dollars of earnings in a single year, not including the interest and amortization payments on their foreign public debt. Consequently, U.S. subsidiaries must reinvest a substantial portion of this new capital, thereby contributing to the vicious circle of yanqui imperialism in Latin America.

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Latin America constitutes the reserve of raw materials and the most important market of yanqui capitalism, which extracts from her 97 percent of the quartz, 26 percent of the manganese, 50 percent of the petroleum and the major part of the iron indispensable to North American industry. In addi-

* *Dialéctica de la política*, Chapter III, pp. 140-141, 142-146; *La rebelión del tercer mundo*, Chapter XIX, pp. 201-202, 203.

tion to copper, lead, zinc, sulfur and other minerals, yanqui imperialism controls the production and exchange of tropical agricultural products: coffee, bananas, cocoa, sugar, etc.

Accordingly, Central America is the banana empire of the United Fruit Company. The Caribbean minus Cuba is the monopoly of the North American sugar trusts. Venezuela is the sultanate of Royal Dutch-Shell, Standard Oil and the Orinoco Mining Company. Argentina is the cattle empire of Wilson, Armour and Swift. Chile is the copper protectorate of Anaconda and the other U.S. copper trusts. The coffee empire of the United States is managed by the Coffee Exchange in New York. The airlines, telegraph, telephone and television circuits complete the picture of yanqui dominion over Latin America, which is more engulfed by the imperialism of the dollar than the British Commonwealth by the imperialism of the pound. Thus Canada, Australia and South Africa have more independence with respect to London than Latin America has with respect to Washington.

The Latin American countries are suffering from a process of cumulative economic deterioration. In 1955 the annual increase in the gross per capita product was 2.2 percent; it declined to 1 percent in 1959 and vanished altogether in 1960. In that year the rise in the price of imports combined with a fall in the price of exports deprived Latin America of many millions of dollars, which reduced to negative figures the overall growth of the economy. For example, in 1961 Colombia received foreign loans valued at 150 million dollars; but the fall in the price of coffee exports amounted to many more millions in losses.

The rate of population growth in Latin America is almost 3 percent annually; as a result, the increase in the gross continental product did not contribute to a per capita increase in 1960. By comparison, capitalist Europe in the nineteenth century, at a similar stage of industrialization, had an average annual population growth of only 1 percent.

Economic stagnation under conditions of population growth indicates that capitalism cannot last, that it cannot reproduce itself. Thus Latin America must follow the example of Cuba

and China, where the rate of economic growth is greater than in the capitalist countries. The disparity between a net annual increase in population and a net annual decrease in national wealth will have to be resolved through a Latin American revolution; but that requires a continental struggle against the indigenous oligarchies and yanqui imperialism.

The North American monopolies and the native latifundium system of land tenure constitute the binomial of economic and technological backwardness in Latin America. The yanqui monopolies will fight to the death against the Latin American masses when these attempt to initiate the struggle for liberation. The outcome promises to be an inter-American war no less bloody than the wars for independence in the nineteenth century. Just as America liberated itself from Spanish colonialism, it must now liberate itself from yanqui imperialism. . . .

As a capitalist power, the United States will defend its Latin American colonial preserve with greater violence than that in Southeast Asia. The North American plutocracy is fully aware that, should a socialist society emerge in Latin America, the U.S. would lose its most important export market, abundant sources of raw materials and an outlet for its surplus capital in the form of direct investments. Should the liberation of Latin America lead to the socialization of these investments and the cancellation of its debt burden, this would deprive the United States of a significant addition to its annual standard of living, cutting the latter by perhaps 20 percent. For lack of markets and raw materials, North American industries would have to curtail production; under these conditions the number of unemployed might reach more than ten million.

The revolutionary solution to the antagonism between Latin America and the United States lies in the hands of the North American proletariat; jobless and impoverished, it would have to seize power in order to install socialism within the United States. Thus an external antagonism would generate an internal qualitative change, which in turn would contribute to an external qualitative transformation in the relations between North and South America.

For the Pentagon and Wall Street to maintain the United States as a capitalist power, Latin America would have to remain colonial space for the dollar. On the contrary, should Latin America escape from this net and establish socialism, the U.S. would have to follow the same road. The productive forces of North America are too great to be contained within the framework of a national capitalism without the imperialism of the dollar.

Only the unity of the two Americas, without classes, capitalism and national frontiers, can make possible for the American hemisphere an accelerated economic growth without civil strife and imperialist wars. But the liberation of Latin America will not be accomplished by the revisionist Communist parties, but rather by men like Fidel Castro, Yon Sosa and Caamaño.

In principle, and for the purpose of industrializing Latin America, North American industry could operate at full capacity without economic crises. Under such conditions, Latin America could expect an increase in production up to 30 percent annually, such as China has achieved during years without agricultural drought.

Within the next twenty years, the Soviet Union will be unable to raise its own level of production to that of the United States in 1965 and also contribute to the industrialization of China, India, Africa and Latin America. Consequently, the industrialization of the Latin American countries will have to come from the creation of a continental socialist system, presumably through the triumph of a socialist revolution in Latin America which, by chain reaction, will bring about socialism in the United States.

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For Hegel, historical forces at a given moment center their action in countries or regions where social and political contradictions are in evidence. Supplementing Hegel's dialectical approach with a thorough knowledge of political economy, Marx argued that historical forces are basically economic in character and that the epicenter of history is where social and economic antagonisms are strongest and most pronounced.

In accordance with this model of historical interpretation, the East-West antagonism (U.S.S.R.-U.S.) was the principal source of world conflict before the Soviets and Anglo-Saxons became members of the same atomic club. Since then, it has been displaced by a North-South antagonism between the developed and underdeveloped countries, whose differences in per capita income are now greater than the per capita differences between bourgeoisie and proletariat in the industrialized countries.

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We live in a changing world: the Communists of yesterday have become the bureaucrats of today; European capitalism has become a neocapitalism with a basically nationalized infrastructure; and the countries of the Third World have become the makers of world history. The underdeveloped countries represent three quarters of the earth's population, but appropriate barely 15 percent of the world's annual production. It is this inequality between rich and poor nations that constitutes the axis of contemporary history.

The political and philosophical concepts that are capturing the minds of the peoples of the Third World will make the future history of mankind. Nuclear energy, military power, the imperialist economy and dehumanized mercantile society will not much longer dominate the man of our epoch. As long as the inequality between rich nations and poor continues to be greater than that between the capitalists and workers of the industrialized countries, the drama of human history will gravitate toward the countries of the Third World.

CHAPTER VI

The Struggle Between Capitalism and Socialism

1. *The Nationalization of the October Revolution* *

With the defeat of Nazi Germany, the U.S.S.R. emerged as the dominant power on the European continent. This situation motivated a counterresponse in the form of the European Economic Community, which has since occupied the pole left vacant in the continental East-West antagonism. In the interaction between East and West, socialist planning has likewise produced a counterresponse in the form of the directed economies of the capitalist countries.

The Soviet Union must now face opposition from the Bonn-Paris axis as it once did from the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis. At the level of national antagonisms the struggle for peace without socialism is a utopia: the sociology of war indicates that hostilities occur when what is good for one nation is bad for another. This antagonism has an economic basis: capitalism produces for a world market in conformity with the international division of labor; but the lion's share of the benefits are appropriated by two or three imperialist powers or blocs.

Under the historical, political and economic pressures of the antagonism capitalism-socialism, the Soviet Union contributed to modifying Western capitalism; but the capitalist countries in turn brought about changes in the Soviet Union. In the West the bourgeoisie have become less stupid and more cruel in defense of their regime; at the same time the Soviet leaders

* *Dialéctica de la política*, Chapter IV, pp. 173-176, 176-177.

have renounced proletarian internationalism or have used it not to spread but to consolidate the socialist revolution in a single country and to raise that nation to the status of a major world power. Thus proletarian internationalism has been transformed by the Kremlin into a species of Soviet nationalism which the Western Communist parties glory in. Inspired by the mirage of constructing a great power by 1980, the Soviet revisionists have immobilized the Western communist masses belonging to the parties owing allegiance to Moscow.

In this way ideas, men and parties remain downgraded or petrified; but the objective irony is that antagonisms negated by decree continue to affirm themselves. Such antidialectical subjectivism has nothing in common with Marxism, which is reducible neither to a mechanistic economic determinism, nor to an abstract or general theory of the state, nor to a philosophy of concrete national political circumstances.

Lenin proposed the following concrete objectives for the October Revolution of 1917: (1) to launch a worldwide socialist revolution; (2) to break the imperialist front by supporting all proletarian movements for liberation; (3) to resolve the antagonisms at the heart of Russian society in order to transform daily life; (4) to accelerate economic and technological growth as a condition of changing the social and political structure; (5) to abolish the state by devolving upon society the powers which the state has appropriated as an organ of class domination; (6) to maintain proletarian internationalism under the protection of the Third International. But the fact is that the October Revolution has become nationalized, subordinating all national Communist movements to the requirements of Soviet foreign policy adjusted to the imperialism of the dollar.

Once nationalized, the Bolshevik Revolution became a fetter on the international socialist revolution: first, through the politics of popular fronts; afterward, through the policy of peaceful coexistence under the mystic symbol of the dove of peace, which has replaced the hammer and sickle as the emblem of Communist parties in the West. The latter policy immobilizes the class struggle and leaves an open field for

imperialism to repress Afro-Asian and Latin American movements of liberation. Thus the antagonism between the Soviet Union and imperialism no longer constitutes the principal world contradiction.

During the Caribbean crisis of October and November, 1962, the antagonism between the United States and Cuba occupied the center of world conflict. The rival antagonism U.S.-U.S.S.R. was conciliated behind closed doors through long and peaceful negotiations between representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union—without the presence of Cuba, whose fate was being decided by others. Once again, this indicates that the contradiction or antagonism between imperialism and the underdeveloped countries is the principal struggle at this time, and not the interminable notes and discussions between the Kremlin and NATO, and above all the United States.

If the antagonism between capitalism and socialism had constituted the principal aspect of world tensions, then the United States would not have been able to decree unilaterally the economic blockade against Cuba in November, 1962. This measure against the use of Cuba as a base for Soviet missiles and a strategic air force was indirectly a military action against the U.S.S.R., for Soviet ships would have had to force their way through the blockade in order to assist Cuba. If the U.S.S.R. had wanted the United States to listen to reason, she could have reciprocated in kind in the Formosa Straits by offering to build missile sites on the Chinese mainland. With the U.S.S.R. and China united, the U.S. would have been just as pressed in the China Sea as the Soviet Union in the Caribbean; but the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy collided with the antiyanqui plans of Peking.

The battle of the Caribbean could have had its great strategic unfolding against the United States in the Formosa Straits, Vietnam, Laos or even Latin America through direct material assistance to national liberation fronts. Instead, the Soviet Union bridled these mass movements: it did not support China against the United States over the question of Formosa; it sought a peaceful settlement in Laos; it did not intervene in

South Vietnam against the yanquis; and finally, it withdrew its missiles and strategic air force from Cuba in return for a vague promise from the United States not to intervene there. This shows that the Soviet Union at the present time will refuse all risks that do not serve its national interests. In this respect it is no different from the imperialist powers in the West; except that these have brazenly assisted the counterrevolution in Cuba and Southeast Asia, whereas the Soviets have given only timid support to the revolution in Laos and the Caribbean.

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The Soviets continue to insist on a general accord with the United States. This nationalist strategy reduces the tensions between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., thereby giving prominence on the stage of world history to the conflict between imperialism and the underdeveloped countries. But in this way the antagonisms between the socialist and capitalist worlds are not eliminated; they take another form. Thus the confrontation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. has become overshadowed by the hostilities involving the United States and North Vietnam, which have tended to escalate in direct relation to peaceful coexistence between the United States and the Soviet Union.

By nationalizing socialism and abandoning the struggle for a world revolution the Soviet Union defers the confrontation between socialism and capitalism; but in postponing it the antagonism becomes more acute and its resolution correspondingly more violent than if it had been resolved earlier. The longer the delay in establishing socialism throughout the world, the more devastating could be a Third World War from which the Soviet Union could hardly escape. Thus the Soviet Union may itself suffer from not having subdued imperialism through the agency of national liberation movements and a strategy of revolutionary war when the time was ripe.

The Soviet intelligentsia wants to direct future history according to its own national and technobureaucratic interests. But the irony of contemporary history is the failure of peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas, the two Chinas, the two

Germanys, the two Indochinas, the two Laos. It is ironical, too, that in the stormy waters of the Caribbean Uncle Sam wants to drown Fidel Castro before the neutrality of the Kremlin.

2. *Peaceful Coexistence and Nuclear Stalemate* *

Rather than propagate and stimulate a socialist revolution on an international scale, the U.S.S.R. has pursued a policy of peaceful coexistence which denies the most elemental maxims of the Marxist approach to political problems. In negating world socialist revolution, Soviet revisionists glory in a Pan-Russian nationalism more suited to the tsars than to Lenin. This plays into the hands of the counterrevolutionary strategy of yanqui imperialism in the underdeveloped countries and in Western Europe—all on the expectation that the U.S.S.R. will meet the figures for industrial and agricultural production programmed for 1980 by Soviet bureaucrats and technocrats. Without stimulating socialist revolutions in the underdeveloped countries, however, the Soviet Union is unlikely to enjoy either a peaceful future or national security.

For not having supported socialist revolutions in guerrilla-controlled Europe in 1945 and for failing to resolve then the conflict between capitalism and socialism, the U.S.S.R. must now face the problem of Berlin and the possibility of a new European war because of the Franco-German military alliance. In this manner, deferred antagonisms beget other forms of societal conflict without having resolved the original ones.

The overcoming of the differences between France and Germany has given rise to new antagonisms not between these countries, but with the U.S.S.R. Such has been the outcome of the opportunist strategy of the Soviet Union, which permitted the Western powers to rearm and to become unified. Once again, as in 1939, the way is open to war, of which the immediate cause might be Berlin or the unification of the two Germanys.

The U.S.S.R. follows a conservative policy because it wants

* *Dialéctica de la política*, Chapter IV, pp. 184–185, 188–189, 189–190; *Estrategia de la guerrilla urbana*, Chapter I, pp. 32–36.

to gain time in order to fill by 1980 its enormous geographical space with factories and communications networks. To that end it wants to halt the wheels of history elsewhere. Russia reached the status of a nation only in 1917, whereas many Western powers achieved nationhood as early as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and the United States, Germany and Italy in the nineteenth century. The practical necessity of creating a unified nation throughout a territory of 21 million square kilometers has given rise to a belated nationalism dissimulated as communism. In this respect the strategy of the Soviet technocrats is defensive: they have more space than they need.

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Preoccupied with its own industrialization, the U.S.S.R. stops short of risking its national interest either in expanding the socialist revolution abroad or in defending Cuba, Vietnam or China against the United States. On the contrary, it puts pressure on these countries that they may come to an understanding with yanqui imperialism. And should they fail to do so, it accuses them of being nationalistic, dogmatic and adventurous.

Soviet revisionism has given indications of searching for a Peace of Vienna or a new Treaty of Versailles; but the Bonn-Paris axis will not bend before Anglo-American pressure to accept the status quo of Berlin and the two Germanys. Accordingly, the European Community is arming itself as an atomic power. Nuclear disarmament is impossible under these conditions. Within a short time China and the European Community will become great nuclear powers, which should change the correlation of strategical forces. The atomic club of the Big Three (United States, England, Soviet Union) will no longer control the world's destiny. Tacitly united in challenging its control, France and China will have rendered obsolete the nuclear accords of Moscow.

Matters are half and half in our world of transition to socialism: two Germanys, two Koreas, two Chinas, two Indochinas; two different systems facing each other, two worlds

mutually exclusive, yet interdependent. This situation cannot last for long. History searches for a definitive solution that goes beyond the existing conflict of social classes, international agreements in the form of peaceful coexistence, and the level of consciousness and will of the world's leaders.

The Soviet revisionists want a settlement with respect to Berlin, a written agreement in order to safeguard their western frontiers and to concentrate on their own peaceful economic and technological development. Because of its enormous size the Soviet Union is still occupied with the task of internal colonization, while the United States is involved in all parts of the world through its direct capital investments, a species of neocolonialism.

The foreign policy corresponding to Soviet internal colonization is peaceful coexistence in order to gain time for industrialization. But this policy is tantamount to subordinating the international labor movement and the other socialist countries to the national interests of the Soviet Union. Geopolitically, the U.S.S.R. has its northern frontiers sealed by the polar ice-cap, its eastern frontiers protected from direct contact with capitalist countries and its southern frontiers flanked by underdeveloped countries. Thus only the western frontiers present points of immediate friction and hostility, though the Soviet frontiers with China are not immutable or untouchable.

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Some 250 U.S. air and naval bases encircle the socialist camp or extend yanqui power elsewhere throughout the world. But the Soviet Union has yet to adopt an intransigent position like that of the yanquis in Cuba when they obliged the U.S.S.R. to dismantle its missile sites. Moscow tolerates launching pads directed against it from Turkey, but Washington refuses to tolerate them on the island of Cuba. That is because the U.S. is oriented toward the outside world, while the U.S.S.R. is oriented within. The Soviet Union needs more time for its economic and technological development; and for that reason it seeks to preserve the status quo with the United States.

In this light it is a questionable strategy that takes the

U.S.S.R. as an ally against imperialism. For its tendency is to negotiate in order to gain time. The opposite is true of the European Community and the United States, colonizers respectively of Africa and Latin America.

In the end, the U.S.S.R. expects to become a world power like the United States. Accordingly, in matters of international policy it subordinates everything to getting along with imperialism and not exasperating it. This takes for granted the passivity of Communist parties in the underdeveloped countries. The U.S.S.R. wants to endure in peace with the United States even at the price of surrendering its closest allies and swallowing its own children, i.e., movements of national liberation. The differences between Mao and Enver Hoxha on one side and the Kremlin on the other indicate that the world strategy of the U.S.S.R. is one of collaboration with yanqui imperialism. In some areas the North American imperialists have fewer differences with the Soviet Union than with de Gaulle in their own capitalist camp or with Mao in the socialist world. The atomic club of Moscow unites Soviets and Anglo-Americans, but separates the French from the yanquis and the Chinese from the Soviets.

International conflicts are dramatized in the opposition between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. But this psychological recourse tends to defer existing antagonisms and to leave them unresolved. It is said that the world has been on the brink of war for many years—but for the purpose of constraining movements of national liberation. Thus imperialism endures with the complicity of the Soviet Union. With the dramatization of international conflicts the masses lose their revolutionary zeal for solving national problems and become subjectively deluded by the struggle for peace.

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Strategically, the correlation of world forces has changed radically with respect to 1945, when the United States was the only atomic power. Actually, the decolonization process immobilizes the United States at various critical points in Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America. Since other nuclear

powers are emerging besides Russia, England and the United States, the balance of world power is changing constantly. It is a matter of strategical wisdom that national sovereignty is now a function of the power of nuclear deterrence. Thus the old metallurgical-based imperialism of steel, coal and petroleum, over which two world wars were fought in 1914–18 and 1939–45, has been replaced by a new imperialism founded upon atomic power and atomic armies including that of the Soviet Union.

In this hour of the world any small nation capable of producing nuclear weapons can guarantee its full sovereignty without multinational alliances. This was impossible in the epoch of gunpowder and explains why the U.S.-U.S.S.R. watchword of limiting the number of fingers on the atomic trigger conceals a nuclear monopoly of power in favor of the Anglo-Saxons and Soviets. Socialists in the advanced countries and the modern revisionists of communism have a false estimation of the strategical and political possibilities of our epoch. For with the protection afforded by its own nuclear arms, no country needs the tutelage of a superpower whether in the East or the West—protection which conceals a subtle form of imperialism on the part of the Anglo-Saxons and Soviets.

The mission of the military forces of the great powers is to avoid war on a nuclear scale, to absorb a sizable part of the national budget in order to maintain the capitalist economy of scarcity and to repress insurrectional movements in the advanced and underdeveloped countries, that is, as long as the U.S.S.R. continues to be seduced by peaceful coexistence with imperialism.

Atomic war signifies the destruction of the great metropolises as well as large military units (army corps, divisions, brigades). Since the Soviet Union has highly populated cities and a regular army like the United States and other industrialized countries, coexistence is dictated by the consideration that a military victory is impossible without reciprocal destruction. But that does not prevent revolutionary wars from taking the place of nuclear ones.

The bourgeois strategists of our epoch estimate that total war on a nuclear scale would bring the destruction of the contending parties. One could say that between two powers of equal nuclear capabilities, their combined forces are equal to zero. Under these conditions, superpower becomes converted into reciprocal weakness, absolute military power into no military power. Thus total power has become a factor for peace through atomic terror as a means of persuasion between nuclear powers. Nonetheless, revolutionary war can release the historical forces temporarily paralyzed by the Kremlin and the Pentagon.

The philosophy of atomic terror is only partially convincing: it is viable only for countries with great cities and large military units. As matters now stand, generals and field marshals can be used effectively only against movements of liberation or future insurrections in the West, such as might arise from a great economic depression like that of 1929 to 1933.

A strategy involving generals, field marshals, great cities and regular armed units is unthinkable in this era of nuclear arms. Nonetheless, small marginal wars, or wars of liberation as they are called, have been multiplying since the end of World War II without the great powers being able to stop them. Despite its military strength, France lost the wars in Indochina and Algeria. The United States failed to win the Korean War, and its battleships, aircraft carriers, planes, tanks and other weapons have shown themselves to be incapable of resolving the wars in Vietnam, Laos and other parts of the world.

International politics are governed, in a certain sense, by these marginal conflicts. The great powers become entangled in events produced by the small ones. What does this signify? Simply that the nuclear powers have to intervene in situations that might drag them into a war with one another. Accordingly, the great nations no longer direct world affairs but are directed by them. To such an extent has the influence of the great powers dwindled since they have entered our epoch of nuclear arms and revolutionary wars.

The bomb over Hiroshima had a destructive power equal to the explosion of 20 thousand tons of TNT. The hydrogen

bomb has a force equal to 20 million tons of TNT. It is estimated that 50 such bombs could paralyze the industrial activity and will to fight of great nations like the United States and the Soviet Union. Six hours following the detonation of from 50 to 100 hydrogen bombs, those countries would be largely devastated. With their cities partially destroyed, the surviving population would have to flee into the countryside, thereby creating some 40 million refugees. Thus nuclear war is lost more in the rear than on the battlefronts. Coexistence between the great powers is accordingly obligatory, at the same time that it surrenders historical initiative to the small countries, i.e., to those under popular leadership. Once again, man is more decisive than technique.

In a nuclear age political war on the basis of small, dispersed but interconnected units is more effective than atomic weaponry. It is no more expedient to employ bombs costing many millions of dollars to kill little groups of dispersed guerrillas than to attempt to exterminate ants with ordinary bullets. A movement of social discontent, which flourishes in all parts in the form of rebellion, cannot be defeated or contained by the great powers using either nuclear arms or conventional ones.

History cannot be congealed with bombs of 100 megatons nor with more powerful weapons. The Soviets and Anglo-Saxons intend to halt the course of history through a policy of coexistence based on a new status quo: state capitalism in the East and private or corporate capitalism in the West. Neither one is a permanent feature of our epoch. Both systems are in transition, no matter how much the revisionists of communism may believe that the Soviet regime is a definitive form of the future.

The focal conflict of our time is shifting from East to West. Here economic crises, strikes, unemployment, the revolution in the countryside, the crisis of nationalities, the great monopolies and struggles between blocs of countries tend to generate more creative, more spontaneous, responses than those in the Soviet Union. There the Communist Party takes the form of a church, the Secretary of the Party is a virtual pope and the

state has absolute powers before which man is less significant than in the presence of the gods of the Greco-Latin religions.

Nuclear weapons act as a brake on hostilities between the major powers, but cannot halt revolutionary developments in the Afro-Asian and Latin American countries nor in the epicenter of capitalist imperialism in Western Europe and the United States. The atomic club of Moscow cannot maintain forever the status quo between East and West. These two worlds are developing at an uneven rate which undermines the viability of any long-term agreements.

3. *Economic Competition between East and West* *

The Soviet world has been seduced by the myth of technique, the sense of the cosmic (Sputniks) and by great public works: the creation of artificial lakes; the construction of great reservoirs; the deflection of rivers; the excavation of canals; and the building of industrial cities. The superman of Soviet society is not the philosopher or sociologist, but rather the astronaut, the Stakhanovist worker and the technocrat. Science fiction in the U.S.S.R. indicates that technocracy is the ruling force, that the intelligentsia is preoccupied more with the exploration of the physical universe than with the social world and that the preoccupation with technics ignores the fundamentals of historical materialism.

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The Soviet technocracy takes pride in an economic subjectivism which impregnates its policies with a boundless optimism. It hopes to win the technical race with the United States, but not in order to liberate the world proletariat from capitalist oppression and exploitation. The Soviet bureaucracy has reduced the practical significance of Marxism to a general theory of centralized economic planning and state-directed growth in the underdeveloped countries. Soviet leaders tirelessly repeat that a socialist economy develops more rapidly than a capitalist one. From 1955 to 1961 and earlier, pro-

* *Dialéctica de la política*, Chapter IV, pp. 191-192, 193-194, 198-199, 201-202, 204, 206-209, 211.

duction increased at an annual rate of 6-7 percent in the Soviet Union, as compared to only 2.5 percent in the United States. Since World War II, however, Germany and Japan have grown just as much or perhaps even more than Russia.

Thanks to the economic advantages of their system, which permits a higher rate of accumulation or investment than in the capitalist world, Soviet leaders are attempting to achieve by 1980 a balance of economic and military power with the United States—in order to guarantee the right to Soviet national existence. The struggle to become stronger than imperialism is not a direct challenge to it, but takes for granted its persistence in the process of attempting to surpass it technically and economically as well as culturally. Such a policy is more utopian than the socialism of Owen and Fourier, although it is seemingly supported by practical considerations involving peaceful coexistence, economic plans, statistics and the objectives set for 1980—as if the future of humanity depended only on the next twenty years.

The international policy of the Kremlin is predicated on the figures of the Seven Year Plan and its long-term goals. On December 12, 1962, Khrushchev put the emphasis on economic development, saying:

Soviet industry unfolds on the basis of the priorities assigned to heavy industry, which fulfilled the plan by 104.5 percent at the end of the fourth year. The overall increase in production during this period was 45 percent instead of the 39 percent envisioned by the plan. If in the next three years our industry progresses at the same rate, we have no doubt that in seven years it will have increased not 80 percent as forecasted, but by 100 percent.

For the revisionists the struggle against capitalism is a problem of augmenting production in the Soviet Union, not of revolutionary subversion in the rearguard of imperialism. To bargain from strength is to adopt not an atomic strategy, however, but the elementary maxims of revolutionary war.

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Inspired by economic subjectivism, Soviet leaders glory in the fact that by 1960 the U.S.S.R. had increased its volume of industrial production by 45 times the volume in 1913, as against 5.2 times for the United States, 2.5 times for France and 2 times the 1913 level for England. The U.S.S.R. has increased its industrial production at a rapid rate; but that is because in 1913 it did not have a developed industry. Accordingly, it is more difficult for the United States to double the production of steel than for the Soviet Union to triple production, especially in view of the fact that in 1960 the United States was capable of producing 130 million tons of steel while the Soviet Union produced only 65.3 million.

In focusing on quantitative changes but not on a qualitative social and political transformation, Soviet technocrats fall into a subjective economism that takes economic hopes and aspirations for concrete possibilities. The result is a species of state capitalism, which blocks the development toward socialism through the systematic depoliticization of the workers and the strengthening of the state apparatus.

Soviet economists, party leaders and technocrats want to make the Soviet Union an economic power equal to the United States. In 1960 the U.S.S.R. had approached the economic levels of the United States by as much as 60 percent in gross national income, 60 percent in industrial production, 75–80 percent in agricultural production, 40–50 percent in the productivity of industrial labor and 33 percent in the productivity of agriculture. In order to equal the performance of the United States in these areas the Soviet economy needs twenty years; on the supposition that there are no disturbing factors, parity will be achieved by 1980. The question is whether or not the economic competition between these two powers stems from an antagonism between capitalism and socialism or between public and private forms of capitalism.

In their race against time the Soviet revisionists estimate that the rate of capital accumulation is increasing for the Soviet Union and decreasing for the United States. But this movement in opposite directions poses a grave and constant

threat of war. The yanqui capitalists will not relinquish the crown of industrial production and world productivity without doing something: whether it be war against the East or the adoption of state capitalism in the West.

The subjective economism of the Soviet bureaucrats may have a quite unexpected outcome. History is not made by men under conditions desired by them, but under conditions independent of their will, i.e., as long as classes and class struggles persist. Sunk in subjectivism, the Soviet leaders cannot anticipate the future course of alienation nor do they know how to overcome it, whether in the Soviet Union or in the capitalist countries. Yet there is one assurance of disalienation: direct action by the masses and economic self-management by the workers.

* * *

Technological progress facilitates man's dominion over nature, but is not the only road to socialism. Lacking complex machinery and with only the simplest tools, the popular commune has created a new social division of labor and has moved further toward communism than the great industrial enterprises, state farms and agricultural collectives in the Soviet Union, where the same social division of labor and conditions of daily work prevail as in the capitalist countries. That is because the popular communes have, and Soviet state enterprises and collectives have not, liberated themselves from commodity fetishism and the alienating effects of money. The fact that Soviet cities are no different from capitalist metropolises in growing too fast and depopulating the countryside indicates that the agrovilles of the future, or unions of several collectives into Chinese-type people's communes, have yet to be organized or to begin functioning. Contrary to the belief of Soviet technocrats, the antagonism between town and country is not on the verge of disappearing but continues to block the road to socialism in the U.S.S.R. In the West the road to socialism passes through the anarcho-syndicalist collectives and enterprise committees for workers' self-management re-

hearsed and tested by the Spanish Revolution of 1936–39; in the East, through the Chinese people's communes.

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In the United States there is a chronic underutilization of productive forces because the capitalist market is too restricted to absorb the output. Thus in 1961 the labor force was 10 percent unemployed and the steel and automotive industries operated at some 40 percent less than capacity. The biggest market for consumer goods is provided by the poor, but they are the ones who buy or consume least. Without a socialist transformation there is no way out from this predicament and from corresponding cyclical crises of relative overproduction and underconsumption. Since the Soviet Union has a comparative advantage over the United States in not having to undergo periodic crises, it hopes to surpass the U.S. volume of production and to become the world's leader in economic affairs. Nonetheless, before the North American economy undergoes another great depression like that of 1929 it will resort to war; it will export cannons if it cannot export cars.

The North American economy entered a phase of comparative debility during the postwar period, oscillating between ephemeral prosperity and intermittent crises. In particular, it underwent recessions in 1948–49, 1953–54, 1957–58 and 1959–61. Following the 1948–49 recession, production increased 34 percent in response to the boom created by the Korean War; after the depressive wave of 1953–54, production increased 10 percent; but after the recession of 1957–58, it rose only 8 percent.

In 1961 only 76 percent of U.S. industrial capacity was being utilized. Unemployment rose to 5.7 million industrial workers, to 1.5 million professional and white-collar workers and to perhaps 1 million agricultural workers, including the partially employed. This represented approximately 10 percent of the work force in the United States. Under such conditions and in order to make the North American economy march forward, it is necessary to limit the amount of real

capital investments at home, which is tantamount to increasing U.S. investments abroad.

* * *

The North American economy is today tied to military production: 63 percent of the national budget is spent on programs of national defense, international aid (dollar diplomacy) and space development. These expenditures tend to mitigate economic depressions by absorbing the excess industrial capacity of the capitalist economy, which already has the economic and technological bases required for the introduction of socialism. As long as the structural conflicts within the North American economy are not resolved, however, the danger of war will persist—war being one means of destroying this excess capacity.

During World War II, from 1939 to 1943, U.S. investments in war production rose to 81.9 billion dollars annually. In 1961 they were 47.5 billion dollars and in 1963, 52.7 billion, which was more than the annual average during World War II. Since the annual production of steel in 1963 was 50 percent greater than during the war years, it is understandable that war production in times of peace is now as great as it formerly was during times of war. If steel were not used to construct warships, cannons, tanks and other arms, the U.S. steel industry would produce at something less than its present capacity. In fact, since the recession of 1959–61, the steel and automotive industries have been unable to utilize profitably more than 60 percent of their plant and equipment—notwithstanding an economy of war in time of peace.

In 1967, in the middle of the Vietnam War, U.S. military expenditures rose to 75 billion dollars, representing 70 percent of the federal budget. Thus rearmament constitutes the great panacea for stimulating the depressed North American economy. In the end, however, armaments are produced to be used, and they finally are used to destroy superfluous wealth and populations, i.e., those which no longer constitute a source of profitability for a capitalist economy. Of course, they would

not be superfluous in a socialist economy, much less in a communist society based on self-management and human freedom.

Capitalism has to perish from an excess of productive capacity. It persists only through artificially induced scarcity maintained through periodic wars and depressions. War is necessary to restore the equilibrium of a capitalist economy glutted by excess production relative to the powers of mass consumption. The interplay of economic forces under capitalism points to the fragility of a policy of peaceful coexistence. A general war may be avoided or postponed, but not indefinitely; the U.S. needs to consume its excess capacity by going beyond the limits of a Cold War. It now needs Cuba and Vietnam for this purpose; eventually, it will need other Latin American countries. And if these are not enough, it may have to stimulate its economy by escalating the now dormant conflict between the capitalist and the socialist worlds.

Investments in programs of national defense constitute the most effective mitigator of depressive tendencies in the U.S. economy. Technical progress in the armaments industry contributes to absorbing billions of dollars because of the expense of continual improvements and the high rate of obsolescence. During World War II a B-17 bomber cost 200 thousand dollars; today a B-70 bomber costs 15–20 million dollars. A conventional submarine formerly cost 5 million dollars; it currently costs 45 million and, armed with Polaris missiles, 90 million dollars. Finally, one Atlas missile costs 35 million dollars, or the equivalent of 8,750 tractors of 50 horsepower or more, which could break new ground in the Amazonian jungles as a means of wiping out the geography of hunger. Nonetheless, to maintain their position of world leadership some countries want to win the moon. In fact, they are losing the earth through fratricidal wars and national egoism based on capitalist private property—the cause of economic crises and, by a chain reaction, of imperialist wars.

Capitalism prevents the United States from digesting the fruits of economic and technological progress. The United States needs socialism to overcome its structural crisis; but such a step depends on the prior liberation of Latin America

and the rebellion of the North American proletariat against its own bourgeoisie. Should this come to pass within the Western Hemisphere, a general war may be avoided; but the war between the two Americas will be so dramatic, intense and contagious that it may ultimately ignite a Third World War.

On the one hand, it is quite possible that yanqui capitalism will not grant the U.S.S.R. the twenty years it asks to develop itself peacefully into the world's foremost industrial power. On the other hand, it is possible that the United States will make the transition to socialism before the Soviet Union. By an irony of history, each of these countries may become transformed into its opposite, i.e., in the event that the antagonism between underdeveloped countries and imperialism is resolved in Latin America.

* * *

Uncle Sam is an old capitalist and a little decrepit. As long as the U.S. does not change its mode of production and distribution, it will be compelled to curb its productive forces except in the manufacture of armaments, in which it employs 7.5 million persons. Logically, an economy of war in time of peace will generate conditions of economic alienation which, without the establishment of socialism, will have to culminate in an imperialist war against the East or West, depending on the prevalence of particular world antagonisms.

If interimperialist antagonisms prevail, there will be war between the major capitalist powers. If the prevailing antagonism is that between underdeveloped and imperialist countries, there will be revolutionary wars. If the tensions between capitalism and socialism should become aggravated in consequence of revolutionary wars, there will be a Third World War. And if the class struggle between the proletariat and bourgeoisie of the imperialist countries should become more acute, there will be a socialist revolution on a world scale. In any case, the historical alternatives for the decades 1960–80 would appear to exclude the seraphic dreams of peace by the apologists of peaceful coexistence: an idealism at variance with

the inner conflicts of our world in which divisions, alienations and antagonisms tend to have a violent and revolutionary outcome.

4. *Soviet Dilemma: Socialist Revolution or Third World War? **

The irony of dialectical development in history shows itself when an existing antagonism is not resolved and each of its poles is transformed into its opposite through the action of reciprocal causation. For example, in aspiring to the position today held by the United States in world production, the U.S.S.R. is gradually becoming a conservative power opposed to the propagation of a world socialist revolution, whereas the United States will have to undergo a social revolution before 1980 if it is to make use of its excess capacity and avoid being overtaken by the Soviet Union.

Because its productive forces are greater than those of the U.S.S.R., the United States is in a better position to establish socialism. The economic backwardness of the Soviet Union compelled the bolsheviks to abandon their policy of war communism for a New Economic Policy (NEP). But even during a great economic crisis, the economic advancement of the United States can provide all the technical conditions for the introduction of socialism as a means of overcoming the almost chronic stagnation of the North American economy. Before losing the battle for the maximum volume of industrial production and labor productivity, the U.S. will do something. It will move toward a form of state capitalism by means of agencies similar to the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Commodity Credit Corporation, which today are at the service of private capital.

When the United States cannot save itself from economic crises through a mixed economy, it will do so by making the public or nationalized sector the dominant one, thereby preventing the U.S.S.R. from taking first place in world economic productivity and the volume of industrial and agricultural output. In the event of two state capitalisms, war would present

* *Dialéctica de la política*, Chapter V, pp. 232, 261–263.

itself as the continuation of their antagonistic policies by violent means. Thus peaceful coexistence through armed peace would eventually resolve itself in war—all because the Soviet Union has not pressed for socialism throughout the world, but rather for state capitalism in a single country.

* * *

The Soviet leaders are staking everything on 1980, as if a peaceful outcome to economic competition could be predicted in an epoch dominated by capitalist antagonisms conducive to national wars, imperialist wars and wars of national liberation. The claim that the Soviet Union will occupy first place among the world powers by 1980 is an astonishing piece of political ingenuousness.

Under a division of society into rival classes and nations, history makes a mockery of idealists in the East and in the West. For war periodically takes them by surprise—a danger endemic to state capitalism as well as private.

For Soviet revisionists the decisive struggle is to achieve a degree of labor productivity superior to that of capitalism. Their assumption is that technique decides everything, that all other efforts are secondary. However, productivism for capitalist or socialist accumulation is a social metaphysic advantageous respectively to a bourgeois class and a technocratic caste rather than to the alienated and exploited masses of ordinary workers.

Neither the bourgeois apology for idleness nor the exaltation of productive work in the East can resolve the human problems of our planet, which men need to refashion into a single socialist country: without classes, castes, national egoisms and other antagonisms conducive to wars and economic crises. In an astronautic and atomic age national security eludes one and all; during the decisive years ahead before 1980, either all will be saved or none. In effect, we must all suffer unless atomic war is precluded through a socialist revolution.

The dilemma of our times is the following: either revolutionary war on a universal scale, which will overcome capital-

ism and install socialism, or an imperialist war with or without atomic weapons, which will destroy population and wealth in the effort to save capitalism through artificially maintained scarcity.

Alienated by the magic of figures and lacking a vision of socialism, Khrushchev estimated that productivity was fundamental to victory over the West. In a June, 1962, speech on the burning questions of world socialism, he said that communism would triumph when the level of the productive forces and the degree of labor productivity were greater than those in the capitalist countries—a thesis currently shared by Brezhnev and Kosygin.

In the international championship for the first prize in economics, the Soviet Union boasts of its tremendous accomplishments. It displays to the four winds a mass of statistics showing that from 1945 to 1961 its annual average rate of industrial growth was 7.6 percent, as against 1.8 percent for the United States, and that in 1961 its rate was 9.2 percent, as compared to 0.9 percent for the United States.

These inferences on the basis of statistics are mathematical, not historical or dialectical ones: the year 1980, as the date for establishing a world record by beating the North Americans in both the total output and the average productivity of labor, is presented as the objective goal. However, the cunning of the Hegelian Idea, with its lovely and ingenuous idealism mocked by Marx, seems to have seduced the revisionists' practical understanding or grasp of reality. Although the Soviet leaders hope to move in one direction during the next twenty years, the interplay of actual economic and political forces is pushing them into situations not elected by them. The conflicts in Cuba and Indochina are merely a prologue to future conflicts of interest and antagonisms between the dollar and the ruble.

No armed peace is stable or lacking the temptation to war. In the long run war cannot be avoided without a struggle for socialism, without class wars and movements for liberation inspired by revolutionary Marxism in opposition to the ideology of peaceful coexistence.

CHAPTER VII

Intersocialist Antagonisms

1. *Socialist Internationalism* *

Because of the uneven development of countries, socialism on a national scale generates differences and antagonisms among socialist countries similar to those among capitalist countries. There is a bourgeois internationalism in action, such as the Organization of American States and the European Economic Community; but there is no countervailing proletarian internationalism except that subordinated to the neonationalist foreign policy of the Soviet Union, which begins and ends with peaceful coexistence with the United States.

The internationalism of the labor movement has been degraded by the opportunist policies of the Soviet revisionists who made the Third International, the Cominform and the international peace movement serve primarily Soviet interests. The Organization of American States and the European Economic Community constitute supranational organizations of the bourgeoisie which emerged in opposition to these and other communist pressures.

Proletarian internationalism was a standard and watchword of the working masses: the First, Second and Third Internationals had inscribed it in their respective programs as basic to the international labor movement. The *Communist Manifesto* ends with the well-known words: "Workers of the world, unite!" Nonetheless, the vacillating and opportunist policies

* *Dialéctica de la política*, Chapter V, pp. 227–231, 250–251.

of the Soviet leaders have not been consistent with proletarian internationalism, which has been used to acquire mass support for the Kremlin's devious diplomacy.

The *Communist Manifesto* states that in the various stages of development through which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoisie has to pass, the Communists are distinguished from other working-class parties in always and everywhere representing the interests of the movement as a whole. This internationalist commitment and basic principle of Marxism has been corroded by the opportunist policies of popular fronts, military alliances with the bourgeoisie and peaceful coexistence—an untimely expression of social democracy in Soviet foreign policy.

Within the compass of a revisionism that moves steadily to the Right, Soviet policy has sought a compromise with imperialism to the detriment of proletarian internationalism. The great Soviet fatherland was not jeopardized for Korea, China, Laos, Vietnam or Cuba. In this respect Soviet nationalism or Pan-Slavism fails to conform to the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism.

The *Communist Manifesto* undermines the myth of patriotism: "The workingmen have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, it is to this extent national, but not in the bourgeois sense." With respect to its content the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie has a national character; yet its sphere of action and influence is international. A socialist revolution that does not surmount national frontiers is condemned to perish or deteriorate into a form of state capitalism, particularly in Latin America.

The crisis in Sino-Soviet and Soviet-Albanian relations is evidence that the East gives priority to national before international socialist interests, thereby generating intersocialist contradictions which can take the form of hostilities similar to those among capitalist countries. Thus wars among the various national bourgeoisies may be succeeded by wars among different national and self-styled socialist bureaucracies.

Because of the ideological factor at issue, these struggles could be the counterpart of the wars of religion between 1618 and 1648.

More than once the Soviet Union subordinated the interest of the Chinese people's revolution to its own national well-being. In 1927 the Kremlin supported Chiang Kai-shek, as a consequence of which the Chinese Communists were massacred. The survivors had to flee the cities and begin the "Great March" into the countryside.

In 1946 the U.S.S.R. signed a treaty of friendship with Chiang and recommended to Mao the formation of a popular front with Chiang's government. Evidently the Soviets were unwilling to support any movement going beyond that of the Kuomintang and the strategy of popular fronts in the West. Such a strategy was deemed necessary to consolidate the democratic revolution, but of the bourgeoisie rather than the proletariat. Until Mao's victory in 1949, the U.S.S.R. continued to maintain consulates in China that recognized the government of Chiang Kai-shek. Moreover, in 1954 the Soviets sought to change the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party by imposing on it the Right wing led by Kao Kang.

During the Korean War the Soviets followed a prudent policy by staying outside the conflict and subsequently supporting a compromise at Panmunjom in 1954, just when the yanqui position was becoming flimsy. In the same year the Kremlin forced a peace on Indochina; the Geneva Agreements helped the imperialists to salvage the unsalvageable from their military defeat at Dien Bien Phu. In the conflict between the two Chinas the Sino-Soviet treaty of assistance not once contemplated aid to the Chinese People's Republic for recovering the province of Formosa.

When the Chinese troops crossed the MacMahon Line during the border dispute with India in October–November, 1962, the Soviets vacillated between their Chinese "brothers" and their Indian "friends." Actually, Soviet neutrality came in response to the actions of the Chinese rather than the Indians. Commenting on the conflict with India, the Chinese *People's Daily* in its issue of December 15, 1962, noted that

the Soviet position was a reactionary one, that it was not based on a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the class struggle and that it virtually ignored the role of India's big bourgeoisie and landowners in opposing the progressive movement within that country and in objectively supporting the interest of world imperialism and yanqui imperialism in particular. In its editorial the newspaper attacked the complicity of the Nehru government in the Congo, where Indian military forces helped to defend the uranium agreements between the Belgians and the Anglo-Saxons—agreements made in the absence of the Congolese people. Attacking the Soviet revisionists without naming them, it noted:

Those who accuse China of having pushed the Nehru government into the embrace of the West mistake causes for effects; throughout the Chinese-Indian border dispute they have given the appearance of being neutral without distinguishing between justice and error, calling China a "brother" at the same time that they take the reactionary Hindu leaders for their "parents" (in the words of Khrushchev's speech of December 12, 1962).

Notwithstanding Soviet economic aid, the Chinese-Indian frontier incident showed that the national bourgeoisie of the semicolonial countries ultimately tends to side with imperialism. Consequently, Mao's critique killed two birds with one stone: the revisionism of the Kremlin and the velvety socialism of Nehru—two forms of neobourgeois nationalism aspiring to great nation status.

* * *

The Russian Revolution has resolved the internal contradictions involving the bourgeoisie and landed aristocracy, on the one hand, against the industrial proletariat and peasants, on the other. But it has since generated new contradictions which may or may not have to be overcome through violence. The alleged "friendly classes" consist of the directing technobureaucracy, the workers and the peasants organized into collectives (kolkhozes). Classes continue to survive in the U.S.S.R. with these denominations. Khrushchev acknowledged

them, if somewhat subjectively, in his June, 1962, speech already cited:

In the socialist countries friendly classes persist along with different nations, while conditions are created that are favorable to the flowering of national cultures. Consequently, national interests and differences are maintained and, in a certain measure, class differences as well.

This confession is evidence that in the process of building socialism the revisionists recognize the existence of "friendly classes" and the uneven development of socialist countries. The existence of such differences in the East, as in the West, is a factor explaining intersocialist antagonisms.

Infantile, dogmatic and undialectical Communists believe that there are no contradictions in the U.S.S.R. These idealists have brought down heaven to earth; however, paradise is a theological problem, not a Marxist one. These Communists have faith because they are ill-versed in the dialectical approach of Marx, Engels and Lenin. In the U.S.S.R., China and the people's democracies, contradictions survive, but of a different kind than those prevailing in the capitalist countries. In the East the landowners and bourgeoisie have been eliminated as classes; the corresponding contradictions have been resolved. Yet other contradictions prevail that, should they not be absorbed in the march toward socialism, could give rise to hostilities like the Hungarian revolution of 1956—because the Party became isolated from the masses and committed atrocities as well as errors. Once the old regime is overcome, the conflicts among socialist countries can degenerate into civil war; the remains of classes surviving during the first phase of building a socialist society tend to disappear only with the advance toward a higher phase.

2. *Soviet Neocolonialism* *

Khrushchev likened the socialist countries to a "single world cooperative" within which the various national economies in-

* *Dialéctica de la política*, Chapter V, pp. 233–240; "El rublo, el Comecon y Checoslovaquia," *Checoslovaquia 1968*, pp. 201–203, 205–206, 207; *La rebelión del tercer mundo*, Chapter XIX, pp. 202–203.

tegrated in the Soviet bloc are coordinated by means of a single plan. On the strategic level the Warsaw Pact is a co-operative plan for the joint defense of the socialist countries in view of possible capitalist aggression. In the sphere of international economic planning the Council for Mutual Economic Aid was founded in 1949 as a counterpoise to the Marshall Plan. This agency has a variety of functions: to coordinate the different national economic plans; to establish an international division of labor among the socialist countries; to organize economic cooperation; to assist each country to specialize in the kind of production most suited to its resources; to secure a balanced economic growth for the socialist bloc as a whole and for each country within it; finally, through a policy of peaceful coexistence, to challenge the economic supremacy of capitalism in order to surpass it technically with a higher productivity of labor and a greater volume of production.

The Council for Mutual Economic Aid is manipulated by the U.S.S.R. in almost the same way as the Organization of American States is manipulated by the United States. Besides the functions already mentioned, it serves the following purposes: to give a centralized structure to the various national economies; to fix the economic proportions or contributions of each; to establish an equilibrium in the balance of foreign payments on the basis of the ruble; to determine the rates of capital investment or the socialist fund of accumulation in each member country; finally, to annul the anarchy of production or spontaneous operation of economic laws typical of the capitalist economies.

Planning under the aegis of the ruble has contributed to the formation of one-crop economies in the East similar to those in Latin America under the protection of the dollar. Within the Soviet bloc the exchange of currencies with the ruble is fixed with little regard for the objective value of those currencies, and in such a way that the terms of trade are favorable to the U.S.S.R. and unfavorable to the people's democracies. The result has been a disequilibrium in the balance of foreign payments: more and more has to be exported

to the Soviet Union in order to gain foreign exchange or rubles for the purpose of covering imports from the Soviet Union. Since the prices of exports and imports alike are prejudicial to most of the member countries, balanced economic growth has yet to make headway against uneven economic development. Actually, the development of socialism within the U.S.S.R. has taken precedence over the simultaneous building of socialism throughout the Soviet bloc.

Frictions are caused by the economic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the people's democracies. Although openly manifested mainly in the case of socialist countries not integrated into Comecon (Yugoslavia, Albania, China), frictions are evident between all socialist countries trading with the Soviets. The Soviet Union demanded minerals from Yugoslavia in order to refine them, but Yugoslavia resisted because she wanted to refine them herself. From Hungary the Soviet Union demands bauxite in order to smelt it and develop a strategic air force. Czechoslovakia is an industrialized country, but provides 20 percent of the market for machinery produced in the Soviet Union and the bloc countries. Poland builds ships for the U.S.S.R. The Kremlin and Wall Street support their economic expansion abroad through these and other forms of satellization.

As a great nation, politically alienated by the Soviet tendency to accept the legitimate existence of two Chinas and to support a policy of coexistence with Formosa, China did not lend her economy to the specialized tasks it would have had to fulfill under the supervision of Comecon. Moreover, Peking's strategic and economic interests in Central Asia differed from Moscow's. The economic conflicts of interest between socialist countries would most likely take a violent form, as in the case of the Sino-Soviet controversy, were it not for the supranational unity provided by Comecon.

It is noteworthy that the nascent English bourgeoisie financed and directed the reactionary international coalition against the French bourgeoisie which had emerged from the victorious Revolution of 1789-93. As long as nations exist, whether under conditions of private or public capitalism, war

will continue to be the last political resort for resolving conflicts of interest.

In 1962 the U.S.S.R. raised the price of meat and butter. Had such products been exported, the socialist countries importing them would have had to pay more than in 1961. Without Soviet subsidies the terms of trade for the importers would have been unfavorable. Thus antagonisms resulting from unfavorable terms of trade are not limited to the economic relations between semicolonial and imperialist countries, but are also characteristic of intersocialist relations.

In this light the much celebrated law of the international division of socialist labor is only a string of words. Economic relations among socialist countries are supposed to be based on friendship, equality, harmony and cooperation. In fact, the U.S.S.R. subordinates trade among the socialist countries to its own national interests and world strategy.

The Soviet Union benefits, for example, from the world monopoly prices of petroleum. In Saudi Arabia a barrel of crude oil costs ten cents to extract plus fourteen cents to transport through pipelines to eastern Mediterranean ports. Thus it costs 24 cents a barrel. Since a ton contains approximately seven barrels, depending on the density, its cost at the port of embarkation is \$1.68. But King Ibn-Saud collects one dollar per barrel in the form of royalties and the Anglo-Saxon companies collect another dollar; consequently, the monopoly price of crude oil is around \$15.68 per ton. The Soviet Union does not pay these royalties: in its trade with the West it does not mark up the price of its own crude oil by this amount. Were it to sell its crude oil at the monopoly prices fixed by the international petroleum cartel, it would be implicated in a similar monopoly of its own. Soviet crude oil costs perhaps 3 to 4 dollars a ton to produce and is sold to the West for 7 to 8 dollars at the port of embarkation. In exchange for Hungarian bauxite, however, it sells for not less than \$15.68 per ton, which indicates that the Soviets benefit in this case from the international monopoly price.

Does this relation of exchange not violate the international division of labor among socialist countries? Is it not an in-

tersocialist contradiction to base exchange on a one-sided contract?

The role of investments in the Soviet bloc resembles that of U.S. direct investments in Latin America. On the topic of basic investments in the geoeconomic space of the countries belonging to Comecon, Khrushchev noted in his June, 1962, speech: "Because of the huge investments required, joint financing is convenient in the industrial branches dedicated to the extraction of raw materials for export." Through such mixed investments the U.S.S.R. has achieved key positions of great strategical importance in the national economies of the people's democracies.

Soviet comanagement of these basic investments constitutes a species of direct investment in foreign countries. It presupposes coparticipation in the wealth of those countries and obliges mixed enterprises to be profitable in the highest degree so that the Soviet Union will not have to share any losses. The workers in mixed enterprises have to produce a high rate of surplus value in order to meet the conditions for Soviet investments.

Without socialist unity transcending nationalities, there will be antagonisms between socialist countries. It is easier to resolve conflicts between members of the European Common Market than between Yugoslavia, Albania and China on one side and the Soviet Union on the other. In Western Europe the supranational or interstate associations for economic and strategical purposes are more effective in resolving antagonisms than Comecon in Eastern Europe because uneven economic development is not as pronounced within the European Community.

Within Comecon the Soviets constitute the economic-financial epicenter, and the other countries the periphery. In the speech already cited Khrushchev provides an example of good will within the international division of socialist labor: "If it should be more convenient for members of Comecon to manufacture certain commodities in countries other than the Soviet Union, the latter is ready and willing to reduce its production of those items." Nonetheless, differences with Albania persist

that are not altogether political or due to the absence of de-Stalinization. They are the effect of Enver Hoxha's refusal to yield before the paternalism of the Soviet Union in the matter of economic integration.

Ironically, the Soviet Union is capable of coexisting peacefully with the United States but not with Albania, as a result of which Soviet "aid" to that country was discontinued. Responding to Khrushchev directly in a speech on the twentieth anniversary of the Albanian Workers' Party, November 7, 1961, Enver Hoxha said: "We ask for charity from no one. If for one reason or another Khrushchev and his kind do not want to help us, in vain will they wait for us to go begging from the imperialists and their allies. Our country has friends and comrades in the socialist camp who have not forsaken us." Evidently, Hoxha was referring to Communist China, which maintained, contrary to Russia's wishes, an active commerce with Albania—evidence that the socialist world is torn by objective and not only subjective antagonisms because of its uneven economic and technological development.

Under the direction of the Soviet economy the countries integrated into Comecon have to maintain approximately the same rate of capital accumulation. The major source of savings for the less developed socialist countries, however, lies in a restriction of consumption; and for them accumulation implies an appreciable decline in their standard of living. Thus the rate of surplus value varies between socialist countries, creating social tensions and political discontent which are not openly or directly manifested from fear of the state's repressive powers. . . .

Great-power nationalism interferes with the integration of the socialist camp: the Soviet Union does not want to sacrifice its standard of living by sharing its wealth with the Chinese or Mongolians. The Kremlin believes that the creation of a socialist superstate would unleash a war with the capitalist world. Seduced by atomic terror, it endeavors to paralyze movements of liberation and class struggles within the capitalist countries, instead of seeking unity through a federation of socialist republics.

Khrushchev spoke for the Soviet intelligentsia when, in the speech previously cited, he covered up the disintegration of the socialist camp by references to its alleged unity: "When socialism surpassed the limits of a single country, it established a world socialist market—a totally new sphere of international trade within which, unlike the capitalist world market, planning rather than spontaneity prevails." Actually, Soviet socialism has not gone beyond its own frontiers because its leadership is fearful of abolishing them—frontiers that have to be erased in order to achieve peace and socialism.

Economic nationalism, which has become the fashion in the U.S.S.R., will not resolve the problems of the socialist camp nor can it compel the capitalist world to take the socialist road. It is more likely to promote a struggle for hegemony culminating in a world war between East and West. A proletarian revolution in the capitalist countries and a people's revolution in the semicolonial ones are necessary to prevent such a war. Although the modern revisionists are opposed to revolutionary wars because these might unleash a world war, precisely such wars are required in order to prevent a universal conflagration.

The Soviet Union has asked the member countries of Comecon for combined economic and technological assistance to the Mongolian People's Republic in order to counteract Chinese influence and the historical, economic and cultural bonds that tie that country to China rather than to the U.S.S.R. and Europe. The creation of an independent Mongolia is designed in Soviet strategy to be part of an anti-China *cordon sanitaire* and to isolate the Russian border population from the allegedly pernicious influence of the Chinese popular communes.

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The totalitarian bureaucracy of Novotný, which was overthrown by Dubček, wanted to perpetuate the satellization of Czechoslovakia within the orbit of the ruble and the strategy of the Warsaw Pact. However, the pro-Soviet reformists claim that the discord between the U.S.S.R. and other socialist

countries has not been objective, but rather subjective or ideological. Actually, China became estranged from the U.S.S.R. because the Soviets wanted to subordinate Chinese international politics to the strategy and diplomacy of the Kremlin in its dealings with the White House. The situation was similar in the cases of Yugoslavia, Romania and Albania, where the Soviets were occasionally as intolerant and aggressive as the yanquis in Cuba and the Dominican Republic. The economic isolation and blockade of Albania by the U.S.S.R., in retaliation for Albania's refusal to condemn China, was extremely costly for that small country: the Soviets never completed the factories they had begun there; they expelled the Albanian students from Moscow; and they excluded Albania from the Warsaw Pact.

The differences between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union are not merely subjective, but have an objective basis. This was brought out at the Conference of Bratislava in August, 1968, where the disagreement between Dubček and Brezhnev defied all efforts at conciliation. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was evidence of that and of the principle that war is a continuation of politics by other means.

The presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia belied the policy of peaceful coexistence and the self-determination of peoples. With a perverse logic the pro-Soviet Communists now claim that the self-determination of peoples does not apply between socialist countries, that it must be respected in the West but not in the East. Is there any greater political cynicism, especially on the part of Western Communists who give the impression of being more Russian than the Ukrainians?

The subjective differences between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union had an objective basis: (1) in 1967 Czechoslovakia had a volume of commerce with the U.S.S.R. valued at 1.7 billion rubles and a balance of payments resulting in a surplus of 400 million rubles; (2) although a creditor nation with respect to the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia lacked convertible foreign exchange for buying commodities cheaper in the West than in the zone of the ruble; (3) the exchange rate

between the ruble and the Czech crown was arbitrarily fixed so that exchange relations with the Soviet Union were as unfavorable as those created by the dollar with respect to most Western currencies.

The exchange relations between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union are governed neither by proletarian internationalism nor by the law of the international division of socialist labor, but by a one-sided contract to the benefit of Russia. The countries within the sphere of the ruble are confronted by the same kind of trade relations as the Latin Americans with respect to the dollar. For example, the Soviets export petroleum to Italy and Germany at less than 10 dollars per ton, but sell it to Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Czechoslovakia at 16 to 19 dollars a ton. To escape from this dependency on Soviet neoimperialism, Romania signed an agreement with Iran for 3 million tons of petroleum in exchange for 15 thousand tractors, and in 1968 signed an agreement with Venezuela for 10 million tons. In other words, Romania does not want to buy Soviet petroleum when it is more expensive than in the West.

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The total value of foreign exports and imports by the members of Comecon increased in 1967 to an estimated 40.7 billion rubles, or 45 billion dollars at the official rate of exchange—higher than what it would have been in a free market. Of the total volume of this commerce, the Soviet share was a little more than one-third, or 16.4 billion rubles. Altogether 11.1 billion consisted of Soviet commerce with the members of Comecon, which is to say that 70 percent of Soviet exports were destined for Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia. In Central America, the Caribbean, Venezuela, Colombia and Brazil the dollar absorbs roughly the same volume of foreign trade as the ruble absorbs in its zone.

In one case as in the other, the terms of trade are favorable to the ruble and the dollar, which buy cheap and sell dear within their respective spheres of economic influence.

Regardless of ideologies, it can be shown economically that any nation which destines to another more than 30 percent of its foreign commerce has to calculate, save, pay and invest with the money of that country and not its own. Its condition of economic alienation is determined by the international division of labor favorable to the great powers and unfavorable to small ones. Notwithstanding the slogans of proletarian internationalism, socialist specialization, cooperation and mutual economic aid, the ruble is the dollar of Comecon.

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At the epicenter of Comecon the Soviet Union governs, disposes and orders with the same economic powers as those the United States uses in Latin America and the International Monetary Fund. Despite its status as an exporter of primary products amounting to two-thirds of its total exports, the U.S.S.R. buys manufactured articles from the members of Comecon at comparatively low prices by international standards in exchange for agricultural goods and raw materials at comparatively high prices. The result in terms of trade for members of the socialist camp is thus the inverse of the terms of trade for exporters of primary products and manufactured articles in the West. In effect, whenever one country absorbs 30 percent of the foreign commerce of another, the resulting terms of trade are determined not so much by the composition of imports and exports as by the law of the stronger.

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With respect to the consumption of energy and calories per inhabitant, the U.S.S.R. is approaching Western European levels, while China, Albania and the countries within the Soviet orbit have income differences with the Soviet Union of roughly the same magnitude as those between some Latin American countries and the United States. The tendency toward unequal economic and technological growth from country to country is evident in the East as well as the West, which would account for the objective and subjective hostilities between China and the Soviet Union. It is evident that Soviet

citizens do not wish to share their standard of living with the Chinese: for the average Soviet income would have to be reduced by more than 50 percent. Nor, for the same reason, would U.S. citizens care to share their national income with Mexicans or Brazilians, should these peoples ever become unified under a common roof.

The class struggle in the traditional context of the capitalist countries has lost its social, political and historical impetus; it has become displaced in large part by the struggle between the neocolonial countries and the great industrial powers. The antagonism between the Soviet Union and underdeveloped Albania, China and Romania is not an exception, but rather an instance of this change. Ultimately, Romania and other countries within the Soviet orbit want economic and political self-determination, including disalienation from the Soviet Union.

The exchange rate between the ruble and the currencies of the other countries belonging to Comecon conceals as many irrationalities or inequalities as the parity of the dollar with respect to gold and the currencies of the International Monetary Fund. In the Soviet Union prices have risen without a devaluation of the ruble, which is prejudicial to the trade of the other members of Comecon, who have to give more of their own products in exchange for fewer Soviet exports than formerly. Accordingly, Romania has turned to the West for many products that are cheaper than those imported from the Soviet Union.

At the present moment the underdeveloped countries are in rebellion against the dollar and the ruble for dominating the world: the U.S. does not pay in dollars its deficit in foreign payments and the Soviet Union does not provide for equal terms of trade. The Soviet Union and the countries within its economic, diplomatic and strategical sphere of influence are not exempt from the overriding antagonism between developed and underdeveloped countries. By an historical irony, the principal antagonism of our times has placed it on the side of the oppressors rather than the liberators of mankind.

3. *Communes or Kolkhozes?* *

In 1962 Khrushchev announced that the scarcity of meat and butter had obliged the government to raise prices in order to stimulate the peasants to produce more of each. These products, like most others in the Soviet Union, take the form of commodities; since they also have a money-form, the relations between persons appear in the alienated form of a relation between things. In China economic relations are different. The Chinese commune embraces several villages, owing to its area of some 30–40 kilometers on each side. It brings together agriculture (peasants), industry (workers), the intelligentsia (professionals and technicians) and the armed forces (soldiers and popular militias) in a single economic unit. The resulting new division of labor enables exchange within each commune to occur without the intermediary of money and without the products of human labor having to take the form of commodities. Products are allocated or distributed for particular purposes independently of the market mechanism. Thus economic alienation has been overcome along with the fetishism of money.

Unlike Soviet peasants, the peasants on a Chinese commune have no interest in raising the price of meat and butter in response to a shortage. In the Soviet Union an increase in the price of meat and butter means that the peasants enjoy a larger share in the national income at the expense of industrial workers and the urban population. On a Chinese commune such a shortage must be equally borne by all.

Socialism is impossible, whether in the city or the countryside, as long as commodity fetishism survives. The day in which the kolkhoz (village cooperative) and the sovkhov (state farm) are transformed into people's communes uniting agriculture, industry, the professions and the military, the state will begin to wither away. Classes have begun to break down within the framework of the commune, but have yet

* *Dialéctica de la política*, Chapter V, pp. 251–253, 260–261; Chapter VII, pp. 297, 301–302.

to do so in the U.S.S.R., where state capitalism rather than socialism prevails.

Contrary to Marx's, Engels' and Lenin's forecasts, in Russia the state has not begun to disappear with the elimination of the bourgeoisie as a class. Precisely because the state gives more to some than to others, it has to persist in order to perpetuate class inequalities. But in that case, what is the class content of the Soviet state?

Actually, the best remunerated sectors in the U.S.S.R. are accustomed to receive approximately ten times the average income of the lowest-paid workers. This inequality makes necessary the existence of a dictatorship. But against whom? For the benefit of whom—the proletariat or the technobureaucracy which controls the apparatus of government, the party and the national economy?

* * *

The Soviet intelligentsia is proud of the fact that in 1963 the U.S.S.R. had increased its national income by 24 times that in 1913. However, these quantitative changes have not produced qualitative transformations, such as those realized by the Chinese people's communes. Soviet agriculture disposes of 1.2 million tractors, 500 thousand harvesting machines and 790 thousand automobiles; but it has not even begun to build the agrovilles of the future. These are being developed by the people's communes—notwithstanding only 100 thousand Chinese tractors in 1964.

The kolkhozes and sovkhovs perpetuate conditions of daily life reminiscent of the Middle Ages. Despite tremendous advances in technique, the work of peasants in the U.S.S.R. has hardly changed at all. Although a high degree of labor productivity makes the road to socialism comparatively easy, man is still more decisive than technique. In the final analysis, socialism depends on a great movement of the masses who, motivated by their objective interests rather than by propaganda or enthusiasm, build a socialist society as much with picks and shovels as with mechanized drills and excavators.

Whoever struggles for the progressive realization of socialist

society must take care not to become alienated by the subjective economism of the technocrats and bureaucrats. Far from being unilateral, the struggle must be waged on three parallel fronts through the creation of a strong economy, the formation of a revolutionary political vanguard and the development of a socialist culture. Thus the movement toward socialism is three-dimensional: economic, political and cultural.

* * *

Socialism has evolved differently in China than in the Soviet Union. The Chinese passed from the expropriation of feudal landlords to a system of small private plots, from there to the building of cooperatives and subsequently to the formation of people's communes. The Soviets passed from war communism to the partial restoration of private capitalism, and from there to forcible collectivization involving the elimination of kulaks or rich peasants.

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Formerly, Soviet kolkhozes were served by Machine and Tractor Stations. These consisted of public property and were designed to forestall the kolkhozes from accumulating capital and developing neocapitalist forms of production. In the epoch of Stalin each station served some ten to twelve collectives and each tractor had to serve approximately 1,600 hours per year to insure its intensive employment. In contrast, small collectives today seldom use tractors for more than 1,000 hours annually—a step backward in the development of socialist agriculture.

Under the old system of Tractor Stations there was a central workshop for repairing machines, designed to maintain a high level of productivity and the full utilization of all equipment. Since the Soviet revisionists turned over the tractors to the kolkhozes, however, they obliged each one to maintain its own workshop. In this way a petty artisan industry has emerged in the countryside which has little in common with socialist society. Many kolkhozes refused to accept

tractors and combines from the state on the ground that it would be uneconomical for each cooperative to have to repair them. Although socialist agriculture passes from independent collectives to people's communes, the Tractor Stations were nonetheless dismantled: skilled mechanics integrated themselves into various cooperatives or otherwise returned to the cities. Thus ended the worker-peasant alliance as it had been understood during the Stalin period.

During the winter of 1962 a severe cold spell and heavy snow prevented the use of some 120 thousand tractors and combines in the cold agricultural zones of Russia. Since these machines had become the private property of each kolkhoz, they could not be moved to other regions where the temperature would have permitted their intensive use. If those 120 thousand machines had remained socialist property under the control of Machine and Tractor Stations, they could have been utilized in more temperature zones. Afterward, when the snow and ice melted and allowed for the cultivation of colder lands, they could have been transported back to do the sowing in a few days. Thus, in 1962, the Albanian kolkhozes finished sowing in twenty days with the help of publicly owned agricultural equipment.

Thanks to the socialization of the means of production, the Albanians had wheat in 1963; but the Soviets had to import it because of their inefficient utilization of agricultural machinery and reconversion of public property into collective and village property. This new economic policy in Soviet agriculture is responsible for the underproduction of vital foods and the increase in prices of meat, butter and other products—all of which reduce the standard of living of the urban masses to the benefit of the rural population. The kolkhozes are appropriating a larger share of the Soviet gross national product not as a consequence of increased agricultural production but because of the higher prices of agricultural goods fixed by the Soviet government.

Because of their increased share in national income, the kolkhozes have cut into the funds available for socialist accumulation or investment in heavy and light industry. The

rate of increase in the gross national product, which averaged about 10 percent annually during the epoch of Stalin, declined to about 5–6 percent during the period of Khrushchev, compared to 8 percent in Japan and 6 percent in West Germany. These percentages indicate that the Soviet Union suffers from internal economic conflicts owing to a class structure within which the interests of peasants are opposed to the conditions of rapid industrialization.

4. *The Molotov Anti-Party Group* *

The persistence of “national differences” and “friendly classes” within the socialist camp indicates that there are fewer hostile antagonisms in the East than in the West, but that the structure of Soviet society is such that its internal conflicts, if not resolved, can issue in a series of political crises. In the event that a rival faction or organized opposition wages a struggle for power at the very heart of the party or the state, social antagonisms may erupt in the form of armed conflict. Popular resistance to the authoritarian state may assume anarchist forms never before witnessed in human history.

The so-called anti-Party group with Molotov at the head represented, in relation to Khrushchev and the technocracy, a major source of political tension that was resolved by the revisionists in a violent fashion almost resembling a *coup d'état*. Molotov and the anti-Party group maintained that the foreign economic aid of the U.S.S.R. should be used to strengthen the socialist camp, i.e., that it should be given preferably to China and the people's democracies. Nonetheless, the revisionists deflected a considerable part of Soviet credits to the underdeveloped countries in order to strengthen the African and Asian national bourgeoisie. This policy was designed to buy support through diplomacy and to win friends for peaceful coexistence among the neutral or uncommitted nations: India, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Burma, Ceylon, Morocco, etc. Since the revisionists believe that war is no longer

* *Dialéctica de la política*, Chapter V, pp. 254–255; Chapter VII, pp. 298–301.

inevitable, all international crises are interpreted as negotiable.

In this light the condemnation of Stalin was directed not against his personal tyranny or cult of personality but against his politics, which remained Leninist on the problems of war and peace. Stalin maintained that, as long as imperialism persisted, peace conferences could defer a war but not avoid one. Consequently, the persistence of Stalinism represented, in certain respects, an obstacle to the policy of peaceful coexistence. Politically, Khrushchev was a Stalinist of the Right, inasmuch as the cult of Khrushchev followed that of Stalin. However, the revolutionary line of Stalin was buried with his mortal remains, and these were removed from Red Square in order to prevent the emergence of a revolutionary myth at odds with contemporary revisionism.

If peaceful coexistence does not contribute to dismantling the air and naval bases of the United States which encircle the socialist camp, if peace is not achieved in Berlin, if China continues to resist Russian foreign policy, if the Soviet general staff opts for an alliance with China or is opposed to maintaining the revisionists in power, if Cuba is fenced in by the imperialism of the dollar, if imperialism fails to coexist peacefully with socialism and if peaceful coexistence breaks down from deferring instead of resolving existing antagonisms, then these may take a violent form in the East and also inside the Soviet Union.

* * *

Soviet society does not present the same class structure as bourgeois society, but it would be a mistake to say that it is classless. Khrushchev himself stressed the existence of “friendly classes” in the Soviet Union. Actually, there are three classes: (1) the bureaucracy; (2) industrial workers; and (3) collective farmers. Differences in income between the highest and lowest strata of Soviet society are considerable. Although the mode of production on the basis of public ownership is socialist, the mode of distribution is still capitalist.

From the economic conflicts of interest among classes

emerge political differences and party factions: a Center, Right and Left wing. When these conflicts become acute they issue in purges of party leaders and in so-called palace revolutions, e.g., the purge of the anti-Party group by the moderate and conciliatory Khrushchev faction, which was subsequently purged by Brezhnev and Kosygin.

The anti-Party group resisted the conservatism of the domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet Union. The Malenkov-Molotov line favored the sharing of Russian atomic secrets with the Chinese. But the Khrushchev group rejected this policy as an impediment to a Soviet understanding with the United States and to peaceful coexistence with the West.

The Malenkov-Molotov faction maintained that war was inevitable as long as imperialism persisted. The Khrushchev group estimated that war might be avoided through mutual concessions.

The Molotov group opposed the dismantling of Machine and Tractor Stations. It favored state over collective property and sought to preserve the worker-peasant alliance fathered by Lenin and Stalin. The moderate Khrushchev group turned over the Machine and Tractor Stations to the kolkhozes, recognized the kolkhozes' right to sell their products on the open market, authorized an increase in agricultural prices and created autonomous industrial regions at the expense of centralized planning.

The Molotov group opposed the extensive cultivation of the virgin lands of Siberia and favored the intensive cultivation of the black earth of the Ukraine through irrigation and chemical fertilizers. Khrushchev's line prevailed. The Siberian lands were transformed into dustbins with disastrous consequences for Soviet agriculture. From 1963 to 1966 the U.S.S.R. had to import wheat at a cost of 1.5 billion dollars. This played a part in Khrushchev's downfall.

The Molotov group proposed the conversion of 78 thousand kolkhozes into fewer than 40 thousand agro-economic units, into state farms roughly resembling the Chinese communes. But the moderates headed by Khrushchev dissolved the Machine and Tractor Stations, thereby restricting the

scope of socialist property. Does not this constitute a step backward for socialist agriculture? While the people's communes advance toward communism, the kolkhozes are retreating in the direction of capitalism.

The differences and tensions among various factions within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union are such that, at a certain moment, they tend to be suppressed outside the bounds of Soviet legality. The fall of Molotov and afterward Khrushchev constituted, in certain respects, a peaceful counterrevolution whose origins can be traced to the violent liquidation of Beria. A great purge followed the struggle against the Molotov anti-Party group: Khrushchev announced that some 400 thousand party militants had been expelled.

Neo-Marxist revisionism has perpetuated and exacerbated internal tensions within the Soviet Union. It has chosen a policy of *détente* with imperialism and has succeeded in estranging Chinese communism. It has followed an economic policy favoring the technobureaucracy and the peasant population, i.e., the most reactionary sectors of Soviet society. How, then, can we trust the revisionists who promise communism by 1980?

5. *The Sino-Soviet Split* *

The ideologues of Soviet neo-Marxism and their catechumens in the West talk about "differences" rather than antagonisms or hostilities between the U.S.S.R. and China. Nonetheless, the tendency toward uneven economic and technological development has given rise to objective antagonisms including hostilities comparable to those between developed and underdeveloped countries in the West. In relation to one another, the behavior of socialist countries does not correspond to their words: the alleged ideological differences in the East conceal objective antagonisms belying a harmonious world without class struggles or conflicts between nations.

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* *Neo-marxismo y acción directa*, Chapter II, pp. 41, 41-43, 43-45, 51.

The objective antagonisms between China and the Soviet Union are predicated on the following circumstances. First, because it has more space than it needs, the U.S.S.R. is oriented inward toward its own colonization; China, which has not enough space for its population, is oriented outward. Second, the U.S.S.R. has caught up to the standard of living of several advanced countries; with five times the gross per capita income of China, it now gives economic and military aid to India instead of China. Third, the U.S.S.R. could reduce its so-called differences with China through economic aid without political and strategical strings attached; instead, it has chosen to reach an understanding with the United States to which the Chinese cannot agree. Fourth, the U.S.S.R. could overcome its differences with China by redistributing its gross annual income with the 750 million Chinese; but that would reduce its per capita standard of living from roughly \$1,200 annually to no more than \$500. Fifth, the U.S.S.R. could avoid conflict with China by not defending militarily disputed sections of their common frontier, which has thus far cost many Chinese and Russian lives. And sixth, the U.S.S.R. is seeking an agreement with Japan rather than China for the joint exploitation of eastern Siberia; but this runs counter to China's interests in view of her excess population and dearth of economic space.

Numbers indicate more than words: a statistical assessment of the unequal economic development of the Soviet Union and China can tell us more than ideological differences. The Soviets are rich and the Chinese are poor; the economic gap dividing them is comparable to that between the United States and Latin America. Although the U.S.S.R. and China are ideologically committed to Marxism-Leninism, they will continue to be more divided than united until their objective antagonisms are overcome. However, this requires a supra-national federation of socialist states that does not give priority to socialism in a single country.

The U.S.S.R. has 0.93 cultivated hectares per inhabitant, as compared to 0.18 in China: Soviet agriculturists dispose of five times the arable land available to Chinese agriculturists.

Is it not likely, then, that this objective difference will generate an active conflict along the length of the Sino-Soviet frontier? The U.S.S.R. is free from population pressures, but in China that pressure is uncontrollable. This accounts for Chinese demographic pressure northward toward Siberia: an empty land more closely linked to Chinese civilization than to the Russia of the tsars.

The valleys of the Yellow River and the Yangtze, like their deltas and the middle plains, are overweighted with population. In some zones there are close to 1,000 inhabitants per square kilometer as compared to 10 inhabitants per square kilometer in the Soviet Union. The Soviets have vast extensions of tundra and unarable cold lands; but they also have huge arable tracts that are still unplowed. Meanwhile, the Chinese are painfully cultivating mountain slopes, making terraces, in order to win a few meters more of cultivated land.

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During the first decades of the twenty-first century, China should have a population of almost two billion: there will be even less economic space per inhabitant than there is today. If the U.S.S.R. does not open Siberia to joint socialist exploitation with the Chinese, then population pressures are likely to push China into a confrontation with the U.S.S.R. rather than with Japan, India, Indochina, Thailand, Malaysia or Indonesia, which are already overpopulated. There are those who fear that Chinese demographic expansion might be directed toward Australia; but the road there is blocked by the North American and British fleets, not to mention their reserves of atomic bombs. Expansion southward would be a vain strategic gesture without a Chinese political and military alliance with India and the countries of Southeast Asia.

Internal colonization limited by deserts and mountain ranges cannot solve China's population problems: eventually her surplus population will be driven toward underpopulated zones contiguous to her frontiers, toward the arable regions

of Siberia, Mongolia and Manchuria rather than Southeast Asia. Tsarism extended the frontiers of Imperial Russia to the Pacific at the expense of a decadent and feudal China. But the new China of Mao denounces the legacy of that imperialism and its reaffirmation by the Kremlin.

In their border conflicts with the Chinese, the Soviets repeat that they will defend their frontiers without ceding an inch. This is tantamount to refusing to share land with a socialist neighbor; it generates further ideological tensions between countries that are already opposed to each other's national and foreign policies. Thus uneven economic development can foment wars between socialist countries just as in the past it provoked wars between capitalist ones.

The nation is a bourgeois institution, social relation or form of intercourse. If it is not superseded by a socialist country, then that country has yet to overcome its antagonism to other socialist nations. Failure to overcome the antagonisms generated by national differences was evident in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) and the Sino-Soviet border clashes in March, 1969. Within a Marxist historical framework, what is advantageous to one nation tends to be disadvantageous to another, in the East as in the West, that is, as long as the world is not a single country or universal federation of socialist republics.

The differences or rather antagonisms between China and the U.S.S.R. have become more acute since the nuclear agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States and the military aid given by the Kremlin to India. The Sino-Soviet pact of mutual assistance has become a dead letter since Moscow advised Peking that all aid would be stopped and the Soviet's nuclear umbrella lowered should China seek to recover Formosa, to intervene in Vietnam or to provoke hostilities with India.

In order to maintain China in a satellite status similar to that of the countries belonging to Comecon, the Soviet Union attempted to dictate the exchange rate between the Russian ruble and the Chinese yen. It sought to manipulate China in much the same manner that the U.S. dominates its own

satellites through the International Monetary Fund. For the purpose of containing China's demographical pressures within her present territorial limits, the Soviet Union decided against sharing nuclear arms, electromechanical equipment for the construction of atomic reactors, uranium, etc. In effect, this policy placed the Soviet Union on the side of the United States: for the Pacific will continue being a North American lake as long as China does not become a major atomic power.

The United States has contributed to dividing Russia and China, to perpetuating an undeclared war along 8,000 kilometers of the Sino-Soviet frontier. China cannot expand overseas; she can only put pressure on the inner lines of her empty periphery toward Siberia. For that purpose she has no need of naval or air power, but only of a large infantry. With a population of 750 million, she can afford to sacrifice 20 million soldiers in a war—fewer than China's demographic growth in two years. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States can afford such a loss, nor can they risk losing more than two million soldiers each without provoking peace demonstrations and internal rebellion. A prolonged war makes no sense to well-fed populations with a high standard of comfort and civilization, to peoples unaccustomed to prolonged and unnecessary sacrifices.

The Soviet Union has become entrenched in the status quo sanctioned by the Treaty of Yalta, which gave her a dominant position in Central and Eastern Europe. However, she has since lost political influence over Yugoslavia and Albania, which escaped from the orbit of the ruble. The ideological antagonism pitting China and Albania against Yugoslavia is on the way to being resolved; but their common antagonism to the Soviet Union has escalated. In the event that the U.S.S.R. were to invade Romania as it did Czechoslovakia in 1968, would China, Albania and Yugoslavia continue to be neutral?

Should the U.S.S.R. send its tanks against Bucharest, as it did against Budapest (1956) and Prague (1968), it might be challenged by the combined defensive forces of Yugoslavia, Albania and China. The repercussions of such a military con-

frontation would be far greater than from the North American expedition to the moon in 1969. For a war between socialist countries would objectively indicate that economic and technological development can give rise to armed conflict between rival bureaucracies and not only rival bourgeoisies. It would show that the class struggle continues in the East and is unlikely to end short of self-managed socialism, direct democracy and workers' councils.

* * *

China has an independent foreign policy. Not once during the epoch of Khrushchev was she willing to negotiate that independence: to accept the existence of two Chinas as the price of admission to the United Nations. In 1972 President Nixon recognized China's *de jure* sovereignty over Formosa, leaving Chiang Kai-shek in the lurch. This indicated that the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Pacific would not intervene in the event of war with Formosa—a situation which the Kremlin never anticipated.

Nonetheless, China has followed the example set by the Soviet Union as a great power. The revolutionary Mao recently received the feudal monarch Haile Selassie, to whom he offered credits of 84 million dollars, and the totalitarian General Ne Win of Burma, to whom he also extended credits. To the anticommunist General Yahya Khan, the administrator of "martial law" who massacred thousands of East Pakistanis, he gave credits of not less than 200 million dollars. As if that were not enough, in 1971 Peking conceded credits as well as direct military aid to the government of Ceylon during the latter's campaign to smash the Guevarista guerrillas fighting in the interior. In this light it is hardly surprising that the U.S.S.R. has granted millions of dollars in credits to the reactionary and totalitarian government of Brazil and military credits to the government of Colombia to be used in liquidating the Maoist and Fidelista guerrillas in that country.

CHAPTER VIII

The Antibureaucratic Revolution

1. *Dictatorship of the Proletariat or Technobureaucracy? **

At the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Moscow, September, 1965, it was resolved that Soviet state enterprises should function on the basis of the profit principle, incentive prices and competition for credits. Any enterprise whose costs were non-competitive or whose products were not fully absorbed by the market would henceforth be penalized: it would no longer receive credits merely for having fulfilled its productive quota.

In returning to the profit principle—the motive force and essence of capitalism, as Marx said—the Soviet economy has not surmounted the economic subjectivism denounced by Khrushchev's successors. It has moved in the direction of neocapitalism, not toward socialism, much less toward the communism promised for 1980 by Khrushchev and his detractors, Brezhnev and Kosygin.

Inasmuch as more powers are devolved on the director of each enterprise in an effort to stimulate its profitability, the CPSU must lose to a certain extent control over the national economy. If the Red Army is no longer controlled by People's Commissars, if the Machine and Tractor Stations have been abolished, if the directors of enterprises are more

* *Dialéctica de la política*, Chapter V, pp. 242–243; Chapter VI, pp. 268–270, 289–290, 290–291, 292–295.

and more autonomous without the workers sharing in the management, if a majority of party members consist of bureaucrats, technocrats and peasants, if all this occurs, then where is the dictatorship of the proletariat? Is it not more accurate to say that the revisionists are oriented toward a neocapitalism, toward a new New Economic Policy (NEP)? When the technobureaucracy shares in the profits of enterprise through an income ten times the minimum wage, then how does this benefit the proletariat?

The bureaucracy, consisting of unpoliticized technocrats, the military hierarchy and state and party officials, is leading the Soviet Union in an apparently Marxist direction, but one which actually favors an understanding with imperialism at the expense of China and the international proletariat, and a technocratic monopoly of the Soviet economy prejudicial to the workers. The revisionists in the U.S.S.R. have superseded Marxism-Leninism with Libermanism [a new Soviet approach to resource allocation based on material incentives, decentralization of decision-making and the economizing of inputs]. The principle of profitability based on price incentives has displaced the Marxist principle of balanced economic development based on the elimination of classes, private property and pressure groups.

* * *

Soviet Marxism is an economic developmentalism. The Soviet bureaucracy is only nominally Marxist: its fundamental concern is industrialization on the basis of nationalization, not the socialization of wealth. Control over the economy is exercised by a centralized and totalitarian administration without workers' participation. The individual enterprise and the autonomous individual of private capitalism are subordinated to a central plan through which the technocracy and political bureaucracy rule over the proletariat with greater rigor than the bourgeoisie ever did. The replacement of private capitalism by state capitalism was a swindle at the expense of the political ingenuousness of the workers. They expected socialism to follow capitalism, but in fact their revolutionary

efforts were rewarded by a dictatorship of the bureaucracy.

Of all the problems confronting Soviet ideologues the most important to them is the antagonism generated by the disparity of economic development between the U.S.S.R. and the industrialized capitalist nations. The beginning and end of Soviet politics is the achievement of economic parity with the United States. As greater importance is attached to this narrow economic objective, less importance is given to the goal of socialist transformation. The prospect of a classless society is used to stimulate economic development, but Marxism is reduced to a philosophy of economic growth.

Soviet man has become a means not to the flowering of socialism, but to catching up economically with the United States. Socialist morality is subordinated to economic objectives, to accelerated industrialization through the investment of a proportionately greater volume of capital than under capitalism, that is, proportionate to the national income. Thus the Soviet worker forfeits his skin to a rate of surplus value that is higher in the East than in the West. In effect, Soviet morality has less in common with Marxism than with Calvinism or Puritanism. Underlying its spurious proletarian internationalism is a national chauvinism which tramples on the interests of other Communist parties by sacrificing those interests to Soviet objectives.

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For Soviet ideologues the bourgeois state is an instrument of power in the service of the dominant class, whereas the "socialist state" is the incarnation and expression of the collective interest. Like the worker in the capitalist countries, however, the Soviet worker wants greater freedom, higher wages, fewer hours of work, more consumer goods and greater participation in management. In the East no less than in the West, the self-management of production by the workers themselves is the only way of overcoming their alienation. But the state prevents the workers from taking control of their own enterprises.

The Soviets claim that the capitalist state is controlled by

the economic base, whereas the Soviet state has control over the economy. In fact, authority over the superstructure passes from the bourgeoisie to the bureaucracy but not to the working class. If there were no state in the U.S.S.R., socialism would begin to develop as Marx anticipated, through workers' self-management. But after half a century of socialism Russia resembles a dictatorship of the bureaucracy more than a dictatorship of the proletariat.

* * *

Stalinism represented the nationalization of communism, the abandonment of a strategy of permanent revolution including the export of revolution, and the subordination of proletarian internationalism to Russian national socialism. The thesis of socialism in a single country can be implemented only by the repressive power of the state within, and coexistence with imperialism beyond its own frontiers. The struggle to realize socialism in a single country conduces not to socialism but to state capitalism; it generates the conditions for transferring the powers of factory councils or worker's soviets, which flourished during the period of "war communism," to bureaucratic authorities in charge of centralized planning. Socialism in a single country presupposes national defense, the creation of a powerful army and the allocation of a substantial part of the gross national income to producing armaments. A nationalized socialism demands that the pro-Soviet Communist parties in other countries be sacrificed to the strategical, political and diplomatic interests of the bureaucrats in the Kremlin.

* * *

The socialist mythology of the CPSU is predicated on the false premise that the social order that follows the defeat of the bourgeoisie is identical with socialism. Actually, the October Revolution has not qualitatively transformed the relation of the workers to the instruments of production. Without the transference of means of production to the workers as a condition of self-management, the workers continue in their

capacity of wage-laborers; and capital, in the form of nationalized plant, continues to be an alien power over them. The abolition of private property in the means of production is tantamount to nationalization; but public property is not the same as socialist property. Thus in criticism of Lassalle's followers who marveled at Bismarck's nationalizations, Engels noted that if socialization consisted of nationalization, then socialism would be found in the public urinals.

Theorists of the Soviet economy have yet to explain the mechanism of surplus value in the U.S.S.R. Carried away by semantics, these ideologues talk about a "fund of socialist accumulation." Surplus value is not as clearly manifest under conditions of state capitalism as under private capital. Given a system of private production and exchange, surplus value is appropriated by owners and employers at the level of the factory and farm before it reaches the bank (as interest on borrowed capital), the market place (as commercial profits) and the state (as taxes). In contrast, under the Soviet system of state capitalism, surplus value is appropriated by the economic and political bureaucracy at the state level even before it is distributed to the individual enterprise.

Surplus value consists of the difference between the cost of production of a given commodity and its market price as arbitrarily fixed by the state, by the central planners, without consulting the producers. The central planning agency determines the margin of profit to be appropriated by the state in its capacity as employer. Since the bureaucracy has absolute powers over the state apparatus, it monopolizes the distribution of surplus value. This makes the bureaucracy the dominant "new class," a class considerably larger than the bourgeoisie but not less onerous or exploitative. Since the alternative to bourgeois rule may be state capitalism rather than socialism, it is thus utopian to identify socialism with the social order which follows the displacement or eclipse of the bourgeoisie.

The director of a Soviet factory has considerable powers and is appointed by the state rather than elected by the workers. Nonetheless, the appropriation and redistribution of sur-

plus value is the prerogative not of the director but of the government and its leaders, e.g., Stalin, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Kosygin, etc. The determination of the magnitude of surplus value, its bookkeeping and distribution are performed through the mechanism of the Plan. The bureaucrats and technocrats who control the state apparatus divide unequally the mass of surplus value to the advantage of persons in authority, who receive an average of ten times the capacity to consume of the workers and peasants at the base of Soviet society. In this respect the Soviet economy functions like a giant corporation within which the managers or bureaucrats are also the shareholders.

To the costs of production of various commodities the Soviet bureaucracy adds a surcharge of 50 percent. In this way the Soviet state levies a fabulous sales tax through which it not only invests annually a greater mass of capital than under conditions of private capitalism, but also appropriates a comparatively larger share of the gross national product to pay the salaries of the bureaucracy. Because wage and salary differentials are greater in the U.S.S.R. than in some capitalist countries, Soviet production may be socialist but its mode of distribution is capitalist.

In a socialist society the cost of production and the market price would tend toward equality and nobody would share in the surplus who did not also share in productive labor. A socialist society would exchange the products or services of one branch of production for those of others only on the basis of their values. In strict conformity to the law of value and the principle of social cooperation, there would be no profits-on-alienation or surplus value from exchange. In the U.S.S.R. the sales price and cost of production are very different, however, because there is a privileged class intent on appropriating surplus value.

The nationalization of the means of production and exchange by the state signifies neither the transition to socialism nor the abolition of human exploitation, much less the conquest of power by the proletariat. Neither in the East nor the West does the nationalization of production put an end to

wage-labor, to the appropriation of surplus value from the producers and to the worker's condition of economic alienation. The nationalization of production does not eliminate social classes, but permits the bureaucracy to distribute and appropriate surplus value in its own interest without the consent of the workers and without their participation in management. The overcoming of the worker's alienation depends on his unity with the means of production: the identification of labor and capital through the self-management of enterprises by the direct producers.

Trade unions in the U.S.S.R. are more effective as instruments of state policy than as agencies for defending the workers. As long as the trade unions do not assume control over production in the form of worker's councils, they will continue to represent the worker's interest only in confrontation with private or state capital; but that is tantamount to leaving his condition of alienation, propertylessness and exploitation unchanged. Consequently, the trade union is fundamentally an agency of the bureaucracy in the U.S.S.R.: in its present form it is incapable of seizing control of production, exchange, distribution and consumption on behalf of the workers. Until the workers own the means of production and the riches they create, however, social classes will not disappear but will take new socioeconomic forms, as they have taken in the countries where state capitalism prevails.

2. *Sources of Conflict in Bureaucratic Societies* *

Soviet Communists and their catechumens in other countries have yet to apply Marx's dialectical method to the analysis of Soviet society. In claiming that Soviet society is free of antagonisms, they convert Marxism into a species of dogmatism, into a mere state ideology sanctioning the power and privileges of bureaucracy. Nonetheless, the following sources of antagonism are evident in the interior of Soviet society.

The socialist principle of the free development and free

* *Dialéctica de la política*, Chapter VI, pp. 276-277, 278-279, 280-282, 284-286, 287.

satisfaction of human needs is a condition of the disalienation of the workers. But it has given way to the accelerated growth of the productive forces under the supreme authority of a factory manager who is not elected by the workers.

The subordination of individuals to the division of labor has not been overcome in the U.S.S.R. The requirements of individual liberty contradict state authority no less in the East than in the West. The disalienation of the worker passes through a libertarian ethic of self-management by the workers themselves; but the Soviet bureaucracy is opposed to it with as much tenacity as the bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries.

In the U.S.S.R. the interest of the state lies in the consolidation and expansion of power. The interest of the worker is the immediate satisfaction of his material and personal needs. The strategy of the bureaucracy tends toward the production of armaments as a necessary condition of national greatness; but the workers favor the production of goods and services, not only liberty in the abstract, but also a high standard of living. Practice has led to a divorce between bureaucratic strategy and popular policy in the Soviet Union. The Soviet citizen feels alienated, as Marx would say, because the bureaucracy is incapable of overcoming or transforming the basis of daily life. Marx indicated that without a transformation of man's daily existence, there could be no socialism. But in the U.S.S.R. art, customs and domestic life exhibit fewer revolutionary aspects than in the West.

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After the period of "war communism" and the regime of direct democracy under workers', peasants' and soldiers' councils, Soviet society witnessed the emergence of totalitarianism, the absolute power of the state, the dictatorship over workers and peasants rather than by them. The self-management of production during the years of war communism, when the anarchists worked openly for the Russian Revolution of 1917-23, has since given way to bureaucratic and centralized planning where the workers are distinguished by their absence.

Economic backwardness in the U.S.S.R. has had a curious

effect on the conflict between East and West. With the adoption of Libermanism, or profit incentives and commercial competition, the Soviet Union readopted certain capitalist mechanisms, whereas capitalism in the West has been advancing toward socialism through a series of reforms, the planned direction of national economies, the nationalization of basic industries, the development of cooperatives and experimentation with limited forms of economic democracy. Western capitalism is still strong enough to compel socialism in Eastern Europe to take a step backward, but not to halt the relentless march toward socialism in the advanced countries. We have here an illustration of the dialectical principle that every action leads to a corresponding reaction when the two poles of an antagonism are causally related.

Capitalism has passed through the following stages: the despotism of absolute monarchy; the liberalism of free enterprise and free competition; monopoly capitalism, or the domination of giant trusts and international cartels; and state capitalism, or the last stage bordering on the historical negation of this mode of production. The Soviet regime has evolved in almost the opposite direction from a regime of workers' self-management (war communism) through the partial restoration of private and mixed enterprises (New Economic Policy) to the bureaucratic nationalization of production and a system of centralized planning, which has completely dispensed with workers' councils or the participation of workers in management.

The struggle between the Soviet state and its proletarian base must eventually surface, notwithstanding the Party's success in making apolitical animals out of prefabricated Communists. Within the Soviet Union and its allies this struggle has taken a dramatic turn: it is now basically an anarchist one. There is a mortal conflict between the productive workers who create surplus value and the quasi-omnipotent state which appropriates and redistributes it unequally, thereby perpetuating human exploitation. Libertarian socialism has perhaps a greater chance of success in the East than in the West precisely because the absolute powers of the Soviet state have

generated an opposite reaction tending toward the virtual negation of all centralized authority.

If socialism had triumphed in the West it would have been disseminated throughout the entire world. But the triumph of "socialism" in a backward country, like Russia in 1917, contributed to isolating the revolution. The encirclement of the Soviet Union and the increasing power of Western capitalism compelled socialism to take a nationalist course. Its economic development was hampered by the requirements of national defense. The blockade against China and Cuba in 1966 is reminiscent of that against the U.S.S.R. in another epoch. When a socialist government is installed in a Third World country, the economic backwardness of that country tends to have a reactionary effect on its politics. From Trotsky to Kosygin, the Russian Revolution has passed through one deformation after another, each one pushing it further to the Right.

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There is a conflict of interests between workers and peasants in the Soviet Union because they are not united locally at the level of people's communes. The farm collectives want higher prices for agricultural products in proportion to their scarcity. High prices for such commodities are damaging to the urban population just as the high prices for manufactured articles during the period of war communism were damaging to rural interests. Nonetheless, the effects of the price scissors on class conflicts have not been studied in the Soviet Union. Instead, there is a blind conviction of the absence of social antagonisms under conditions of alleged socialism and the transition to communism.

Among the visible sources of antagonism in Soviet society are the following: the bureaucratic use of public resources at variance with the worker's aspiration to self-management; the expenses of maintaining a strong government at the cost of individual consumption; the high salaries of technocrats in comparison to the wages of ordinary workers and peasants;

the policy of socialism in one country in opposition to the worker's interest in permanent revolution at home and the export of revolution abroad; and the hegemony of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at the expense both of Soviet workers and the independence of the Communist parties of other countries. The resultant antagonisms are likely to become more acute with the repeated failures and political setbacks of pro-Soviet Communist parties. For when the opportunity presents itself for a party, leader, nation, philosophy or civilization to fulfill a revolutionary role, and it does not, then it is implacably passed over as an historical anachronism.

The capitalist blockade of the U.S.S.R. contributed to the formulation and adoption of a policy of "socialism in one country." In choosing the road of nationalism rather than proletarian internationalism, the Soviet leaders had to develop a powerful national army; but this absorbed a considerable part of the gross national income, thereby restricting the potential growth of agriculture and light industry as conditions of the triumph of socialism. The creation of a professional army and a repressive military code prejudicial to ordinary soldiers transformed the Red Army into a pressure group, a state within the state with the attendant dangers of Bonapartism. Following the abolition of people's commissars in the army, the supreme military hierarchy could thus use its influence as it pleased to exchange Molotov for Khrushchev, and Khrushchev for Kosygin.

The question whether or not to invest more capital in heavy industry, to produce more means of production than articles of consumption, divides the Soviet hierarchy and issues in a struggle for power between sections of the bureaucracy tied to one or another branch of production. The army always supported those in favor of heavy industry; but it was opposed by elements of the party and technocracy linked to agriculture, light industry and the service sector. These antagonisms at the heart of Soviet society have frequently led to political violence with characteristics of palace revolutions, e.g., the liquidation of the Molotov anti-Party group by Khrushchev

supported by General Zhukov, and afterwards the "purge" of Khrushchev by Brezhnev and Kosygin perhaps with the support of Marshal Malinowski.

Like the masses in other parts of the world, the Soviet masses aspire to both economic and political liberty; but this aspiration runs counter to the efforts of the technobureaucracy to accelerate technological growth through large capital investments at the expense of the worker's consumption. If the bureaucracy does not reduce its own salaries in order to invest more, then it must oblige workers and peasants to consume less, which requires the use of dictatorial powers. Despite the depoliticization of Soviet man, sooner or later his conflict of interests with the bureaucracy must take a violent form.

The requirements of the Soviet state have collided with individual interests. The state favors compulsory industrialization and national defense at the expense of personal income. In this respect it is the representative not of the collective interest but of special interests—bureaucratic pressure groups which fulfill in the U.S.S.R. a role similar to that of bourgeois interest groups in the capitalist world. The Soviet state is not an instrument of society but of the "managerial class," i.e., the technobureaucracy. Thus the conflict between state and society in the U.S.S.R. is basically an anarchist one.

* * *

The major Soviet reforms were decreed from above without the direct action or participation of the masses. These measures were insufficient to establish socialism beyond the sphere of production because the bureaucracy refused to relinquish its control over the state apparatus. In the event that bureaucratic authority is again challenged, however, the Hungarian insurrection of 1956 may cease to be the only example of its kind. All unrealized antagonisms tend to be resolved through force when they become aggravated, and the U.S.S.R. is no exception to this rule. Although Soviet textbooks are silent on this matter, the Soviet bureaucracy is exempt neither from intra-bureaucratic conflicts nor from challenges from Soviet workers.

Freedom of thought in the U.S.S.R. is subordinated to a

centralized monolithic authority for the purpose of accelerating economic growth. The party, nation and state take precedence over the individual. Soviet man has become liberated through work; but he has overcome the tyranny of nature only at the price of civil liberties. In the United States man's basic physiological needs are not always satisfied; but bourgeois liberties are more "elastic" than Soviet freedoms. Moreover, the introduction of profit incentives and competition within the Soviet economy exposes Soviet man to new insecurities, to unemployment and slowdowns whenever the market cannot absorb a given volume of production. Thus the Libermanization of the Soviet economy is tantamount to a new NEP, which is pushing the Soviet Union in the direction of capitalism rather than socialism.

Soviet man leads a wretched inner life. His emotional and cultural impoverishment is conditioned by the existence of a totalitarian state which shackles his intelligence and alienates him politically. He can complain under his breath or in the presence of his family, but he cannot sincerely or publicly express criticism on matters of politics, art, institutions, hierarchies, etc. Tedium dominates his daily existence when he lacks the opportunity to criticize the world in which he lives. Soviet socialism has not overcome the alienation of the individual, who is perhaps as oppressed by the tedium of daily work as he would be under capitalism. In negating self-management of production by the workers themselves, Soviet society perpetuates the class struggle, the alienation of the worker from his wages, the divorce between labor and capital, human injustice and the inhumane in history.

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We have sketched these various sources of antagonism in Soviet society in order to present an overall view of the new forms of alienation in the countries dominated by state capitalism and a dictatorship of the bureaucracy. Will state capitalism rather than monopoly capitalism or imperialism, as Lenin believed, constitute the final stage of world capitalism? If the great theoretician of the Russian Revolution were still living,

what would he think of peaceful coexistence as an alleged alternative to class struggle? If Marx could make an economic and social study of Soviet society, what would be his analysis of classes, the state, property, surplus value, the rate of profit, interest, commodities and money in the U.S.S.R.? Would he consider a country to be socialist which has become congealed at the level of state capitalism?

3. *The Antiauthoritarian Political Revolution* *

For the neophytes of the Kremlin, the Soviet troops and their allies ("satellites") attempted to free the Czechoslovak people in 1968 as they had freed the Hungarian people in 1956. But the Czechoslovaks and Hungarians were not trying to restore a bourgeois regime; they were trying to introduce a new order of socialism in the form of self-management. They were seeking to liberate themselves from the yoke of an oppressive bureaucracy which had taken the place of the bourgeoisie—a self-serving elite enjoying high salaries from its power to appropriate the surplus value of the "socialist countries" where there is no direct democracy or worker's self-government.

The revisionists of communism have yet to acknowledge that the class struggle has also erupted in the countries with "socialist" or state capitalist regimes. Their totalitarian bureaucracies are being challenged by the masses of workers and peasants. As an effort toward popular liberation against an all-embracing state serving the special interests of a bureaucracy, this struggle is largely an anarchist one.

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The Soviet workers and peasants are confronted by a state that is the absolute proprietor of the wealth they produce. Accordingly, it would be rash for workers to strike in one sector should workers continue to labor elsewhere. A limited strike would not create much of a problem for a single em-

* "El rublo, el Comecon y Checoslovaquia," *Checoslovaquia 1968*, pp. 200, 204–205, 210; *Democracia directa*, Chapter IX, pp. 110–111, 112–113; Chapter XII, pp. 149–150.

ployer like the Soviet state. In the West matters are different: a steel strike paralyzes the bourgeoisie in that sector, obliging them to bargain collectively with the steelworkers. But the right to strike is meaningless in an absolute state that is also the owner or disposer of all wealth. Although limited strikes can create havoc with centralized planning, state bureaucrats have considerably more power over the workers than do the old liberal or monopoly bourgeoisie in the West.

Consequently, in the struggle against the bureaucratic state, a state capitalism dissimulated as socialism, there is only one effective strategy: total revolutionary war. A general insurrection against the state bureaucracy is sufficient to make the social and political struggle in the East an anarchist one. The alternative to a scientific technobureaucracy is scientific anarchism based on self-government, the self-management of production and a knowledge of economics, sociology and history. The struggle against bureaucracy indicates that the moment has arrived for uniting Marx's historical and economic analysis with Bakunin's humanism and direct action, which together can help to promote a libertarian socialism of self-management and self-government.

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In Czechoslovakia the people rose up against leaders like Antonín Novotný and a Communist Party which had capitulated entirely to the dictates of the Kremlin. The Czechs were already known to be lovers of liberty when, in the fifteenth century, the Hussites waged a civil war in defense of religious freedom and the Taborite reformers adopted a communist mode of life. In 1968, five centuries later, the Czechs again raised the flag of rebellion in the East. While struggling to democratize their economy, government and Communist Party, they also called for the end of censorship, for freedom of speech and the press, and for workers' self-management and control of the economy. In effect, they chose to follow the Yugoslav model, the example of Tito rather than Stalin.

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On November 29, 1943, in the middle of World War II, the Yugoslav Republic was proclaimed by thousands of assembled guerrillas and representatives from the liberated areas. As early as 1941, Marshal Tito's Army of Liberation had as many as 300 thousand volunteers, who diverted more German divisions than the entire North African front did. The uniqueness of Yugoslavia is that it liberated itself from Nazi-Fascist occupation at the cost of 1.7 million dead, who helped to forge Yugoslav independence without the concurrence of either East or West.

Lovers of their own sovereignty, the Yugoslavs have not mortgaged it to anyone. Tito resisted Stalin's efforts to make Yugoslavia an economic, political and military satellite of the Soviet Union. Because of that resistance, the Yugoslav Communists were expelled from the Cominform and subjected to an economic and diplomatic blockade by the Warsaw Pact countries and members of Comecon.

In a speech at Leskovac in October, 1968, Marshal Tito said the following about the Soviet-initiated blockade:

In 1948 the U.S.S.R. and other East European countries broke diplomatic relations and refused to respect their agreements with Yugoslavia. Our country was then devastated; our losses and the destructive consequences of the war were immense. And in that situation we also had no friends in the West.

At that moment Yugoslavia stood isolated and alone. Nonetheless, she was able to extricate herself from that predicament by tightening her belt, by establishing commercial relations with all countries and by making her industries competitive. These are now among the most prosperous in the Balkans. The Yugoslav dockyards compete in the quality and quantity of ships with the most advanced in Western Europe.

"The isolation of our country," Tito said in Leskovac, "has lasted many years. To compensate for the blockade in the East, we had to accept credits from the West. Since 1960, we have paid all of our prewar debts, which we were obliged

to recognize in exchange for foreign assistance." However, Yugoslavia never once relinquished her socialist course, her freedom of action and sovereignty. On the contrary, she encouraged the Czechoslovaks and Romanians to adopt the socialism of self-management, to debureaucratize their economies and to give to workers the right to elect the directors of their own enterprises and to participate in decision-making and the distribution of income—activities from which they are excluded in other countries.

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The Czechoslovak people want socialism with liberty, economic self-management and the debureaucratization of their institutions: trade unions, enterprises, cooperatives, the state and party. The Yugoslav political and economic reforms have accomplished all this, a fact which has encouraged the Czech reformers to follow the Yugoslav model.

There are rumors that Yugoslavia might be invaded because of differences with Bulgaria over the question of Macedonian sovereignty. But the Yugoslav people who struggled against Hitler, the guerrilla leaders who suffered and slept on the ground will not bend before the Kremlin. In this respect they are unlike the peoples and leaders of other Eastern European countries.

Yugoslavia is in arms. Should the Soviet Union and her satellites attempt to intervene in Yugoslavia as they did in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet generals would find their own Vietnam in the Yugoslav mountains. Yugoslavia is not Czechoslovakia: it liberated itself from Nazism and is prepared to liberate itself from Soviet national socialism. Belgrade has affirmed that there are many roads to socialism and that no country can claim its road to be the only one without falling into a dogmatism alien to Marxism.

* * *

In epochs of transition from one mode of production to another on an international and not only a national scale,

ideologies tend to obscure the real content of revolutions, the role of social classes and the new economic forms in process of displacing the old. In Part I of *The German Ideology*, in the section concerning the production of consciousness, Marx says:

Every new class, then, achieves its hegemony on a broader basis than that of the class ruling previously; for that reason the opposition of the nonruling class to the new ruling class later develops all the more sharply and profoundly, and the struggle against this new ruling class leads to a more decisive and radical negation of society than before.

For Marx the prevailing ideas at any given time reflect the interests of the dominant class—and the Soviet bureaucracy is no exception to this general tendency. The struggle against bureaucracy represents a new form of the class struggle distinct from the antagonisms inherent in the regime of private capitalism. It is a struggle for the emancipation of the workers against the usurpers of public economic power—in reality a struggle against the state. Scientific socialism is pitted against bureaucratism. On the basis of a knowledge of history, economics, society and nature, scientific socialism calls for the abolition of the state in favor of cheap government limited to the administration of things. People's self-government is more efficient and less expensive than bureaucratic government which maintains itself through an army, jails, courts of justice and police. Self-administration is tantamount to scientific government in which technique, labor, land and capital work together without the mediation of the bourgeoisie or bureaucracy.

The new generations in the Soviet Union and the other countries with a state economy are preparing to rebel against their bureaucratic and technocratic oppressors in a movement directed at the transformation of state capitalism. That system will be replaced with the socialism of self-management, whether through structural reforms or violent revolution. That will depend on the resistance of the ruling bureaucracy, the extent to which it defends its privileges and refuses to surrender economic and political power to the direct producers.

4. *Economic Democracy: The Socialism of Self-Management* *

The proletariat can become free and master of its own destiny only on condition of acquiring possession of the means of producing and distributing the economic surplus, without the intermediary of the bourgeoisie or bureaucracy, through workers' councils in self-managed enterprises. With state property and a bureaucratized economy, the worker continues selling his labor-power as a commodity: he is not the direct master of the instruments of production and he must sign a work contract with the state or owner of the social wealth—all of which contradicts the fundamentals of Marxist socialism.

* * *

In Yugoslavia labor-power has ceased to be a commodity: in whatever industry, the worker begins as a direct self-manager of production. The means of production and the final product belong to him rather than to the bourgeois or bureaucrat. The income of a Yugoslav worker no longer depends on the supply and demand of labor-power but on the productivity of his enterprise, the quality or efficiency of its equipment and the rate of savings or accumulation per worker, i.e., on the investment of the economic surplus.

The free worker in a self-managed enterprise should remember the words of the *Communist Manifesto* (Part II): "In bourgeois society living labor is but a means to increase accumulated labor. In communist society accumulated labor is but a means to enrich and embellish the lives of the workers." Economic self-management by the direct producers has the task of increasing the mass of social capital or accumulated labor, but in order to liberate muscle-power through machinery and to raise the productivity of labor: the only way in which socialism may be fully realized. Since material misery generates moral misery, political ruin, class struggles and the

* *Democracia directa*, Chapter IX, pp. 95, 96, 97, 100, 111–112; Chapter XII, pp. 152–153, 154–155; *Socialismo de autogestión*, Chapter IX, pp. 204–205.

penurious existence of man, socialism can triumph only through an economy of abundance.

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Our epoch, which has a technological base much more developed than that investigated by Marx, has the objective conditions for the transition to socialism because of the automation of production and the extensive use of fertilizers and machinery in agriculture. With fewer productive forces per worker than in the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia has introduced workers' self-management through the transference of state property to the enterprises now owned as well as operated by the direct producers. Self-management evolved in Yugoslavia at an opportune moment in the development of its national economy.

Perhaps centralized planning is initially necessary in an underdeveloped country in order to reconstruct and radically program production, to develop basic industries at the expense of other sectors that are not as economically indispensable. Nonetheless, after fifty years of having subsidized an enormous economic infrastructure, the U.S.S.R. maintains the system of centralized planning and a bureaucratized economy, thereby excluding the direct producers from management. After a few years of centralized planning and economic bureaucracy, Yugoslavia promulgated the Law of Worker's Councils in 1950, by which workers became owners of their means of production. This regime of self-management, whose sources can be traced to the Paris Commune (1871) and to the Spanish agricultural collectives and factory committees (1936-39), has since demonstrated greater efficiency and capacity for generating new productive forces than the centralized economy it replaced.

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The workers of a self-managed enterprise constitute its democratic base with the power to approve or reject the following: statutes of the enterprise, production plans, economic

objectives, research proposals, quality and quantity of output, credits, sales of products and services, import and export policies, organization of the enterprise, labor productivity and the distribution of the economic surplus. In brief, the workers acquire through self-management not only control over their enterprises, but also the administrative and technical knowledge which formerly had been the secret patrimony of the bureaucracy or technocracy.

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In the practical terrain of economic and technological development the productivity of Yugoslav agriculture has risen approximately 6 percent annually. Following the economic reforms of 1965 that introduced profit and price incentives into Yugoslav industry, industrial productivity rose to about 7 percent annually. With respect to the volume of industrial production, its annual increment in 1969 was between 7.5 and 8.5 percent. Exports have also increased at a rate of approximately 12 percent per annum.

Economic and technological development in Yugoslavia has been achieved without inhuman wages for its workers. In 1964, before the economic reforms, labor's share in the gross national income was 52.5 percent; in 1967 it was 67.4 percent. By comparison, in Argentina labor's share in 1967 was a little less than 50 percent with social insurance coverages included in the wages.

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The critics have argued that workers' self-management would interfere with economic development. But Yugoslav agriculture has developed more rapidly under conditions of economic self-management than Soviet agriculture under its regime of bureaucratically managed state and collective farms. For many years Soviet agriculture suffered from a severe crisis of underproduction, whereas Yugoslav agriculture increased its output from 1956 to 1966 by 80 percent. In the U.S.S.R. agriculture developed slowly because the prices of agricultural

products were fixed at comparatively low levels, a fact which compelled the peasants to subsidize or pay for the rapid progress of Soviet industry.

In Yugoslavia workers and technicians enjoy direct democracy and a high rate of productivity with liberty. Investments in the Yugoslav economy have been averaging about 30 percent of the gross national income. Self-managed enterprises must pay municipal taxes to cover the costs of operating in urban zones, and also national taxes. Despite these costs and the high rate of investment, however, Yugoslav enterprises also pay a decent income to their workers.

There is nothing utopian about Yugoslav self-management. On the contrary, it is an economy which works in the social interest: it unifies labor, capital and technical skills; it prevents the revenue and economic surplus from being monopolized and distributed by a privileged class; it insures that a substantial part of the gross income will be reinvested for the purpose of expanded reproduction; it guarantees to the worker his liberty and right to participate in the direction of his enterprise; and it requires that the general manager be responsible to the workers and that an administrative committee be elected by a workers' council. Thus the direction and base of each enterprise are able to work together without class antagonisms.

After fifty years the Soviet bureaucracy opposes self-management on the ground that it interferes with accelerated economic growth. Yet in Japan the bourgeoisie has achieved an annual rate of growth of 9.5 percent of its gross national product, compared to 6 or 7 percent in the U.S.S.R. Is this not because the Soviet bureaucracy appropriates and unproductively consumes at least as much surplus value as the Japanese bourgeoisie?

The Soviet leaders have fallen victim to a political mythology that obscures their understanding of the objective character of the Soviet regime. Lenin was aware that the economic basis of the Soviet state was originally closer to state capitalism than to socialism. "State capitalism," he said, "is the capitalism we know how to limit, to which we assign limits; state capitalism is controlled by the state, in turn controlled by the work-

ers, the most advanced workers or vanguard consisting of ourselves." Nonetheless, half a century of Soviet rule shows that it has not evolved toward socialism. If anything, the Soviet regime has neocapitalist tendencies evident in the creation of mixed enterprises with foreign participation by such companies as Fiat, Pirelli, and Olivetti, which have not invested their capital for nothing, but rather to extract surplus value from Soviet workers.

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It is said that in the U.S.S.R. the worker's state is the owner of all wealth and that the worker who shares in this ownership is not a producer of surplus value. Actually, the Soviet worker signs a contract with an employer, receives a wage, has no decision-making powers with respect to management and cannot strike without being branded a "counterrevolutionary" or "antisocialist." Since he is paid a wage in the same way as a worker in a capitalist country, it is evident that he produces more value than he receives. Matters are otherwise under conditions of self-management, as in Yugoslavia or the anarcho-syndicalist collectives during the Spanish Revolution. Workers' councils have the power of democratically deciding how to redistribute the economic surplus. . . . Socialism is not only a mode of production, but also a mode of distribution. It hardly matters whether the means of production are privately or publicly owned, if the producer has no power to determine how the social product will be distributed.

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In the East, under the system of bureaucratic and centralized planning, the director of an enterprise is an absolute dictator. In the West the employer behaves like a monarch, likewise excluding the workers from sharing in the management. Despite the fact that workers and technicians produce the goods and services without which society must perish, in both cases, under state capitalism or monopoly capitalism, the worker is a zero on the Left. . . .

The practice of direct democracy is more in accordance

with the expectations of Marx and Engels. In order to overcome the alienation of living labor and the reification of objectified labor, they called for an end to the antagonism between labor and capital through the direct management of enterprises by freely associated producers. Although Yugoslavia represents only the initial phase of socialist society, its self-managed economy is closer to achieving communism than the bureaucratic and technocratic management of production characteristic of state capitalism.

Undoubtedly, Yugoslavia is the least bureaucratized country, which explains why its annual rate of growth has caught up to Japan's—the highest in the world. In 1969, its overall or combined rate of growth was more than 10 percent. This achievement cannot be denied by any dogmatic ideology; it is convincing to anyone who is not alienated or politically mystified, who has respect for science, empirical evidence, historical results and economic and sociological objectivity.

PART III

*What Can Be Done?**(Strategy of the Urban Guerrilla)*

CHAPTER IX

Problems of Revolutionary Strategy

1. *Revolutionary Strategy and Imperialism* *

The Pentagon and the State Department are seeking an agreement with the puppet governments of Latin America in order to create a repressive continental army with sepoyan infantry and North American weapons and advisors to be commanded, if possible, by generals who have totally surrendered themselves to imperialism, such as Panasco Alvin [the Brazilian general who commanded the OAS troops] in Santo Domingo in 1965. The supposed "Inter-American Peace Force" of the Organization of American States (OAS) is an international of bourgeois reaction prepared to crush all movements of national liberation. Within this international organ of the Pan-American bourgeoisie the ideologies are similar with few exceptions. As a result there is a common goal of protecting the "Free World" in the interest of the dollar and the vast rural property-owners of Latin America.

The "holy alliance" of repression, whose strategic epicenter is the Pentagon and whose economic resonance box is Wall Street, claims that the boundaries between states are no longer national but ideological. This imperialism, intolerant and totalitarian, has been humbly accepted by the Brazilian and Argentine military strategists in order to create a permanent antipopular armed force at the service of the Pentagon. Just as the treaties of Rio de Janeiro and of Bogotá were directed

* *Estrategia de la guerrilla urbana*, 1st ed., Chapter II, pp. 42-44, 44-53.

against the U.S.S.R.—although now there is coexistence between Washington and Moscow—so there was pressure to create an antipopular alliance whose goal would be coexistence with the U.S.S.R. and violence against the insurrectionary or rebel peoples of Latin America, who are not resigned to wearing the hangman's noose of the North American "Free World."

Against the continental repressive army, against the military dictatorships united to yanqui imperialism, the Latin American peoples must form their own multinational organizations:

- (1) A United Latin American Anti-Imperialist Front.
- (2) A Latin American Army of Unity and Liberation.
- (3) A United Latin American Central Trade-Union Organization.
- (4) A United Front of the Latin American Youth.
- (5) A Latin American Student Federation.
- (6) A Latin American Labor Party.

To the "holy alliance" of the indigenous oligarchy and of yanqui imperialism we must answer with an offensive of Latin American liberation on all fronts, in all countries, in the cities and the countryside, through a revolutionary war on a continental scale. We cannot permit imperialism and its native quislings to subject peoples as in Santo Domingo, to carry out fraudulent elections and to disembark repressive troops. We must attack on all Latin American fronts the possessions and the representatives of yanqui imperialism, whenever the General Staff of the Pentagon gives the order to intervene in a Latin American province either alone or together with a Panasco Alvin. To remain neutral while imperialism invades a Latin American province (Santo Domingo) is to negate the unity of Latin America and to expose Latin America to colonization by the United States. Accordingly, the rest of the provinces must fight against imperialism for the right to be a great and sovereign Latin American nation.

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The peoples of Latin America must have an heroic sense of life; they must abandon a decadent and flimsy nationalism

(the province as a false nation); they must propagate a Latin American nationalism (the unity of Latin America); they must cease to be Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean, Peruvian, Paraguayan, etc., in order to become militant soldiers for a unique cause: the union of Latin America against imperialism, feudalism and militarism; in short, they must employ the strategy of revolutionary war in the metropolises, the countryside and the mountains on a Latin American scale. Thus the unity of the Latin American peoples would be realized in the course of a few years of fighting for liberation, decolonization, the liquidation of the "war lords": the enemies of democracy, the inventors of *coups d'état*. Pretorianism prospers and acts with impunity in Latin America because the people have no revolutionary leaders; because they do not know how to resort to combined revolutionary wars in the city and countryside; because the trade-union bureaucracy, the liberal bourgeoisie, the second-rate Communists favoring coexistence, and the parlor socialists leave the masses abandoned without strategic leadership, faced with imperialism and creole sepoyanism.

In Latin America the economic crisis and the unrestricted growth of the population are leading toward a great social revolution, despite efforts to contain it on the part of native militarism allied with yanqui imperialism. In 1966 there were military dictatorships in Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Ecuador, and oligarchic-dictatorial regimes democratically disguised in almost all of the Latin American countries. The political parties of the bourgeoisie and national oligarchies cannot resolve the structural crisis of Latin America by parliamentary methods. Under such conditions, in order to place the cost of the crisis on the urban proletariat and rural lumpenproletariat, to put brakes on inflation, to settle the foreign public debt with the help of international finance capital, military dictatorships have substituted the force of bayonets for the feeble parliamentarianism of the national bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie.

For a time, before the economic crisis was to convert itself into a social and political crisis, the general staffs of the Latin American armies held power but not the government. Now,

with accelerated inflation and squeezing by international bankers, military men have displaced politicians in Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina and Ecuador, not to mention other Latin American countries in similar circumstances. The army, the armed forces, now appear as the governing political parties. The final act of the Latin American tragedy is about to arrive: there are guerrillas in Colombia, Venezuela, Guatemala, Peru, Bolivia, etc. But there is not a continental revolutionary strategy capable of defeating the Pentagon and the Latin American military.

An army of Latin American liberation must be formed in each country, but with a continental strategic command. The army of Latin American liberation in countries with military dictatorships must struggle for basic liberties, the constitution, political and trade-union rights, for national sovereignty against imperialism, residual feudalism and militarism, for a direct democracy of the workers, intellectuals and the economically emaciated middle classes. Should the program of a war of liberation also include the aspirations of the national bourgeoisie who have been replaced in the government by the military, then the national bourgeoisie will provide support for the urban and rural guerrillas.

The general staff of an army of liberation must not forget that the ancient strategy depended entirely on dominating a territory. But a popular army has to control the population. Space without a favorable population is an absolute strategic void for the defeat of an unpopular, repressive, antidemocratic army compromised with imperialism, the corruptor, divider and violator of Latin American sovereignty.

Between a favorable territory and a favorable population, the army of liberation must choose the population and not the terrain. Only a guerrilla force with the support of the population is able to bring about the revolutionary war of the armed people against which the most powerful regular army is helpless. In Vietnam, despite the enormous economic and military power of the United States, what is decisive is man and not brutal military force supported by the myth of modern military technology.

Confronted by a powerful army with numerous troops, one must cede the territory no less in the cities than in the countryside; but one must continually gnaw away at the enemy until its morale is broken. In a war of liberation the final victory is not decided by arms, as in imperialist wars. In a revolutionary war that side wins which endures longest: morally, politically and economically. In the old strategy the factors making for victory were firepower and the number of combatants; in revolutionary war, if one knows how to employ strategically the factors of time and space with the support of the population, the side that knows how to or can endure the longest will ultimately win. A pretorian army which oppresses and self-colonizes its own people will never achieve victory but rather the most definitive and crushing defeat, that is, should it be forced to engage in small battles, compelled to waste away and to become demoralized by the time factor, and forced to strike in the void by the guerrillas' rational and strategic employment of the factor of space.

The initial revolutionary force, a small army of liberation, must be employed where it leads to the most strategic results and has the most possibilities of mobilizing the population, so that the people become the subject of history instead of passively submitting to almost all military coups. To organize a small revolutionary army and to isolate it from the popular masses in a mountainous terrain, without a territorial organization to support it, is to expose it to the implacable destruction by the air force, to bombardments of napalm and to encirclement and annihilation, as was the case of the guerrillas under Luis de la Puente in 1965 in Mesa Pelada (Peru).

There is no strategic possibility of creating liberated republics like Marquetalia (Colombia) as guerrilla bases, if the repressive pretorian army is not also attacked in the urban zones, in the weak points of its rearguard. Helicopters, napalm, the 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles, contradict many of the classical guerrilla theses concerning revolutionary war. Today the epicenter of the revolutionary war must be in the great urban zones, where heavy artillery is not as efficient as in the countryside for annihilating guerrillas tied to the land

(like the Peruvian guerrillas under Luis de la Puente or the peasant republics in Colombia). If a city is not liberated in the course of a mobile revolutionary war, if the population is on the side of the forces of liberation and space is symbolically in the hands of the reactionary army, in this situation and until it is both politically and strategically convenient to liberate the whole city, the enemy cannot employ its heavy artillery without firing at its own forces.

There is the possibility of forming guerrilla bases in high mountain and wooded zones, provided that these are numerous and well implanted not only in favorable terrain but also in the midst of a favorable peasant population; but it is also necessary to count on a vast urban guerrilla force to give to the revolutionary war a political dimension. Revolutionary war must consist of surface warfare that is in all parts at the same time and nowhere permanent or tied to the terrain, until the second and the third phase of a popular war can count on military units strong enough to destroy enemy battalions and to disappear instead of remaining in a fixed position. What is important is not to win space, but rather to destroy the enemy and to endure longer. Now then, if a people is in a ready condition to embark on insurrection owing to a unique historical occasion, it is absurd to engage in mountain guerrilla warfare when the revolution can be decided in a few hours or days in the cities, e.g., Spain in 1936, Santo Domingo in 1965 and Russia in 1917. The war of urban and rural guerrillas must contribute to creating all the conditions in time as well as space for victory, following a general insurrection as in Madrid in 1936 or Petrograd in 1917. Strategically, a very small guerrilla army must operate in view of bringing about a mass insurrection without engaging the popular forces in an initial battle, without fastening itself to a given space (urban barricades), without creating fixed mountain encampments (as long as it is weak in space it must know how to endure in time).

The example of the rural guerrillas in Colombia—which have now lasted more than fifteen years without being able to advance to the stage of forming an army of liberation—indi-

cates that an exclusively peasant foothold or a unified rural movement without massive support from the urban population, without an urban guerrilla force, will not succeed; nor will it be capable of going beyond the second phase of a revolutionary war (guerrilla bases like Marquetalia or the peasant republics, an instance of “states within a state”). Moreover, in Colombia the guerrilla struggle has regressed from the second to the first phase of a revolutionary war (mobile guerrillas), since now a massive air force and air cavalry (helicopters) have destroyed the peasant republics for lack of mass urban support. To neutralize these weapons it is more effective to make use of the guerrilla model of the MR-13 Movement in Guatemala, which combines urban and rural war, than the model of rural guerrilla warfare in Colombia, which is incapable of surmounting the stage of dispersed peasant guerrillas.

If imperialism supports the native military and oligarchies of Latin America with military forces and strategic armaments, it is evident that liberation can be achieved only with great difficulty in a single Latin American country—unless the Latin American peoples and masses attack in continental time and space the yanqui interventionists, beginning by destroying U.S. direct investments, military missions and diplomatic and consular establishments. This strategic law of Latin American liberation is demonstrated by the defeat of the Bolivian revolution, the continental isolation of the Cuban Revolution and the imposed Dominican negotiations designed to break the strategic yanqui encirclement of the “new city” of Santo Domingo in 1965. In this city victory was possible for the oligarchy and the native pretorians supported by the disembarkation of the yanqui marines, because the popular masses of Latin America did not unleash a continental revolutionary action against imperialism to force it to release its prey.

After the encirclement of Cuba by yanqui imperialism and the Latin American oligarchies and after the smothering of the Dominican insurrection of 1965 by the Pentagon and the Latin American military, it has become evident that the re-

formist Communist parties and the Latin American Leftist organizations are not able to confront imperialism. As a consequence, those parties and organizations have ceased to prevail as positive political forces in leading the masses. The low-key socialism, the pro-Soviet communism of "peaceful coexistence" and the passive Leftist movement in Latin America are all superfluous to the politics and history of a continent which, through the OAS, upholds a black international. Throughout Latin America communism has become a petty-bourgeois and measly nationalism without a revolutionary contribution to the Cuban or the Dominican people.

The Inter-American Conference of Rio de Janeiro (1965) acknowledged the necessity for the creation of an "Inter-American Peace Force." That was the force at work in Santo Domingo, helping imperialism to regain its privileges by slaughtering the insurrectionaries.

Confronted by the continental army of repression directed by the Pentagon with the support of the Latin American pretorian forces, one has to create a popular Latin American army of liberation, a central Latin American trade-union organization, a Latin American front for liberation, a Latin American youth organization and a multistate party for the liberation of Latin America. Without a continental strategy to expel imperialism and liquidate the oligarchies, the Latin American people are incapable of liberating a single country from their pretorians, the landed aristocracy and yanqui monopolies.

2. *Strategy and Urban Population* *

Each system of production has its own law of population: slavery distributed population between the cities and the country; feudalism polarized the masses around the castles; capitalism has concentrated the population in the industrial cities at the expense of a decrease in the population in the country. Wherever capital centralizes and accumulates, there are its servants: the workers bound to wage-labor.

* *Estrategia de la guerrilla urbana*, 1st ed., Chapter IV, pp. 61-66, 67-68; *Desafío al pentágono*, Chapter VI, pp. 149-150.

In the great industrial centers there is a great human mass ruled by the tyranny of private capital. There are active workers, retired ones, unemployed workers, employees and a wide variety of subproletarians and middle strata. Private capital concentrates and accumulates the direct products of thousands of craftsmen, laborers, peasants and other victims of capitalist production.

And in this way each day there are fewer capitalists, who nevertheless are more powerful. The great monopolizing enterprises have arisen from the liquidation of many small capitalists who could not stand up under the law of competition in the market. It is implicit under the dialectic of capitalism that the centralization of wealth also implies the concentration of a vast proletariat. The bourgeoisie is thus preparing its own undertakers: the proletarians dispossessed of their means of production.

The great urban industrial complexes of London, New York, Amsterdam and others have concentrated enormous masses of proletarians under the regional or urban polarization of the capital. All of these economic and demographic regional complexes have been poorly studied from the economic, demographic and strategic viewpoints.

If 70 percent of a country's population is urban, the demography and the economy must dictate the specific rules of the strategy of revolutionary combat. The center of operations should never be in the mountains or in the villages, but in the largest cities where the population suffices to form the army of the revolution. In such cases, the countryside must support the actions of urban guerrillas through its clandestine local militias (groups of self-defense), who work during the day and fight at night, encouraged by a program of agrarian reform that gives the land to those who cultivate it.

Some of the urban centers in underdeveloped countries such as Buenos Aires and Montevideo have respectively more than 30 percent and 50 percent of the total population of the country. The capitals of these countries including their suburban zones constitute a sea of houses which extends for miles. But in the interior of the country the population of the

ranches consists more of animals than men. There are fewer inhabitants per square mile than there were in the Middle Ages in Europe. The great cattle ranges have contributed to transferring population from the countryside to the slums of the city. At the same time, capitalist monopoly concentrates the workers in the cities, extracting them from the marginal population of the countryside. Strategically, in the case of a popular revolution in a country in which the highest percentage of the population is urban, the center of operations of the revolutionary war should be in the city. Operations should consist of scattered surprise attacks by quick and mobile units superior in arms and numbers at designated points, but avoiding barricades in order not to attract the enemy's attention at one place. The units will then attack with the greatest part of their strength the enemy's least fortified or weakest links in the city.

In those countries with more than 50 percent urban population (72 percent in Argentina and 84 percent in Uruguay), the revolutionary battle should preferably be not in the mountains and countrysides but in the urban areas. For the revolution's potential is where the population is. In the provinces without a dense population there are possibilities of creating hundreds of incidents in order to attract a part of the enemy troops (the more the better) through hundreds of separate guerrilla actions. Thus when the enemy is dispersed throughout the country, it is conquered by the concentration of the revolutionary army upon the cities, the rearguard of the revolution. To achieve victory over a powerful army that is hated by the population, it is necessary to scatter it, attracting it here and there, defeating it in small battles in a suitable field for the urban guerrillas, until the population turns against it and more and more people join the army of liberation, regional echelons and groups of self-defense (local guerrillas).

Each system of production contains its law of the social division of labor, which allocates in time and space the means of production and the population. The city regularly produces machinery and other goods for the countryside, receiving food and raw materials in return. If the rural guerrillas inter-

rupt the communication between city and countryside by means of nocturnal sabotage, food and raw materials will not flow normally into the city. It is the purpose of this strategy to shatter the functioning of the law of the division of labor, the exchange between countryside and city. The city without food is a disintegrating world. The countryside, however, can subsist for a longer period of time without manufactured goods from the cities. Consequently, not even in those countries with a high percentage of urban population is an effective strategy possible without including the countryside. Cooperation between the laborer and the peasant is essential to the revolution.

In those countries with a high percentage of urban population in which the economic system is concentrated upon one, two or three cities, revolutionary warfare must preferably be urban, without excluding the cooperation of the rural militias, whose job is to attract part of the urban military forces in order to preserve the initiative of the army of liberation. . . . Buenos Aires represents approximately 70 percent of the wealth, the consumption of energy, the transportation, the industry, the commerce and in general the greater part of the Argentine economy. Santiago de Chile, Lima, Rio de Janeiro, Mexico City, Bogotá and other Latin American capitals do not have the concentrated economic power of Buenos Aires and Montevideo. . . . Revolutionary warfare is preferably rural in Brazil, although it has its center of operations in the cities of the River Plate. Brazil is a country in which the war must be conducted against an enormous mass of counterrevolutionary troops, while Uruguay and Argentina must undertake prolonged urban warfare based on many small military victories which together will render the final victory.

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When a country is integrated by great regional industrial complexes or by a great capital city and its suburbs with little rural population, it would be poor strategy to carry the epicenter of the revolutionary conflict to the countryside as the peasants did in the Middle Ages. Strategy is not created by

geniuses or by generals, but by the development of the productive forces, the logic of events and the weight of history. If the urban masses find themselves without work and are discontent, it is not a question of encouraging them to demonstrate in the streets just to be trampled by the horses of the police. They should be placed in guerrilla units which strike unexpectedly here and there with superiority of arms and numbers in order to disarm the agents of authority who have been dispersed. In this way the liberation army grows as the repressive army diminishes. . . . Disarming one enemy agent is worth far more than temporarily stopping thousands of them by a barricade, risking a total loss of materials, ammunition and men. Slight damage to the enemy is better than making him run. The damage can be inflicted persistently until a giant surrenders to a dwarf. Goliath was defeated by David not by strength but by cunning and skill: the giant trusted in the strength of his arms, but David's sling killed him from a distance simply because the giant blindly trusted in his own victory.

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For a politics of the people to be effective under conditions of a pretorian dictatorship it is necessary to resort to an urban strategy that upsets the political apparatus, replying to violence with violence. But for a small armed minority to endure in the struggle against despotism it must lead a consistently clandestine existence with the support of a favorable population in the neighborhoods where the police and the army will be misinformed and harassed from all sides. Nonetheless, some of the urban guerrillas will have to be situated in bourgeois or petty-bourgeois neighborhoods, but on the condition that they live separately rather than together. The basic strategical principle of the guerrillas has to be: Live separately and fight together in order to elude police repression. Under no circumstances should the urban guerrilla ever leave a suburb densely populated with houses and reside several months in a house outside the city where he is easily identifiable. If he does not wish to expose himself to detention early or late,

the urban guerrilla will have to remain, like a fish in water, within a favorable urban milieu. And in order to endure he will have to change his domicile constantly, never settling in a given place.

In a large city where there are a hundred guerrilla cells of five persons living separately and fighting together, the police will be unable to control matters; it will have to cede terrain, especially at night, in unfavorable population zones where no policemen dare appear separately or in small groups. If at night the city belongs to the guerrilla and, in part, to the police by day, then in the end the war will be won by whoever endures longest. The guerrilla will be able to endure if he can count on support from the great majority of the people, anxious to shake off the yoke of a repressive, bloody, treasonable and self-colonizing dictatorship of an already oppressed country.

There is a strategical law that no guerrilla army must fail to recognize: the strength of a fighting unit is the product of its firepower and mobility. These factors are inversely proportional: a guerrilla advances rapidly with light arms, slowly with heavy ones; but utilizing grenades, machine guns, rifles with small-bore bullets and a few bazookas, a guerrilla has, at one and the same time, the advantages of an infantry endowed with artillery.

3. *One Great Battle or a Long Campaign?* *

In urban warfare, unless all of a town has taken up arms, small military endeavors should not be undertaken to seize posts, arsenals or other large objectives. It is better to draw out the revolutionary spirit of the people with small and repeated military actions until they willingly enter into battle, or rather until there are no neutral parties in the revolutionary war.

Battles as in Stalingrad or "El Alamein" are typical of powerful national armies or coalitions of national armies. A revolutionary who acts as commander-in-chief of an insurgent

* *Estrategia de la guerrilla urbana*, 1st ed., Chapter IV, pp. 68-72.

town will never enter into a large battle such as the uprising of Warsaw against Hitler's troops, just to become the military objective of the heavy artillery of the enemy. Such strategy, typical of bureaucratic generals, will always lead to the defeat of the insurgents.

Homeric battles such as that of the Commune of Paris in 1871 should not take place within the city. Actions should consist of numerous small conflicts both in and out of the city which slowly corrode the enemy, stripping him of his ability to unite his forces. Entering into a large urban battle, confronting the yanqui power combined with its sepoian followers, is more like a surrender than a genuine revolutionary strategy. In 1965 the Vietnamese NLF had blockaded more than fifty cities, disconnecting them from their rural source of supplies. However, this did not entirely liberate the cities since it contributed to the North American bombing of them and led to conventional warfare.

A revolutionary commander should not be subject to the myths of the classic strategy, in which all else is secondary to the conquest of space. In the case of the revolutionary, the fundamental strategic objective is not space. The positive force is the will of the people. Consequently, it is not necessary to hold a position upon which the enemy can exert its power in three dimensions (air, land and sea) or a fourth dimension (atomic weapons, including nuclear warheads). When the enemy realizes that, because of its cost, the atomic bomb cannot be used to kill an ant, when its heavy artillery and its great concentration of troops fail to produce results, the revolutionary soldiers will liberate the cities. Meanwhile, guerrilla warfare is necessary, even taking many troops from the cities to the countryside in order to revolutionize them.

The strategic error of Colonel Caamaño in the rebellion of Santo Domingo in 1965 was based on the following factors. During the first and second day of his *coup d'état* he should have rushed to defeat the internal enemy. However, after three days the North American Marines landed and changed the allegiance of powers in a way unfavorable to Caamaño. He should have sent a part of his troops quickly to the interior

of the country. In this manner the Americans would not have been able to surround them in the small perimeter of the city. If the followers of Caamaño had controlled the interior of the country, the yanquis would have had to negotiate with them or else embark on a prolonged revolutionary war such as that in Vietnam. The U.S. was not morally and politically prepared for such a war, lacking the support of the Latin American masses, who were solidly behind Caamaño, not to mention lack of support from its own citizens.

A revolutionary command that does not fall into strategic mistakes must conduct itself as in Madrid (1936) or in Petrograd (1917), provided that the people are in the streets and the military establishment is in a state of disorder. To give up the taking of a city when no military resistance is found would be absurd and against the basic rules of strategy. Once the city is taken over, it must be defended against enemy attack by moving part of its population to the countryside. A different strategy is required by the people in the event of foreign intervention. If the invader should attempt the capture of a city, that action must be repelled not by defending one firm, strong position, but rather by going into light guerrilla formations and inflicting persistent casualties to the invaders through evening attacks or even by daylight ambushes wherever the terrain allows. But it is most important to preserve the morale of the people. When confronting an enemy equipped with superior arms and forces, revolutionary warfare must not concentrate on the defense of one position.

With the fall of the Paris Commune, the victorious enemy appropriated 400,000 rifles and approximately 1,500 pieces of artillery. Had that materiel been well distributed in the interior as well as in Paris, the Commune could have destroyed the forces of Versailles. That is how the Paris Commune failed in its strategy and in its politics of coordination of the peasant forces and other provincial communes. The alliance of workers and peasants is fundamental to the revolution. The peasant must accept the aid of the urban laborer to assure him the land; to attempt to gain it on his own is to remain in the condition of a pariah. The urban laborer needs

the peasant to upset communications, to sabotage and harass the enemy. The peasant must be part of a territorial organization, regional or provincial paramilitary group and unit of self-defense, working during the day and fighting at night. The secret of revolutionary victory lies in the unity of country and city under the same strategic direction in the revolutionary war. This war must not be fought only in the countryside nor must it be fought only in the city. Each must complement the other. Victory will not result from urban strategies as in Warsaw, nor will it be a product of classic peasant fighting dispersed and disconnected between regions. On the contrary, both countryside and city must be unified under the same military command and one commander-in-chief.

4. *The May Student Revolt* *

Coincident with a period of relative economic prosperity, the students in neocapitalist Europe have launched a revolt without waiting for a grave economic crisis, massive unemployment or the fall of a political regime in consequence of defeat in war. In the situation faced by Russian tsarism (1917) and the German monarchy (1918), the people were in the streets; the armed forces, demoralized. Such historical conditions are absent today in Latin America, where armies do not make war but engage in large-scale, repressive police actions and counter guerrilla tactics against their own people.

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Students have liberated themselves from the myths of technology, from the fragile capitalist world of comfort, from bourgeois abundance that conduces to economic crisis and war, from the cult of personality in the East, from the old bourgeois parties and from the pseudo-Marxist ones whose talk is on the Left while their practice is on the Right. Psychological and sociological explanations in the style of North American social science, the economic and political rationalizations of businessmen and bureaucrats, the semantic idealism which converts the class struggle into "peaceful co-

* *Estrategia de la guerrilla urbana*, 2nd ed., Chapter VI, pp. 129, 130-132, 133-134, 138-142, 146-148; Chapter VII, pp. 166-167.

existence" and the scene of the North American trusts into the "Free World," the subordination of science, engineering, philosophy, literature, art and information to the interests of the dominant powers in the East as well as the West—all this has antagonized the students who experience alienation in their own flesh and spirit and want to transform the bourgeois university into a critical one in the service of the whole people.

The students are now in the vanguard of the revolutionary struggle for redeeming the old generations domesticated by publicity campaigns, by false patriotism and by the proliferation of consumer goods. The students, the youth, have yet to be leashed by the conservative responsibility of maintaining a home, of having to be present at the sound of the work siren; they are free for revolutionary action, in better condition than workers for asserting themselves. Yet to succeed they require the support of the workers, peasants and proletarianized middle strata behind a political program that looks toward the immediate interests of these sectors through a revolutionary front of liberation.

Whatever its detonator or spearhead, a revolution is produced when there is a conjunction of oppressed classes against their oppressors and when the interest of an oppressed class (in our epoch the proletariat) coincides with the general or national interest and with that of other oppressed classes (peasants and the proletarianized middle strata).

To make a social revolution it is necessary to overthrow by violence the old ruling class, to dissolve the old social relations between exploited and exploiting classes, to create a new mode of production (socialism in place of capitalism), to organize new juridical relations and to form a direct government of the people with organs of production, with committees for the defense of the revolution and with federated councils or juntas of liberation in order that the revolution may not degenerate into chaos.

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The students in France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the United States are in a state of permanent rebellion. The student crisis reached its

maximum revolutionary tension in France. In ten days the French students, who detonated a nationwide strike against the Gaullist regime, did more to undermine the real power of de Gaulle than did the republican, socialist and Communist parties in ten years of anti-Gaullist political coalitions.

The rebellion of the French students began in the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of Nanterre, the great suburb of Paris, where some 12,000 students of letters rebelled against the Rector, Pierre Grapin, and against the Minister of Education, Alain Peyrefitte. The students of humanities had come to realize the crisis of the North American way of life, the danger point in the financial colonization of Europe by the dollar and the failure of Soviet ideology.

The crisis of the university began with the students in humanities and not those pursuing technological careers, who are more susceptible to the "myth of technique" and to the dehumanization pointed out by Ortega y Gasset in his *Rebellion of the Masses*. The "young philosophers" of Nanterre put before their bureaucratized and depoliticized professors the following queries: "To learn?" "But what?" "For what purpose?" "To make money without regard for people?" "And afterward, to serve whom?" These questions could not be answered by professors caught up in the schedule of routine university work, in which science, technics, economics, philosophy and other disciplines had become removed from national problems and the real world, and in which the significance of the human drama had become concealed after the manner of the radio, press, television, etc.

In their discontent the youth began by letting their beards grow in protest against something they neither desired nor understood. In concealing the structural and cultural crisis, their professors had unwittingly contributed to the formation of the greatest party of all: the party of discontent, which at bottom imperceptibly protests against the collective frustration and degradation of human values even while people talk of cybernetics, astronauts and atomic energy. The "myth of technique," as the subtle politics of a depoliticized technocracy or dehumanized stratocracy, led to the rebellion of the young

intelligentsia who, united with the popular masses, asked for a self-managed economy in order to overcome economic alienation and the totalitarian capitalism of the trusts in the West and of the state in the East.

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In going into the streets the students realize that the time has arrived for action, that deeds speak louder than words and that a revolutionary praxis can liberate man from anxiety and a miserable conscience. The maximum capacity for disorder achieved by the revolutionary vanguard constitutes in this respect the most effective political-military strategy for burying the old socioeconomic system of exploitation. Accelerated disorder gives birth dialectically to a new order: the overcoming of man's spiritual, political and economic alienation through the socialism of self-management and comanagement of production by the workers together with an administration without bureaucratism and a planning authority based on direct democracy.

In the technological society students represent the "power of youth." Statistically, they constitute a relatively increasing magnitude in all countries, a scientific, cultural and technological proletariat. The future of man belongs to science, to intelligence. Once humanity is liberated from private property in capital and the corresponding fetters on production, there will be more opportunities for scientific workers. But for that, disalienation must pass through a social revolution.

In view of their numbers, students have become an enormous political force. If we add to the number of college students those in secondary education who also exert political pressure, then it is evident that "Student Power" is becoming a decisive revolutionary factor, decisive because its political program conforms to the ideas, interests, desires and will of the party of discontent: the majority party whether in the capitalist West or the semifeudal Third World. This party is to be won not by elections, but rather through social revolutions involving direct action.

In the dialectic of contemporary history the commanding

forces are centered in the countries of greatest economic, technological and cultural development. The countries that do not reach the stage of nuclear energy, astronautics and the automation of manual, intellectual and administrative work remain in a neocolonial world of increasing dependency because of scientific rather than economic underdevelopment. The Latin American students must become the vanguard of the social revolution in order that science, technics, economics and culture, without monopolies and latifundia, may permit the twenty Latin American countries to abandon at last the colonial pact with the dollar and a level of productivity in agriculture characteristic of the Middle Ages.

The Latin American students must become the vanguard of the economic decolonization of the continent from the vassalage of Wall Street. The technical and scientific underdevelopment of Latin America is evident in relation to North America. In 1964 five million students had matriculated in universities in the United States, as against only 796 thousand in Latin America, which is to say that twenty nations are not the cultural equal of one. To put an end to scientific and cultural underdevelopment there must be a continental revolution unifying the revolutionary efforts of workers and students against residual feudalism, the imperialism of the dollar and sepoyan militarism. Without a supranational struggle there cannot be full-scale liberation for the Latin American peoples.

During May, 1968, in France there was a great unfinished revolution, which will continue as a political and historical process despite the brakes imposed by the reformism of the French Communist Party and the trade-union bureaucracy of the CGT. In Latin America a similar revolution has yet to occur because students and workers have not fought together on the same battlefield. In the years ahead, when the economic, social and political crisis reaches a higher level at which a social war between the two Americas might explode—the imperialist North against the neocolonial and underdeveloped South—this conjunction of revolutionary forces must emerge.

The May Revolution in France could not be an exclusively working-class one. Industrial civilization has contributed to the development of a tertiary sector which consists of salaried employees but not workers. In France workers as such make up seven million of a total of 37 million voters. Consequently, the seizure of power with or without violence is a utopia unless students, workers, peasants and salaried employees converge on a revolutionary united front. This same revolutionary scheme applies to Latin America: the revolution will occur on a favorable occasion that may arise at any moment, but will be successful only under conditions in which several hundred professionals in revolutionary warfare have prepared in advance for this eventuality.

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The Second French Revolution was a sublime event: the urban combat of May 11 was worthy of the great classical battles with phalanxes and legions. Altogether 75 cars were set on fire, 72 barricades were constructed, 300 fires were made in the frontal zone of the urban war, 5 police stations were assaulted and, following a prolonged struggle, 72 policemen were wounded and 1,500 persons arrested. In this linear battle of confrontation similar to that of the ancient soldier, there wanted only peripheral guerrilla units to call upon the repressive forces from many places at the same time in order that the dispersed police should not be strong in any given one. In order to defeat the enemy a revolution or civil war has to be made conformable to strategies and tactics that yield for the people more victories than defeats. The battle in the streets of Paris represents a new form of doing politics by revolutionary means: there will be many more situations like that of May, 1968, produced in the great cities, but victory will depend on the combination of a guerrilla force of several hundred men who attack everywhere in order to disarm and weaken the enemy, giving cover to the regular formations of the people deployed on semimobile fronts of barricades and street struggles.

Paris, like any other large modern city, has a central area

and numerous suburbs. If revolutionary urban war does not spread to more than one district, then it involves a linear battle that lends itself to defeat before the massive use of tanks, light artillery, cavalry and infantry. But taking the war to all districts and preferably to those with a favorable population, the urban guerrillas have the opportunity of developing into an army of liberation, that is, to the extent that they mobilize and arm the population against the repressive government hated by the people.

In order to defeat the enemy the space of a city has to be studied strategically in the same way as mountain terrain or the cultivated countryside. The conquest of space is less important than the defeat of the enemy, the winning of more and more of the population by deeds, the force of example, to the point of converting the guerrillas into the armed fist of the people. In revolutionary war nothing is more important than the political consequences of our actions; everything else is secondary, proper to generals for whom the art of war consists in compelling the adversary to retreat.

A large subversive though unarmed mass can and should engage in a great public demonstration or take up positions behind barricades, like the students in the Latin Quarter of Paris in 1968; but parallel to these stationary forces which attract the enemy there must also be urban guerrillas who move in time and space, who attack the enemy from different positions simultaneously or successively, thereby changing the strategic locus of popular subversion as often as they like. Since revolutionary war is never decided by arms but rather by winning the political support of the people, it is important always to take the initiative, to demoralize the repressive forces almost without fighting the enemy, compelling it to strike in the void and continually to change its operational plans.

Important to a revolutionary war is not a lightning victory when the people are not in the streets, but rather small and frequent guerrilla actions which prepare them for the moment at which they arise en masse like an enraged lion. The "strategy of the artichoke" is the most prudent or safe one for urban

or rural guerrillas: to eat the enemy bit by bit, and through brief and surprise encounters of encirclement and annihilation to live off the enemy's arms, munitions and paramilitary effects. The strategical paralysis of the adversary can be achieved by an insurrectionary populace combining three combat echelons: (a) local militias, which fight in only one zone of operations; (b) provincial militias, which fight in several zones as permanent paramilitary forces recruited from the district or departmental combat echelons; (c) a popular army of liberation, which fights in all parts of a country with the cooperation of local and provincial militias. Thus it is always possible to wage surface warfare: calling the enemy from all parts in order that it will not be superior in numbers and firepower, in a place chosen by the guerrillas for applying the tactic of encirclement and annihilation, and in order to provision themselves at the expense of the enemy.

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As an historical event the insurrectional strike movement of May, 1968, in France is important for the capitalist West: complemented by a guerrilla tactic it constitutes perhaps the most appropriate model of revolutionary war for demolishing the power of the Western plutocracies on the urban front.

The nationwide student and worker strike of May represented the shortest road to power for the masses of workers and consumers exploited by the industrial and commercial monopolies. It is evident that students and workers had arrived at a new model of the social revolution:

- (a) the strike paralyzed the bourgeois state, causing it to become separated from the people by an immense political, economic, social and communications vacuum;
- (b) as a political strike, the general strike mobilized the major part of the French population against the government;
- (c) the existing correlation of forces favorable to the people did not culminate in a Great Revolution because the general strike could not count on 50 urban guerrillas capable of holding out and pushing the struggle to the brink of a revolutionary war. . . .

5. *Politics of the Urban Guerrilla* *

Without going beyond a trade-union framework, without acting politically in the name of all the oppressed classes, student and worker strikes cannot make the social revolution. Statistically, workers do not represent the majority of the population in the countries of the Third World, where peasants and the middle class constitute the greater part of the population. Only the highly industrialized capitalist countries have, practically speaking, two great classes: the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The solution of this antagonism does not give rise to class coalitions or fronts as in underdeveloped countries, e.g., against oligarchy and imperialism. In the industrialized countries the revolution has only one objective: the suppression of the bourgeoisie and capitalism for the purpose of immediately installing socialism. In the Afro-Asian and Latin American countries the revolution has for its end, first, liberation from the oligarchies, from imperialist capitalism and its indigenous allies, and only then the foundation of a socialist society.

In the United States, for example, there are two concrete classes: the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. In Latin America there are five distinct classes: the workers, the peasants, the middle class, the native bourgeoisie and the landed oligarchy. For a Latin American revolution to succeed through worker, student and popular struggles, there must be a national front of three classes against two: the workers, peasants and proletarianized middle class against the large native bourgeoisie and landed oligarchies supported by imperialism. Within the bloc of the Latin American bourgeoisie it is possible to subtract that part that produces for the internal market: it fears the foreign competition of imperialism and is consequently inclined to struggle alongside the people against imperialism and the oligarchy.

Students, workers or the politically ideal union of both must

* *Desafío al pentágono*, Chapter VI, pp. 163-165; *El pueblo en armas: estrategia revolucionaria*, Chapter I, pp. 1, 2-3.

not make the revolution in isolation from other oppressed classes. In an underdeveloped country students or workers alone are unable to command a favorable population that is sufficiently large. As much as 80 percent of the population is necessary for combined urban and rural guerrillas to carry forward a general insurrection, a vast surface revolutionary war in all parts of a national territory, or continental one in the case of Latin America, and to defeat strategically the sepoyan armies supported militarily, directly or indirectly, by imperialism. Only in this manner can one defeat the landed oligarchy, the native bourgeoisie tied to international finance capital along with the imperialist invader; but only on condition of forming an antioligarchical and anti-imperialist popular front based on a program of liberation that brings together workers, peasants, the proletarianized middle class and even a section of the native bourgeoisie fearful of being pushed to the wall by imperialism. In this perspective the strategy of revolutionary war is essentially political: if it does not begin with a broad front of liberation, the guerrillas will lose the war strategically, regardless of tactical successes, from failure to obtain the support of the great mass of the population of an underdeveloped country.

Though imperialism and the sepoyan armies enjoy a strategic superiority of 1000 to 1, the guerrillas can win the war, provided they have 80 percent of the population on their side. For in a given place and at a given time the guerrillas can be stronger than the enemy in numbers and firepower, as 5 to 1, on condition that a favorable population reveals the presence of isolated and hostile forces small enough for the guerrillas to encircle and disarm in order to provide themselves with munitions, arms and military equipment.

If they aspire to a revolutionary role, students and workers must represent the general interest. For that, it is necessary that the workers' trade unions and student associations become part of a broad insurrectionary front including: (a) a clandestine army of liberation as the armed detachment of the people; (b) a united front of peasants, workers and the democratic middle class; (c) a solid worker-student alliance. In the Latin

American countries the insurrection must be continental in scope. Although the revolution begins by being a regional one, the struggle must spread or become choked by the imperialism of the dollar, whether militarily or through an economic and diplomatic blockade. In Latin America we must either liberate all or perish together before the indigenous oligarchy and its imperialist sustainer.

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A revolution in a given country or region can only be made under particular historical and political conditions in which the ruling class has lost prestige: when it is responsible for wars, for social and economic crises, for financial speculation and immorality, thereby incarnating all the crimes, disgraces, miseries and frustrations suffered by the popular classes. Furthermore, it can only be made by a majority class representing at the same time, the general interest of society and the other oppressed classes. Only then, and provided this class is aware of its historical mission of liberation, can it lead a revolution to victory and to the ultimate political, economic and social consequences of a total transformation of society, i.e., the overcoming of anachronistic social relations and institutions.

No matter how large a class is numerically, if it does not represent the general interest of society, it will never make a successful social revolution. Without diminishing the revolutionary force of the peasantry, it must be said that throughout the Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation the peasants were unable to defeat either the armies of the nobility in the countryside or the armies of the bourgeoisie concentrated in the cities. If the peasants were defeated in revolutionary wars when they represented 80 to 90 percent of the population, it would be absurd in our epoch of highly developed urban populations to launch the principal front of a revolution in small villages or mountains under conditions in which the peasants are no longer a majority and there are few logistical resources for modern warfare.

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If we analyze the revolutionary war in China, we see that the Communist forces of the Fourth and Eighth Route armies did not emerge from nothing. They originated in the bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1911; their war materiel, commanding cadres and a large part of the troops came from the cities. Without going from the city into the countryside and then returning to the city Mao could not have defeated Chiang Kai-shek in the revolutionary war. And without Japanese intervention in China and the Second World War, Mao would have lacked the "historical occasion"—the key factor conducive to a social revolution and its ultimate victory.

Without the War of 1914–18, when the Russian people suffered great hardship, when her soldiers were deserting in large numbers, when the people spontaneously made the February Revolution of 1917—a prologue to the October Revolution—without these revolutionary political, economic, social, psychological and moral conditions, without this "historical occasion," Lenin would not have triumphed over Kerensky and his generals, Denikin and Wrangel among others.

Without the Spanish military taking the initiative in 1936 through a *coup d'état* which unleashed a social revolution in response, there would not have been the revolutionary conditions, the "historical occasion." However, since the Spanish revolutionaries were unprepared to lead the masses, they lost the revolution.

Without the Prussian invasion of France in 1871 there would have been no Paris Commune—a consequence of the defeat of Napoleon III at Sedan. The Paris Commune had its causes, its "historical occasion" like the Russian Revolution of 1917, but it lacked coherence and an authentically revolutionary party capable of exporting the revolution beyond the immediate environs of Paris. In 1936 the revolutionaries in Madrid did not make this mistake, but sought to win the strategic periphery vital to its defense. In Spain, as in Russia in 1917, the revolution was carried from the city to the countryside. Perhaps for that reason the strategic model of contemporary social revolutions relies heavily on the experience and lessons of the Paris Commune (1871), the Russian Revo-

lution (1917) and the Spanish Revolution (1936–39), especially in densely populated areas where the urban population is the majority, e.g., the United States and the Southern Cone of Latin America.

6. *The Guerrilla Experience in Brazil* *

In a speech delivered to the Central Committee of the Communist League, September 15, 1850, Marx summarized the League's revolutionary failures in Germany in 1848:

For the critical conception the minority substituted a dogmatic one; for the materialist conception, an idealist one. Instead of actual conditions, you make sheer will the driving force of the revolution. We say to the workers: "You have fifteen or twenty or fifty years of civil and international wars to go through, not just to alter conditions but to alter yourselves and qualify for political power." You, on the contrary, say: "We must obtain power at once or we might as well lay ourselves down to sleep."

Here we have Marx's criticism of what might be called "historical impatience" or "revolutionary voluntarism," which is evident in many Latin American revolutionaries. For them action, as long as it takes a military form, has the quasi-miraculous capacity of unleashing a great revolutionary process in no matter what country. They seem to have forgotten that revolutionary war is the continuation of politics by violent means, that strategy must be subordinated to politics; or, better said, that politics and strategy are conjoined in revolutionary and guerrilla warfare.

In his "Strategical Problems and Principles" (January, 1969) Carlos Marighella admits to strategical doubts or insufficiencies and to the lack of agreement among Brazilian revolutionaries. At the same time, he affirms that:

(a) The city is the area of a complementary struggle and for that reason the urban struggle, initiated by the guerrillas or by the organized masses and their respective supporting networks,

* *El pueblo en armas: estrategia revolucionaria*, Chapter I, pp. 4–5, 5–6, 6–8, 11–13, 15.

always assumes the character of a tactical struggle; (b) the decisive struggle is strategical, that is, in the rural area, and not in the tactical area comprising the city.

We have already indicated that under conditions of an urban civilization in which the accumulation and centralization of capital occurs in the great cities, the principal area for strategical maneuvers is not in the countryside. Accordingly, a revolutionary war must be initiated and made in the cities.

By assigning a tactical character to the urban guerrillas and a strategical significance to the rural guerrillas, Marighella confuses tactics and strategy, thus subordinating the principal to the secondary tasks of the revolution. In the most favorable instance, a peasant war supported by a general uprising of the rural population can be lost because of the peasants' small-village mentality and local loyalties, which permit the repressive forces to divide and defeat them one by one, village by village, region by region, one force after another. In contrast, the millions of residents of São Paulo, Rio, Belo Horizonte, Pôrto Alegre, Recife, Bahia, etc., can operate together or independently, according to whichever is more convenient in each phase of a revolutionary war.

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If the bulk of the population does not support an action for liberation, as in the case of Che Guevara in Bolivia, then every tactical victory leads to an ultimate strategical defeat. Logistically, since his troops and military equipment could not be replaced, his tactical victories were for nothing. This great guerrilla had to be defeated, because he confused the tactical with the strategical aspect of revolutionary war. If he had operated in the cement jungles of the Argentine cities and at the moment of a military dictatorship, with his great personality he would have moved the Argentine masses to revolt. Today these same masses are being stirred by a handful of urban guerrillas who have defied and harassed the powerful Argentine army—an army which, like the Brazilian, is the primary beneficiary of political power and second only to the Brazilian army in representing pretorian interests in Latin America.

Before his assassination in June, 1971, and on the basis of his rich experience with rural as well as urban guerrillas, Carlos Lamarca summarized the Brazilian guerrilla experience as follows:

Beginning with Marighella's conception we developed the notion of a guerrilla column combined with other forms of guerrilla organization in the strategical zone, its periphery and the connecting routes. We recognized, moreover, other areas for regular and irregular guerrillas, for sabotage commandos operating on the outskirts of cities. But this vision of the guerrillas based on a conception of their national character, we now consider to be insufficient: the conception of the guerrilla column as the only mobile force was strategically mistaken in Bolivia; and the conception of its strategical task as creating a liberated area isolated from the rest of the country was mistaken in Venezuela and Peru. These conceptions are characteristic not of national but of local struggles, which permit the ruling class to take political and military measures against the rebels.

Precisely because he allowed himself to be seduced by "localized struggle," Carlos Lamarca was killed and his column destroyed. In the village of Pintada in the township of Ipirira he was betrayed by a population unfavorable to the guerrillas. This would not have happened in São Paulo among its nine million inhabitants. Even if some were unfavorable, he could have stayed among them like a fish in water.

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In the light of actual events the revolutionary struggle in Brazil has to be reassessed and restructured along the following lines. There must be criticism and self-criticism. Marx's dialectical method must be applied to all matters including our own errors. After all, if we don't know why we lost a particular battle, we are unlikely to win one in the future.

Second, there is an impasse in the Brazilian revolution. Its political and military aspects have yet to be successfully correlated. The political processes and specific strategies of the Brazilian revolution are waiting to be discovered. If we have

no clear knowledge of the broad Brazilian road to liberation, the pretorians can remain in power for many years. Finally, when they are weakened politically like the Argentine military, they can call elections in order to forestall one or several revolutions.

Third, the only way to destroy the forces of the bourgeoisie and imperialism in Brazil, as in all Latin America, is the revolutionary road. But for the revolution to become a great mass movement, it must not follow old ideologies: it must formulate its own program of liberation which stresses whatever unites rather than divides the forces of opposition.

Fourth, there is still no working-class vanguard in Brazil capable of leading a popular revolution against the bourgeoisie and imperialism. That is to say, there is no Marxist vanguard with a dialectical, political, sociological and economic understanding of Brazilian reality. Such a vanguard must consist of professional revolutionaries, regardless of the class from which they derive. Marx said that when a particular class is called to power and individual members of the ruling as well as oppressed classes join it in the struggle for power, then conditions are ripe for revolution. Marx, Bakunin, Lenin, Fidel, Che were not workers but revolutionaries—sparks destined to set the prairie on fire. The revolutionary vanguard in Latin America requires an activist minority committed to the propaganda of the deed, a minority capable of moving the passive majority to struggle politically and to take up arms. Anything else is tantamount to revolutionary adventurism or political subjectivism.

Fifth, revolutionary organizations contend among themselves for the leadership of the various existing armed groups in Brazil, though none has a politics, strategy and tactics capable of leading a popular revolution to victory. For that reason, one of those organizations should attempt an investigation of the revolutionary factors, an analysis and synthesis of the revolutionary process hitherto frustrated in Brazil. However, it should do so with reference to the national aspects of the struggle for liberation. Foreign ideologies and practical programs may be very useful in other countries, but have little bearing

on the objective and subjective situation in Brazil. For there are no two wars which are made with the same strategy, nor two revolutions with the same ideology.

Sixth, the only road of the Brazilian revolution is that of socialism. The vanguard must impose itself on the masses, but it must also be formed within the working class, the only class capable of carrying the revolution to its ultimate consequences. The revolutionary cadres must have a socialist training; but they should say nothing about socialism or related matters publicly. The struggle gains momentum when it is not subjected to an already existing ideology but takes its bearing from concrete national realities. If Fidel had said in the Sierra Maestra that he was aiming at socialism, he would have lost the war. Socialism will be a consequence of a popular victory, but does not have to be acknowledged in the struggle against imperialism and the national bourgeoisie. One must talk about concrete issues and arouse the population by means of actions. The revolutionary vanguard of workers, students or whoever else it may be should talk about nationalism, not about socialism.

Seventh, it is imperative to find a new strategical orientation, more adequate methods and forms of struggle, and pertinent new data that can enrich the operational development of revolutionary theory. In that way revolutionaries may escape from the limbo of improvisation in which tactics are confused with strategy.

Eighth, during three years of revolutionary attempts by rural and urban guerrillas (1969–71), the Brazilian people could not be raised to more than a sympathetic response to these actions—though it was necessary to obtain more concrete support. This failure of the politics and strategy of the revolutionary groups has enabled the armed bourgeoisie to step up its oppression and exploitation of the people. Revolutionary actions cannot succeed in separation from the masses, who must be assisted directly in order to awaken their revolutionary enthusiasm. For this reason, actions must be directed against the bourgeoisie, the army as its chief representative, and imperialism. Strategy must also be designed to support and to provide cover for mass movements of students, striking work-

ers, hungry peasants and squatters, and the lower clergy who oppose the dictatorship. To push the Church beyond its timid objectives it is necessary to abduct persons of great value and significance to the pretorian regime, exchanging them for Third World priests who serve the people. Such actions are necessary to give the struggle a broad popular character, without having recourse to socialist and Marxist-Leninist phraseology.

Ninth, the principal revolutionary antagonism is between labor and capital; but at this moment the most important is that between the pretorian dictatorship and imperialism on one side and the Brazilian people on the other. This point constitutes the key to a successful politics and strategy of national liberation.

Tenth, the revolutionary New Left in Brazil must be made aware that only through politically and militarily experienced cadres can the level of struggle be modified in our favor. Once this problem is settled, it is easier to resolve the others.

Eleventh, political work including armed actions designed to educate the masses should be our principal preoccupation. In working-class circles socialist propaganda is admissible, but always within a national context—for one has to broaden the struggle. Marx said that those revolutionaries always triumph who know best how to present the national question, thereby rousing the people to arms.

Finally, given the space, time and opportunity, all forms of struggle are useful whether armed or otherwise. But there must be an "historical occasion" or it must be created little by little, in order that the guerrillas may rise above the limits of a localized rebellion to a general conflagration.

If our Brazilian friends will apply these lessons and conclusions, Marighella, Lamarca and the other great Brazilian revolutionaries will not have died in vain.

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Despite the presence of economic imperialism in Brazil, the hunger and privation in the northeast, the many millions of unemployed, the minidevaluations of the cruzeiro, the decline in the standard of living, the abrogation of elementary rights

and liberties, the dissolution of political parties, the students in rebellion, the Church's refusal to sanction the pretorian state—despite all this the Brazilian guerrillas have not known how to mobilize politically the great mass of discontents in a struggle for liberation against imperialism, militarism, feudalism and a native capitalism that continues to be dependent on foreign interests. Why, then, have the guerrillas failed? Because they have not known how to exploit these conditions in a revolutionary way.

Paradoxically, the weak link in the Brazilian dictatorship is its achievement of a high rate of economic growth. A politics concentrating on wage increases through a chain of strikes would reduce both the pay-off and rate of development. The actual growth rate of 11 percent in 1971 was made possible not only by the accumulation and investment of native capital, averaging 16.8 percent annually during the period 1967–70, but also by annual foreign savings of 8 percent and by a 20 percent reduction in real wages since 1964. In defense of the workers a revolutionary politics must be able to mobilize them to recover their former standard of living with the backing of urban guerrillas—a basic strategical objective. If the guerrilla commanders do not take advantage of the inhumane and self-defeating conditions of economic growth in Brazil, if they do not use these circumstances to create a social and political crisis, then they are likely to become isolated and ineffective like the guerrillas in Guatemala, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. . . .

As long as the pretorians have a firm hold on the screws of repression, a rate of economic growth of 11 percent will contribute to an expansion of the productive forces at a rate two or three times that under the democratic government displaced by the military coup of 1964. Historically and economically, this constitutes a major justification of the “New State”—notwithstanding its totalitarian and fascist character. Accordingly, the Brazilian guerrillas must revive and energize trade-union struggles for the recovery of the 20 percent reduction in real wages lost under the pretorian government; they must mobilize the working class into refusing to subsidize an economic growth

rate of 11 percent of which almost half, or 5 percent, is to be attributed to the real wages withheld as a fund for capital accumulation. In effect, they must apply pressure to reduce the economic growth rate to what it was in 1964, thereby creating the conditions of a major economic crisis and the corresponding objective and subjective conditions of a revolutionary situation.

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It is not enough that the Brazilian guerrillas have kidnapped consuls and ambassadors in order to negotiate with the military regime; they must also mobilize the masses to act out of self-interest. To recover the real wages lost since 1964, it is necessary to take as hostages native capitalists or members of their families when their workers are on strike and negotiations are at an impasse. Here the Uruguayan guerrillas of the Revolutionary Popular Organization (OPR-33) may serve as a model for the Brazilian guerrillas. Thus in the case of the striking rubber workers in Montevideo and in opposition to the government's institutionalized policy covering wages and prices, OPR-33 contributed to winning the strike by militarily backing the trade union. In the case of Brazil mass demonstrations for an overall increase in real wages of 20–30 percent, supported by the strategy and tactics of urban guerrillas like OPR-33, could put an end to the hardships and sacrifices underlying the 11 percent increase in the gross national product. The rationale for the dictatorship would then lose its credibility because economic performance could no longer be used to excuse military repression.

7. *Assessment of the Uruguayan Tupamaros* *

To the credit of the Uruguayan guerrillas, they were the first to operate in the cement jungles of a capitalist metropolis, to endure during the first phase of a revolutionary war thanks to an efficient organization and tactics, and to confound the police and armed forces for a considerable period. . . . With its

* *El pueblo en armas: estrategia revolucionaria*, Chapter II, pp. 35–47.

failures as well as successes, the Movement of National Liberation (Tupamaros) has contributed a model of urban guerrilla warfare that has already made a mark on contemporary history—the scene of a struggle between capitalism and socialism with its epicenter in the great cities. The lessons that can be learned from the Tupamaros can be summarized in the following ten points.

(1) *Fixed or Mobile Front?* When urban guerrillas lack widespread support because of revolutionary impatience or because their actions do not directly represent popular demands, they have to provide their own clandestine infrastructure by renting houses and apartments. By tying themselves to a fixed terrain in this way, the Tupamaros have lost both mobility and security: two prerequisites of guerrilla strategy. In order to avoid encirclement and annihilation through house-to-house searches, the guerrillas can best survive not by establishing fixed urban bases, but by living apart and fighting together.

(2) *Mobility and Security.* If urban guerrillas rent houses for their commandos, they are in danger of leaving a trail that may be followed by the police who review monthly all registered rentals. Should most of their houses be loaned instead of leased, then the guerrillas should refrain as a general rule from building underground vaults or hideouts which would increase their dependence on the terrain. To retain their mobility and a high margin of security they must spread out among a favorable population. Guerrillas who fight together and then disperse throughout a great city are not easily detected by the police. When dragnets are applied to one neighborhood or zone, guerrillas without a fixed base can shift to another neighborhood. Such mobility is precluded by a reliance on rented houses or hideouts in the homes of sympathizers, heretofore a major strategical error of the Tupamaros.

(3) *Heavy or Light Rearguard?* Urban guerrillas who develop a heavy infrastructure in many rented houses commit not only a military error, but also an economic and logistical one. For a heavy rearguard requires a comparatively large

monthly budget in which economic and financial motives tend to overshadow political considerations. Lacking enough houses, the guerrillas tend to upgrade to positions of command those willing to lend their own. Among the Tupamaros detained in 1972 was the owner of the hacienda "Spartacus," which housed an armory in an underground vault. At about the same time the president of the frigorific plant of Cerro Largo was detained and sentenced for aiding the Tupamaros. He may well have embraced the cause of the Tupamaros with loyalty and sincerity; but as a businessman he responded as any other bourgeois would to his workers' demands for higher wages. Thus when promotion through the ranks is facilitated by owning a big house, a large farm or enterprise, the guerrillas become open to bourgeois tendencies. When guerrillas rely for cover not on a people in arms but on people of property, then urban guerrilla warfare becomes the business of an armed minority, which will never succeed in mobilizing in this manner the majority of the population.

(4) *Logistical Infrastructure.* Although a mobile front is preferable to a fixed one, there are circumstances in which a fixed front is unavoidable, e.g., in the assembly, adjustment and adaptation of arms. These fixed fronts, few and far between, must be concealed from the guerrillas themselves; they should be known only to the few who work there, preferably one person in each, in order to avoid discovery by the repressive forces. In the interest of security it is advisable not to manufacture arms, but to have the parts made separately by various legal establishments, after which they can be assembled in the secret workshops of the guerrillas.

It is dangerous to rely on a fixed front for housing, food, medical supplies and armaments. If the guerrillas are regularly employed, they should live as everybody else does; they should come together only at designated times and places. Houses that serve as barracks or hideouts tend to immobilize the guerrillas and to expose them to the possibility of encirclement and annihilation. Because the Tupamaros immobilized many of their commandos in fixed quarters, they were exposed in 1972 to

mass detentions; they lost a large part of their armaments and related equipment and were compelled to transfer military supplies to the countryside for hiding.

In abusing control over their sympathizers and keeping them under strict military discipline, the Tupamaros had to house them together. But they were seldom used in military operations at a single place or in several simultaneously, indicating the absence of strategical preparation. If urban guerrillas cannot continually disappear and reappear among the population of a great city, then they lack the political prerequisites for making a revolution, for creating the conditions of a social crisis through the breakdown of "law and order." Despite their proficiency during the first hit-and-run phase of a revolutionary war, the Tupamaros have failed to escalate their operations by using larger units at more frequent intervals for the purpose of paralyzing the existing regime.

(5) *Heroes, Martyrs and Avengers.* In revolutionary war any guerrilla action that needs explaining to the people is politically useless: it should be meaningful and convincing by itself. To kill an ordinary soldier in reprisal for the assassination of a guerrilla is to descend to the same political level as a reactionary army. Far better to create a martyr and thereby attract mass sympathy than to lose or neutralize popular support by senseless killings without an evident political goal. To be victorious in a people's war one has to act in conformity with the interests, sentiments and will of the people. A military victory is worthless if it fails to be politically convincing.

In a country where the bourgeoisie has abolished the death penalty, it is self-defeating to condemn to death even the most hated enemies of the people. Oppressors, traitors and informers have condemned themselves before the guerrillas; it is impolitic to make a public show of their crimes for the purpose of creating a climate of terror, insecurity and disregard for basic human rights. A popular army that resorts to unnecessary violence, that is not a symbol of justice, equity, liberty and security, cannot win popular support in the struggle against a dehumanized tyranny.

The Tupamaros' "prisons of the people" do more harm than

benefit to the cause of national liberation. Taking hostages for the purpose of exchanging them for political prisoners has an immediate popular appeal; but informing the world of the existence of "people's prisons" is to focus unnecessarily on a parallel system of repression. No useful purpose can be served by such politically alienating language. Moreover, it is intolerable to keep anyone hostage for a long time. To achieve a political or propaganda victory through this kind of tactic, the ransom terms must be moderate and capable of being met; in no event should the guerrillas be pressed into executing a prisoner because their demands are excessive and accordingly rejected. A hostage may be usefully executed only when a government refuses to negotiate on any terms after popular pressure has been applied; for then it is evident to everyone that the government is ultimately responsible for the outcome.

So-called people's prisons are harmful for other reasons: they require several men to stand guard and care for the prisoners; they distract guerrillas from carrying out alternative actions more directly useful to the population; and they presuppose a fixed front and corresponding loss of mobility. At most it is convenient to have a secure place to detain for short periods a single hostage.

To establish people's prisons, to condemn to death various enemies of the people, to house the guerrillas in secret barracks or underground hideouts is to create an infrastructure supporting a miniature state rather than a revolutionary army. To win the support of the population, arms must be used directly on its behalf. Whoever uses violence against subordinates in the course of building a miniature counterstate should be removed from his command. Surely, there is little point in defeating one despotism only to erect another in its place!

(6) *Delegated Commands.* In a professional army the leadership is recruited from the military academies within a hierarchical order of command. In a guerrilla organization the leaders emerge in actual revolutionary struggles, elected because of their capacity, responsibility, combativity, initiative, political understanding and deeds rather than words. However, at pain of forfeiting the democratic character of a revolution-

ary army and the function of authority as a delegated power, not even the best guerrilla commander can be allowed to remain long at the helm. A rotating leadership is necessary to avoid the "cult of personality"; power should be alternately exercised by those commanders with the most victories, by those most popular with their soldiers and most respected by the people. Inasmuch as guerrilla warfare takes the form of self-defense, its success depends on the exercise of direct democracy, on guerrilla self-management and self-discipline—a far cry from the barracks discipline typical of a bureaucratic or professional army. . . .

The people have more need of many revolutionary heroes than of a single outstanding leader like Julius Caesar or Napoleon Bonaparte. Epaminondas, the Theban general who defeated the Spartans, held a command that lasted only two years. Although the greatest strategist of his time, he became an ordinary soldier when his command expired. Only because of his extraordinary skill was he made a military adviser to the new commander-in-chief. Guerrillas can benefit by his example.

A delegated command is unlimited except for the time determining its delegation. The responsibility of subordinates is to discuss in advance each operation, to make recommendations, etc. But the discussion ends when the supreme command assumes responsibility for the outcome of a particular battle or engagement. If the commander is mistaken in his judgment, if the result is defeat rather than victory, his duty is to resign. Should he succeed in a vote of confidence he may retain his command; but two successive defeats should make his resignation irrevocable.

One of the most common errors of Latin American guerrillas is to make legends of their leaders as they did of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. The resulting messianism conceals the incapacity of many guerrilla commanders who take their troops into the countryside—like the Tupamaros in 1972—without revising mistaken strategies. Perhaps the leaders of the Uruguayan guerrillas have come to believe in their providential powers, thereby reducing the ordinary guerrilla to a political

and military zero, to the status of a soldier in a conventional army.

(7) *Revolution: Which Revolution?* Youthful Leftists without a proletarian praxis, without having suffered directly the effects of capitalist exploitation, aspire to liberate the workers without the workers' own revolutionary intervention. When revolutionary action is limited to a series of military engagements between guerrillas and a repressive army, armaments are of little use in mobilizing the people for national liberation. The corresponding *foquismo* [exaggerated reliance on guerrilla *focos*, armed encounters and military tactics to spark a mass insurrection] is petty bourgeois in origin as well as outlook—evident in the token number of workers and peasants in the guerrillas' ranks. Actually, it is an insurrectional movement for piling up cadavers, for giving easy victories to the repressive generals trained by the Pentagon.

In the case of the Tupamaros the commanding cadres and the greater part of the rank and file have come from the universities, the liberal professions and the rebellious petty-bourgeois youth who have learned how to disobey. They long for a revolution. But what kind of revolution? Since there are few workers or peasants in the columns of the Tupamaros, it is understandable that the struggle is limited mainly to engagements between the guerrillas on one side and the army and police on the other. In these encounters the people are caught in the middle, leaving a political vacuum which only a different kind of guerrilla movement can fill: one providing support for all popular acts of protest, strikes, demonstrations, student rebellions, etc. Only through the intermediary of the people, in other words, can urban guerrillas pass from the first phase of revolutionary war to a generalized state of subversion leading to a social revolution.

In their endeavor to create a state within the state through highly disciplined guerrilla columns, secret barracks, "prisons of the people," underground arsenals and a heavy logistical infrastructure, the Tupamaros have become overly professionalized, militarized and isolated from the urban masses. Their organization is closer to resembling a parallel power contesting

the legally established one, a microstate, rather than a movement of the masses.)

(8) *Strategy, Tactics and Politics*. If the tactics adopted are successful but the corresponding strategy and politics mistaken, the guerrillas cannot win. Should a succession of tactical victories encourage a strategical objective that is impossible to attain, then a great tactical victory can culminate in an even greater strategical defeat.

The kidnappings of the Brazilian consul Días Gomide and the CIA agent Dan Mitrione are instances of tactical successes by the Tupamaros. But in demanding in exchange a hundred detained guerrillas, the Tupamaros found the Uruguayan government obstinate, in order not to lose face altogether. Here a successful tactic contributed to an impossible strategical objective. In having to execute Mitrione because the government failed to comply to their demands, the Tupamaros not only failed to accomplish a political objective, but also suffered a political reversal in their newly acquired role of assassins—the image they acquired through hostile mass media.)

The Tupamaros would have done better by taping Mitrione's declarations and giving the story to the press. The population would have followed the incidents of his confession with more interest than the interminable serials. Mitrione's confessed links with the CIA should have been fully documented and sent to Washington in care of Senator Fulbright. With this incident brought to the attention of Congress, the operation against the CIA would have won world support for the Tupamaros. Once the Uruguayan government had lost prestige through this publicity, the Uruguayan press might be asked to publish a manifesto of the Tupamaros explaining their objectives in the Mitrione case. Afterward his death sentence should have been commuted out of respect for his eight sons, but on condition that he leave the country. Such a solution to the government's refusal to negotiate with the guerrillas would have captured the sympathies of many in favor of the Tupamaros. Even more than conventional war, revolutionary war is a form of politics carried out by violent means.

With respect to Días Gomide the Tupamaros lost an oppor-

tunity to embarrass politically the Brazilian government. They should never have allowed matters to reach the point at which his wife could appear as an international heroine of love and marital fidelity by collecting sums for his release. Every cruzeiro she collected was a vote against the Tupamaros and indirectly against the Brazilian guerrillas. In exchange for Días Gomide, a man of considerable importance to the military regime, the Tupamaros should have demanded the publication of a manifesto in the Brazilian press. Its contents might have covered the following items: a denunciation of the "death squad" as an informal instrument of the Brazilian dictatorship; a demand for free, secret and direct elections; the legalization of all political parties dissolved by the military regime; the restitution of political rights to Brazil's former leaders and exiles including Quadros, Kubitschek, Brizola, Goulart and even reactionaries like Lacerda; the denunciation of government censorship of the press; and a demand that popular priests be set free. With such a political response the revolutionary war might have been exported to Brazil. Guerrilla actions should not be narrowly circumscribed when they can have regional and international repercussions. . . .

The Tupamaros are perilously close to resembling a political Mafia. In demanding large sums of money in ransom for political hostages they have sometimes appeared to be self-serving. It matters little to the average citizen whether bank deposits pass into the hands of "expropriators" who do little directly to lighten the public burden—not because they do not want to but because they cannot do so in isolation from the people and without popular support. There is an historical irony about these would-be liberators who indirectly live off the surplus of the people they liberate.

(9) *OPR-33 and the Tupamaros*. (Enormous losses were suffered by the Tupamaros in 1972 through more than 3,000 detentions, including those of persons guilty by association. Popular hatred against the government has intensified because of its house-to-house searches and disregard for fundamental rights. If the Tupamaros had as much political and strategical sense as they have tactical skill, they might have achieved in

1972 a new polarization of forces culminating in a truce, a virtual recognition by the government of a situation of dual powers.)

But the political and strategical mistakes of the Tupamaros, their rigorous centralism and hierarchy of authority led instead to internal divisions and split-offs that further weakened the organization. The deliberately mislabeled "Microfaction" broke with the movement. This group politically responsive to the Uruguayan Revolutionary Worker's Party (PRT)—a political affiliate of the Argentine People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)—would hardly have been permitted to split peacefully were it not for the ERP. The "22nd of December" guerrillas likewise split with the leadership: a group concentrating on operations designed to mobilize the trade unions and other mass organizations without the military centralism of the Tupamaros' general staff. . . .)

Politically, the Tupamaros follow an ambiguous line promising something of interest to everybody. On the other hand, the *Tupamaro Courier*, a bulletin of the organization, has carried in its pages extracts from the speeches of conservative nationalists like Aparicio Saravia. On the other hand, the Tupamaros' leadership forbids its cadres from criticizing the pro-Moscow Communists. This political irresolution, indefiniteness and ambivalence have hurt the Tupamaros in their efforts to gain a foothold in the Communist-controlled trade unions. Although they penetrated and won over the leadership of the Union of Sugar Workers (UTA) and the workers of the Frigorífico Fray Bentos, they have shown little skill in directing trade-union struggle or introducing workers' self-management. Perhaps they have been unsuccessful in pressing for immediate reforms because they anticipate that seizing political power will resolve everything.

Unlike the Tupamaros, the anarcho-syndicalist Revolutionary Popular Organization (OPR-33) uses armed struggle to support the workers' immediate demands without directly challenging the government and armed forces. Neither OPR-33 nor the "22nd of December" contributed to the 1971 electoral struggles of the Broad Front against the established political

parties. While the Tupamaros supported the Broad Front, OPR-33 used its armed units to win the strike at the Portland Cement Company, where workers with anarcho-syndicalist tendencies demanded higher wages. Rodney Arismendi, secretary-general of the Communist Party, denounced the anarcho-syndicalists as adventurers for allegedly playing into the hands of reactionaries and ignoring the principal task of electing a new president, senators and deputies. But the Broad Front lost the elections, while the workers at Portland Cement won the strike. Moreover, the railroad workers also triumphed against the bosses, thanks to the armed backing of OPR-33 with the support of the Worker-Student Resistance (ROE) and the Uruguayan Anarchist Federation (FAU).

OPR-33 and ROE also spurred a series of successful strikes in the metallurgical, rubber and clothing industries. The strike at SERAL, a footwear manufacturer, lasted more than a year. Where the Communist-controlled unions failed, OPR-33 and ROE succeeded. The anarcho-syndicalists initiated the strike at SERAL: they endured in hunger, asked for collections in the streets of Montevideo and mobilized popular support. But the owner, an ex-worker, could not be moved. Finally, his son disappeared. OPR-33 was apparently behind the operation but, unlike the Tupamaros, admitted to nothing. No ransom was asked; words were unnecessary. In view of the circumstances it was tacitly understood that the owner, Malaguero, could recover his son by negotiating with the workers. In this way the most difficult strike in Uruguay was won: the workers were compensated for lost pay; their union was recognized as the only legal bargaining agent. Thus during the first six months of 1972, when the Tupamaros were being detained by the hundreds, Malaguero's son was lost but reappeared with the resolution of the strike at SERAL. Despite the success of the repressive forces in uncovering the people's prisons and hide-outs of the Tupamaros, the boy could not be found. Here was an altogether different style of guerrilla warfare from that of the Tupamaros'—and also more effective.

The strike against the Frigorífico Modelo was won through a similar operation. In the midst of the strike the firm's presi-

dent, Fernández Lladó, disappeared. Thus a second company was compelled to negotiate. In no instance has OPR-33 been pressured to execute hostages. For it has not made demands of its own, but has applied force only to obtain what hundreds of exploited workers have already been asking for. In this way, little by little, it may continue to win support from the workers until even the reformist trade unions fall into revolutionary hands. Once revolutionaries are in command of their own house, then they are ready for revolutionary action in depth: the occupation of factories that operate at less than full capacity; the transformation of these into producer's cooperatives or self-managed enterprises; and preparation for the seizure of political power. For what purpose? To establish a new kind of socialist society in which the people rather than bureaucrats or guerrilla leaders are the beneficiaries.

(10) *MIR, ERP and the Tupamaros.* The Tupamaros were the first group of urban guerrillas to teach the world how to initiate an insurrection in the cities with few supporters and modest means. But their superb tactics have been nullified by a mediocre strategy and a questionable politics.)

Like OPR-33, the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and the Argentine People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) offer new models of urban guerrilla warfare in which strategy and politics combine to reinforce the Tupamaros' tactics. The Chilean and Argentine organizations show great initiative in combat, a clear-cut program of national and social liberation, the capacity to mobilize large masses and a virtual absence of petty-bourgeois tendencies. They are openly critical of Right-wing nationalism and the opportunism of Social Democrats and Communists. Without such criticism, without liberating themselves from a narrow professional outlook, urban guerrillas can succeed in tactical engagements; but they cannot develop a revolutionary movement capable of winning power, if not for themselves as bureaucrats, then for the people they represent.

In 1972 MIR had the most effective revolutionary organization in Latin America. Its leading cadres are directly responsible to the rank and file through a system of direct democracy;

its politics are clear and unambiguous; it proposes at any moment only what it can actually accomplish. Nothing escapes the political analysis and synthesis of the MIR cadres. They are Chile's major revolutionary reserve. In the event Allende's government is overthrown, only they are presently equipped to fight for liberation under conditions of repression. They are acid critics of demagoguery and adventurism. Their proposals are well reasoned and concrete with respect both to immediate issues and the future.

The ERP is another model worth imitating. In Rosario it seized the British consul and the manager of Swift for the purpose of settling a major strike. It has prepared the ground for surmounting the traditional trade-union tactics of the Peronist labor bureaucracy, the pro-Moscow Communists and genteel socialists. Even the tragic finale of Sallustro, president of Argentine Fiat, is an example of blood spilled not so much by the ERP as by the Argentine military. For the dictatorship countermanded the negotiations between the Fiat management and workers as the price of his release.

(The Tupamaros faced their gravest crisis during the first half of 1972, when the repressive forces detained several hundred of them. That so many fell was due not to lack of secrecy, security measures or compartmentalization of their activities, but to absence of autonomy. Their supreme command is centralized: it knows all, says all, does all. Nothing can be more fatal to a guerrilla organization than lack of self-direction under conditions in which the guerrillas cannot be continually united and in which each group or commando has to adapt to the tactical situation at hand without waiting, as a conventional army does, for orders from above. Excessive centralization of authority makes an organization rigid and vulnerable: once the repressive forces discover a single thread they can begin looking for the spool.)

The Tupamaros acted precipitately in attacking the newly elected government of President Bordaberry. They provoked the as yet untested government to declare a state of war. Repression was escalated in the crudest forms: punitive expeditions, legalized terrorism, physical tortures. A formal

democracy gave way to dissimulated dictatorship. Far better had the Tupamaros waited for the economic and social crisis to discredit the new regime. The prime necessities are in scarce supply; there is not enough meat, milk, sugar, kerosene to satisfy the demand. Nonetheless, the government is strong because the revolutionaries' rhetoric is weak, and they have not mastered the art of mobilizing popular discontent on these basic issues.)

A revolutionary organization must demonstrate that it knows more than its bourgeois rivals in power. To displace the bourgeoisie and bureaucracy, it must convince the public of their incompetence, a task which cannot be done overnight. It must show how greater levels of productivity can be achieved compatible with human freedom, how the scientific-technological revolution can be advanced, how agriculture can be fully mechanized and electrified, how industrial integration can be achieved, how culture can be made to serve economic and technological growth, how atomic energy can be utilized, how the socialism of self-management can be introduced. If a revolutionary leadership fails to demonstrate humane qualities, scientific knowledge and social, political and economic skills, it may commit blunders by initiating an insurrection before fully mobilizing popular support. Then is the time for military intervention. Thus in Peru the guerrillas were exterminated by the developmentalist generals who now pass for revolutionaries; and in Brazil the military waged a preventive coup, mortgaged their country to foreign capital, reduced corporate taxes, outlawed industrial unrest and depressed real wages in order to stimulate economic growth.

From the Tupamaros we can learn from both their exploits and mistakes—magnifying their strengths and concealing their weaknesses can be of service to dogmatists and sectarians, not revolutionaries. The Tupamaros have served as the best revolutionary academy in the world on the subject of urban guerrilla warfare; they have taught more through actions than all the revolutionary theories abstracted from concrete situations. But their brilliance in matters of tactics has not been matched

by their strategy and politics. Thus the revolutionary ideal must combine the tactical proficiency of the Tupamaros with the mass strategy of OPR-33 and the politics of the Chilean MIR—a synthesis most nearly approximated by the Argentine ERP.

CHAPTER X

Challenge to the Pentagon

1. *Latin America: Strategic Analysis* *

Revolutionary war is an act of political violence undertaken when the political ends of the people cannot be effectively pursued through peaceful means, whether under an oppressive and repressive indigenous government or in the presence of an invader for whom war has become a means of foreign policy. It can succeed against the combined forces of an indigenous government and an imperialist invader, which in our epoch frequently fight together against the people as in the war in Vietnam. Such a reactionary conjunction of native oligarchies and imperialist plutocracies against the people is one of the political characteristics of revolutionary war in Latin America.

Colonial wars, national wars, classical imperialist wars have changed in the historical course of the capitalist world. The wars of a former time were less inhuman than those of our time. The contenders had limited political goals: the victor did not alter the mode of production, dominant religion, form of state, class structure or property relations of the vanquished. In Vietnam, for example, a popular victory would exchange the existing order of classes, private property, social relations, internal and external politics, and the capitalist regime for a socialist society. Consequently, revolutionary war is total war: the people and its army collaborate everywhere against internal

reaction and the foreign invader in a struggle without clemency that exacts the highest political tension.

Capitalist wars had for their essential objective a decisive battle, the conquest of an opposed territory, the defeat and disarming of the enemy in order to force him to the negotiating table, to sign a treaty by virtue of which the victor would financially, commercially and economically exploit the vanquished nation, but without changing the traditional mode of production, social classes and political structure. Such has been the colonial or neocolonial policy of the imperialist countries, from the pharaohs to Uncle Sam and even Brezhnev, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet troops and satellites of the Warsaw Pact.

Revolutionary war does not propose to decide anything by arms, nor by means of great battles, nor by occupying foreign soil, but rather by attracting the invader or repressor of the people to territory where the population is favorable and the repressor can be defeated, exhausted and demoralized in a prolonged war. Thereby political and moral factors become more decisive for victory than heavy armaments and ironclad units. In revolutionary war man is always superior to military hardware.

In the philosophy of war there are general strategical laws and specific ones which are a function of space, time, distribution of the population, armaments in vogue and sociological factors such as class struggles and national conflicts. If a war is between countries or blocs of countries for the purpose of conquering spheres of influence but not altering the mode of production and social relations, then it will be open to negotiation. But if the war is between rival classes, it is a revolutionary war to the death, since the victor will be implacable against the vanquished, like Crassus against Spartacus or Franco against the Spanish republicans.

As a function of politics, economics and sociology, war is total or limited. If belligerents have the same military or economic power, their campaigns will involve regular formations, a continuous front and great battles of which the strategic end is to occupy the enemy's territory. But if one of the belligerents

* *Desafío al pentágono*, Chapter II, pp. 55-59, 59-60, 61-62, 63-64.

has a preponderance of power, then the weaker army must practice the strategy of ceding space, as Fabius did against Hannibal, in order to be stronger in the dimension of time. Such a strategy puts a premium on endurance and conduces to a war of guerrillas in the territory of the weaker power. In our epoch this type of warfare was used by Mao Tse-tung against Chiang Kai-shek, Giap against Navarre, the Algerian guerrillas against the French army, Fidel against Batista, and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam against the North American army.

Given the natural and social conditions peculiar to Latin America, the strategy of a revolutionary war must take advantage of the following circumstances: (1) a vast neocolonial space; (2) sepoyan armed forces; (3) the emergence of guerrillas; and (4) a potentially favorable population.

In Latin America there are 22 million square kilometers for a population in 1968 of 260 million inhabitants; but of these 40 percent are illiterate, a fact which indicates a low level of cultural development. Confronted by a powerful external and internal enemy, the Latin American insurrectionary masses can win through ceding territory and prolonging the war with greater possibilities of success than in Vietnam, since there is more space in Latin America than in Indochina for defeating the generals of the Pentagon.

Consequently, the first characteristic of revolutionary war in Latin America is that it covers a vast neocolonial space, making it possible to prolong such a war by ceding territory to the sepoyan armies and imperialist forces. If a guerrilla foco can count on a large territory for attacking in all places without having a fixed front anywhere, in time it will defeat the most powerful armies as long as it continues to win the population because of its politics, its front of oppressed classes against oppressors, against dictatorship, militarism and imperialism.

As an insurrectionary strategy of the people in arms against oppressors from within and beyond their frontiers, surface warfare is more effective than a war of guerrillas. Surface warfare is strategically distinct from linear warfare involving regular formations suited to nations or blocs of nations. Linear

war has only a limited extension: hardly a few kilometers between the opposing armies with their respective advanced and supporting lines. A surface war is in all parts without a definite front, thereby enabling the guerrillas to appear and disappear at will. Should the guerrillas become converted into an army of liberation, then the revolutionary war takes the form of a leopard skin, with many liberated zones; with such luck that the enemy cannot, at one and the same time, destroy them all or occupy any zone without the army of liberation reappearing in the others.

The vast Latin American space has formidable geostrategical zones: a large, high Andean cordillera which can become the Sierra Maestra of liberation, as Fidel Castro noted; enormous river basins like the Orinoco, the Magdalena, the Cauca, the San Francisco and the Plata; extensive forests which cover 44 percent of Latin America in which rural and mountain guerrillas can cede terrain, win over the peasant population and reduce to impotence the most powerful regular army; industrial and highly populated cities where urban guerrillas can and should attack the enemy from behind when it has been partially whipped in jungles, fields and mountains by rural guerrillas. Strategically, the guerrillas have to change their tactics according to the terrain: in open countryside they should work by day and fight by night; in the forests and mountains the struggle is a continuing one, with the possibility of establishing liberated zones in dense forests at high altitudes; in the cities the guerrillas agitate, fight and give cover to the masses, but cannot establish liberated zones until there is no longer danger that the enemy will surround, bombard and annihilate them. In each case tactics must be flexible in response to the terrain; rather than defend a given space, it is important to destroy the enemy and to arm oneself at his expense.

* * *

Since imperialism has large investments of capital, captive markets, sources of raw materials and energy and a strategical geopolitical zone in Latin America, it is evident that a revo-

lutionary war will prompt imperialist intervention as in Santo Domingo in 1965. Actually there are green berets in almost all the Latin American armies, not in defense of the national sovereignty already liquidated by economic dependency, but as shock troops against general strikes, student demonstrations and rural and urban guerrillas. This repressive function is performed by the green berets conformable to the models of counterrevolutionary war studied in Panama under the direction of the Pentagon, which in this manner defends the investments of Wall Street throughout Latin America.

Thus the second general characteristic of revolutionary war in Latin America is that the national armies are reactionary and their operational plans directed by the Pentagon are in order to repress their own peoples. It is noteworthy that the armaments leased by the Pentagon, such as warships, cannot be used against the yanquis nor any country allied to the United States. Consequently, the Latin American armies employ them against their own working masses. However, should a popular insurrectional coalition reach out to include Catholic revolutionaries, then middle and lower cadres of the indigenous armies would be exposed to desertion and demoralization.

The sepoyan armies are politically feeble: some of their superior cadres have lost prestige for peddling influence and acting as public-relations agents for foreign enterprises. The resistance movement should give their full names and denounce them in its clandestine newspaper, thereby separating the commanding heights of the reactionary army from its popular base of ordinary soldiers, subofficials and officials with plebeian backgrounds.

In the struggle for Latin American unity, for the abolition of foreign monopolies, the creation of a continent-wide industry and the suppression of the latifundia, a segment of the military will be on the people's side. Should imperialism continue to advance economically, following its monopolistic enterprises will be employees and managers speaking English, until Spanish becomes an underdeveloped idiom and Latin America a colonial space for the dollar. This perspective of

decadence will become a reality before the year 2000 unless the united Latin American provinces do not first destroy imperialism, feudalism and sepoyanism, which together are responsible for the neocolonization of Latin America in the areas of politics, economics, diplomacy, military strategy and finance.

There are many honest military men who, like Caamaño, Yon Sosa and others, have embraced the popular cause. It is necessary to insert a political and psychological wedge between the military high command and the lower cadres; it is needful that debourgeoisified Christians, socialists, trade unionists, intellectuals, students, peasants and the proletarianized middle class march together in the same front with 80 percent of the population in supporting a revolutionary war directed against sepoyan militarism, residual feudalism and economic imperialism. With this political strategy crystallized in a popular front of liberation, a guerrilla force can defeat sepoyan militarism and the imperialism of the Pentagon, as David defeated Goliath.

* * *

A third characteristic of revolutionary war in Latin America is the actual emergence of guerrillas. Confronted by a sepoyan army which can count on imperialist support, guerrillas have been able to win power with a brilliant strategy and a favorable population base, as Fidel Castro did in the Sierra Maestra. In countries with hated military regimes the guerrillas defend the liberties and rights that have been violated; thus they appear politically as the armed detachment of the people and are in fact supported by the peasants, workers, students, liberal middle class and democratic bourgeoisie opposed to dictatorship.

Only when an armed minority acts in the interest of the oppressed majority can it reasonably hope that the guerrillas with popular backing may develop into a victorious army of liberation. A small guerrilla detachment can transform itself into a large army provided that it is used to overcome a hateful tyranny, a despotism that has suppressed the most elemen-

tary bourgeois liberties; guerrilla politics must not be sectarian, dogmatic or intolerant, but rather flexible in a new style freed from semantic "isms," operating politically in the name of the general interest in order to win support from the entire oppressed population. Political situations of this kind are optimally present throughout Latin America where military dictatorship has become the fashion, where the military wants to have the economic crisis paid for by the workers, peasants, middle class, students and decapitalized native bourgeoisie, in order that foreign capital may be invested without risk of inflation and social unrest.

Even against a sepoyan army the guerrillas may succeed by concentrating on acts designed to win the population, on armed propaganda, on giving cover to strikes, demonstrations and occupations of factories and fields, on protests against the indigenous tyranny and imperialism. But they will have to operate strategically, not in the same places where these struggles occur but rather away from them where the enemy is unprepared or militarily weak. The punishment of a repressive figure, the kidnapping of a military, diplomatic or economic representative of imperialism, the seizure of arms in isolated or insufficiently guarded places—when the enemy is elsewhere repressing student demonstrations, strikes and occupations of factories—may become optimal objectives of the urban or rural guerrillas. In this way they can gain prestige through continuous and successful operations against the enemy, which added together constitute a victory for the people in arms.

* * *

Turning finally to the factor of population, Latin America has 45 percent in cities with 5,000 inhabitants or more. Strategically, this means that the Latin American revolution is urban and rural at the same time, that it is impossible without a worker-peasant alliance. But it may occur that the initial spark that ignites the prairie comes not from the 55 percent in rural areas but rather from the 45 percent in cities, from the comparatively politicized and radicalized urban popula-

tion. Nonetheless, in tropical countries it is possible that the epicenter of the revolution is in the countryside rather than the cities, since there the proletariat is in the fields cultivating cane, coffee, cocoa, cotton, bananas and other products exploited by foreign companies. In the Caribbean and Central America imperialism resides in the countryside; in South America the countryside belongs to the oligarchies and the cities belong to the imperialists. These two different projections indicate that a revolutionary war may have its initial epicenter in either the South American cities or the Caribbean and Central American countryside. Although the revolution in Santa Domingo in 1965 was exclusively urban, perhaps it failed because it was not at the same time an agrarian revolution, a vast surface war against the sepoyan army and the U.S. Marines like that waged by the Vietnamese against half a million yanquis.

Despite its predominantly rural composition, the bulk of the population of Latin America, representing 70 percent of the total, is confined to a geographical strip that penetrates barely 500 kilometers from the coast. In the interior Latin America is basically an empty continent. It is there that the sepoyan military and imperialists have to be attracted by the guerrillas in order to disperse their forces in inhospitable terrain without communications nor adequate paramilitary and natural resources. Seduced into that empty space, the enemy will be less ready to defend the cities, the center of gravity of the industrial and urban civilization developed by capitalism, where in the end the ultimate battle will be won.

In summary, revolutionary war in Latin America must combine actions in the countryside with those in the city, war in the interior with attacks on the urban rearguard of the sepoyan troops and imperialism. Let us never forget that the revolution is an historical phenomenon of capitalism and that the people will never triumph without changing the mode of production. And for this there must be a revolution in the cities, where we find industry, commerce, finance and the great concentrated masses of the population.

We have pointed out four general characteristics of revolu-

tionary war in Latin America. In conclusion we might note that there is a favorable terrain and population for starting an insurrection; but the insurrection must be planned conformably to its urban and rural objectives in order to awaken from the beginning the admiration of the people. Che Guevara's thesis of the insurrectional *foco* is correct inasmuch as action creates the revolutionary conditions; but it is imperative to know in each country and situation whether to begin operations in the city or the countryside, that is, in the event that we cannot do so in both places at the same time, which would be the optimum initial strategy given sufficient forces.

2. *Program of Liberation for Latin America* *

In revolutionary war there are three well-defined phases: first, the enemy army is very strong and the guerrillas are very weak, being reduced to one or more armed bands without possibility of maintaining themselves in a definite terrain, but eluding the enemy's offensive and encirclement owing to their mobility, security, velocity and combativity; second, the guerrillas win popular support and increase in size, establishing and defending liberated zones in high mountains covered with forests but without clinging to the terrain, while the enemy passes from a permanent offensive to a static policy of surrounding and blockading the liberated areas; third, the guerrilla bands are transformed into an army of liberation which combines relatively large units with semiheavy equipment taken from the enemy and maintains in the enemy's rear a large detachment for the purpose of rousing the population and catching the adversary between two fires.

In the first phase space is ceded in order to avoid encirclement and large battles; in the second phase several or more liberated zones are maintained in order to confront one force, space and regime against another; in the third phase the enemy space is occupied, since without occupying it there can be no victory. But this must be done when the enemy is demoralized, exhausted and without possibilities of resistance.

* *Desafío al pentágono*, Chapter III, pp. 71, 73-75.

To win a revolutionary war these phases must not be confused. If the enemy collapses during the second phase, so much the better; but in order not to be deceived, it is necessary to know from the beginning of a revolutionary war the enemy's maximum rather than minimum capacity for resistance.

* * *

Economic imperialism generates the law of the international division of labor, thereby creating one-crop or dependent economies. Consequently, the revolution in Latin America begins by being regional, but cannot fully succeed against the native oligarchies and imperialism except on condition of becoming a continental revolution. When each country has only one or two products for export, the revolution from within artificial frontiers is a utopia. In Latin America the revolution must embrace a broad front of the insurgent population in order to defeat the sepoyan armies, in the first and second phases of revolutionary war, and the imperialist army that may intervene to prevent them from being overcome during the third phase of people's war.

To secure victory the Latin American people must unite on the basis of a broad front of liberation, continental in scope, which proposes among other things the following objectives:

- a) *Latin American Federation*: Imperialism has to be expelled from the Latin American space for the purpose of creating a unitary federal republic of all Latin American peoples.
- b) *National Liberation*: The twenty states of Latin America have a single aspiration based on their common origin and historic destiny, a common language, the ecumenicity of the Catholic religion, the joint struggle against imperialism and the oligarchies, their supranational unity and struggle to overcome neocolonial Balkanization—all this must contribute to a broad front of liberation that embraces 80 per cent of the Latin American population.

- c) *Prohibition of the Monopolies*: The natural resources, basic industries, public services, means of production, exchange and consumption in the hands of economic imperialism must be surrendered to the working masses, who will manage them by means of direct democracy in cooperation with the planning authorities.
- d) *Suppression of the Latifundia*: The land belongs to those who cultivate it without the intermediary of the onerous feudal aristocracies; it is intolerable that 1.5 percent of the latifundia own 64.9 percent of the land; an agrarian reform is the basis of the Latin American revolution; a modern, mechanized agriculture constitutes the most important market for urban industry and presents the possibility of overcoming the "geography of hunger"; with 750 million Latin Americans in the year 2000 there can be neither latifundia nor minifundia, but only a co-operative, self-managed scientific agriculture.
- e) *Front of the Oppressed Classes*: In Latin America the revolution has to be made with other classes besides the urban proletariat; the course of liberation depends on a united front of workers, peasants, the proletarianized middle class, the segment of the native bourgeoisie struggling to defend the internal market against imperialist encroachment, students, intellectuals and Catholics who support and promote a change toward socialism; with such a broad front united in thought and action, Latin America will become a nation and her decolonization an historic reality.

A Latin American program of liberation must not become identified with the old political denominations. Within a united front there is room for Marxism, libertarian socialism, a debourgeoisified Christianity and all the progressive movements that have politically liberated themselves from the Soviet bureaucracy, yanqui imperialism and the native bourgeoisie.

3. *Preparing for a Revolutionary Struggle* *

The voluntaristic idealism of rebels, not to be confused with the political sagacity, dialectical objectives and strategy of revolutionaries, frequently takes wishes for reality; it subjectivizes fervent revolutionary desires without taking into account objective revolutionary conditions. The rebel goes into action without thinking matters out; the revolutionary takes action following an economic analysis of the situation, a study of friendly and hostile classes, and an effort to avoid becoming isolated in war through a liberation front directed against the principal enemy, the oligarchy. The rebel launches an insurrection without preparing it; the revolutionary starts from a minimal organization as the basis for an armed vanguard, from a clear and sensible program that unites the oppressed classes against their oppressors and exploiters, from a strategy and tactics compelling the repressive army to fight a surface rather than linear war, i.e., to disperse its forces toward its strategic ruin.

A handful of men can make the revolution by taking advantage of an economic crisis (massive unemployment, the shutting down of factories, increasing misery, etc.), a military defeat or loss of prestige by the incapacity of the traditional parties to overcome tyranny. Under these circumstances a minority acting in the interests of the majority can bring about a successful revolution, provided it knows how to wage an insurrection and to rouse the people to arms. But if an armed minority isolates itself politically from the majority, if it fails to represent the general interest in critical moments when the masses are abandoned, then an insurrectional *foco* will never make a social revolution. Nor will it make such a revolution without developing an alliance of oppressed classes, a territorial organization in the countryside to assist the guerrillas in the mountains, and a paramilitary urban organization to provide cover for guerrillas in the city.

Under determinate political conditions favorable to a revolution a dozen men can make a social revolution, provided that their armed operations are always in defense of the people

* *Desafío al pentágono*, Chapter III, pp. 92-94, 95-97.

and for the purpose of winning a favorable population. Without the support of a guerrilla movement and an army of liberation, thousands of men involved in strikes, large demonstrations, occupations of factories and universities and struggles behind barricades are easily defeated by the military and police forces of the bourgeois or bureaucratic state.

One can always win a war against a reactionary and unpopular regular army by adopting a revolutionary strategy that combines mass actions, strikes, demonstrations, mutinies, occupations of factories in support of the right to work, seizures of schools and universities, and rural and urban guerrilla action coordinated by an army of liberation. An authentic revolutionary war presupposes a total war, which Ludendorff, the German militarist, could not possibly have anticipated. The mountain or rural *foco* is only one facet of a revolutionary war and not—as Régis Debray supposed in *Revolution in the Revolution?*—its highest expression. A revolutionary war is consummated when it makes use of the following: mountain or rural guerrillas including clandestine militias in small towns; urban guerrillas; combined operations of local guerrillas, regional echelons and an army of liberation; sabotage, kidnappings, terrorism, and armed propaganda which is a daily event in revolutionary wars like those of Vietnam, Algeria and Cuba; strikes, demonstrations, mobilizations of women and students; and actions in the cotton fields, cane fields and mines, where the worker is most exploited. Finally, a revolutionary war depends on a minority's becoming the locomotive that pulls the majority behind it, through the creation of an army of liberation supported and defended politically by a united front.

For a minority to become the champion of an oppressed majority that wants to throw off the yoke of militarism, the landed oligarchy and imperialism, it must be based on a movement that cannot be classified in terms of the classical political labels, but rather one that takes a date as the origin of its political denomination and revolutionary action [e.g., July 26 Movement, Revolutionary Movement of November 13 (Guatemala), Revolutionary Movement of October 8 (Bra-

zil), etc.]. In this manner the particular (the guerrilla) becomes a symbol of the general (the people). For an insurrectionary movement to blossom into an army of liberation, it first has to be a people in arms; the party can come later, after the formation of the army and front of liberation. To fall into semantic idealism or to play at words with this or that political color or ideology deprives the armed minority of the assistance of the majority, which has difficulty following stale ideologies. Many Latin American revolutionaries have suffered without understanding this, have been executed by firing squads or jailed for having mistaken tactics for strategy, wishes for reality. In determinate situations, in several hours or days, a few divisions may lose the war; but by ceding territory and gaining time in order to mobilize the people, a guerrilla *foco* of ten may win against a large army when it acts in the interest of the oppressed, exploited and abandoned majority.

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A revolutionary war should be based on optimal political conditions, where there are hateful tyrannies to be overthrown with the participation of all the people. The most favorable political conditions shorten the revolutionary struggle and contribute to its development; but they can also make it cruel and bloody as in Colombia, where the guerrillas fight a war in the countryside while the city reads the news or does nothing about it. To launch a guerrilla war in the form of an insurrectional *foco* in countries that enjoy certain democratic liberties, and before an economic crisis reduces the relative level of life, is to run a strategical risk unfavorable to the guerrillas. In the best of situations the revolution would have many tactical successes—the seizure of arms, the defeat of the enemy in numerous and repeated encounters that have been well prepared. But who would make up for the human losses and who would use the arms taken from the enemy? As the highest expression of class struggle, revolutionary war cannot prosper when the guerrilla is not supported by a front of the oppressed classes against their oppressors. If at the beginning of an insurrectional action such a front is not formed, then it is because there is

not yet a political loss of faith, a crisis reaching the point of chaos, the maximum of corruption, political crimes of the lowest sort and a despotism so cruel and immoral that the people say and repeat: "Matters cannot go on in this way! Enough!"

In Latin America one is used to the recurrence of guerrillas in countries with an appearance of democracy, while nothing is done where pretorian dictators have dissolved all political parties, seized power, made themselves the lackeys of imperialism and placed themselves against the working class, the students, the peasants, the intellectuals and the liberal bourgeoisie. Guerrilla war has done nothing against these ominous, shameful and treasonable dictatorships. It was used when there still existed a representative regime, but it is not used now against pretorian dictatorships. This indicates that guerrillas who are ill-formed politically cannot strategically arrive at a knowledge of the most elementary principles of revolutionary war, but are likely to be seduced by ludicrous, half-sporting and mountainous heroics that are closer to the movies of Robin Hood than to the practice of Fidel Castro.

A guerrilla war in the mountains or rural areas of countries with pretorian tyrannies does not as a rule give much importance to problems of liberty, which are problems of the intellect and the spirit of man, of urban life rather than rural. In those circumstances the guerrillas are situated beyond the areas of the principal masses and the propaganda designed to win a favorable population; the peasant with his limited horizon neither understands nor suffers in his daily life the problems of social identification and political alienation. The dictatorship employs most of its power in the large cities, and it is there essentially where it must be attacked politically and militarily. If a country oppressed by tyranny has high-mountain and forest zones, however, there is a double possibility of attacking the enemy in cities and mountains. Under these conditions and in order that the city may not become an immense prison for recognized revolutionaries, those whose names and photos have been given publicity should take to the mountains and carry on the struggle in liberated or semiliberated terrain,

which would constitute for them a kind of liberation. In the fighting cadres of the urban guerrillas one must always have new faces to employ in favor of the guerrilla's principal weapon and most effective ally: surprise.

The incidents against tyrannies that occur in the cities have a tremendous repercussion on national and international news, much more so than reports from the countryside, which are often suppressed by totalitarian governments in order not to foster popular myths about the guerrillas, myths like the one about Fidel Castro, who won over Havana by his actions and gestures from the Sierra Maestra.

One should not launch a revolutionary war with only small support from the population. Lack of popular support would bring great suffering to the guerrillas and make matters easy for the repressive forces. The guerrillas must take root in zones that hope for justice from the liberation army; they must provide support, little by little, for the oppressed people; they must offer protection to students, workers, peasants, intellectuals, etc. One must not invent the masses but follow their wishes, not allowing the trade-union leadership to negotiate matters for them, but rather pushing the struggle beyond the limited horizon of the bureaucrat. Only in this way can revolutionary war become the most effective means of implementing policy through action, when a dictatorship prevents the people from doing so legally by democratic means.

4. *Strategical Problems of War between the Americas* *

Latin America signifies for North America its best market, its most important source of supply of raw materials. It will struggle to maintain this vital space and depository of natural wealth even at the price of war and the landing of Marines.

During the second half of the twentieth century a war between the two Americas is likely to emerge from the historical and socioeconomic situation within which the plutocratic North exploits the proletarian South, thereby creating a dialectical contradiction whose historical solution will have to take

* *Desafío al pentágono*, Chapter IV, pp. 99-100, 101-103, 107-110.

the form of violence. Latin America will have to contest the imperialism of the dollar for the same reasons that the worker struggles against capitalism. The struggle between poor and rich countries recapitulates today all the characteristics of the class struggle, which is taken by Marxism to be the motor of history. In this perspective one may affirm that the struggle between proletarians and bourgeoisie within the imperialist countries tends to be combined at a given historical moment with the struggle between poor neocolonial countries and rich nations, which would indicate an end to capitalist imperialism in human history.

The Pentagon has already sketched a continental strategy for maintaining the Latin American countries in a neocolonial status, for disposing of their natural riches, strategic minerals and markets with the diplomacy of the cannon. The Pentagon's strategy is determined by the monetary imperialism of Wall Street and by the reactionary politics of the State Department. In implementing its neocolonial policy, the republic of the dollar counts on an alliance with the landed oligarchies in Latin America, which need the help of the Marines against their own insurgent peoples. There is, then, a Pan-American capitalist internationalism evident during the reunions of the member armies of the Inter-American Council of Defense. It is deplorable that in opposition to the Organization of American States (OAS) of the Pan-American international bourgeoisie there is not a Latin American anti-imperialist internationalism, having for its strategical-political purpose an attack on the Pentagon. That would require a surface war in all Latin American countries at the moment that the Marines, alone or aided by the sepoyan armies, attack the Latin American people, as in the case of the landing and invasion of Santo Domingo in 1965.

In opposition to the Pentagon strategy of disembarking Marines to support the counterrevolution where a socialist revolution might succeed in Latin America, it is imperative that the guerrillas attack the yanquis in many countries at once and whenever the yanquis become entangled in a single country. The victory of the people depends on utilizing a strategy

and a tactic for extending the war in space and prolonging it in time when the enemy wants to confine it to a single city or zone.

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The fixed investments and enclaves of Wall Street must be the objects of permanent harassment by Latin American guerrillas in order to force the Marines to remain stationed in many places at once. In this way the Marines will not be in the place elected by the guerrillas for waging an offensive of encirclement and annihilation, for seizing booty, for arming themselves from the materiel and munitions factories working for the Pentagon, i.e., for availing themselves of a part of the 80 billion dollars invested in U.S. national defense. The guerrillas do not have their own war factories and for that reason have to live from the materiel taken from the enemy.

The generals of the Pentagon will have to become the police of the great North American businesses and monopolists of strategic Latin American minerals. . . . Before abandoning its neocolonial investments in Latin America, the United States will have recourse to war in the form of military interventions justified in terms of anticommunist or, better still, anti-Castro and antiguerrilla propaganda. In whatever revolutionary conflict that might arise between a sepoyan government and its popular masses, whether it takes the form of numerous guerrillas or a collective uprising as in Santo Domingo in 1965, the bankers of Wall Street will enlist the Pentagon generals to defend their direct investments. Latin American revolutionaries are politically ingenuous who do not foresee the dialectic of belligerency on the part of yanqui capitalism in Latin America. They deserve to be defeated for not having given a scientific basis to their struggle and program of liberation, a basis in an analytical and comprehensive understanding of events proceeding from the analysis of social antagonisms to their objective resolution through action.

The North American trusts will not renounce the petroleum, iron, copper, lead, zinc, manganese, tropical agricultural products and control over the finances and commerce

of Latin America without opposing the movements of liberation having for their objective the overcoming of neocolonialism from the Rio Grande to Cape Horn. As long as North American big business dominates the Latin American economy, part of the burden of North American economic difficulties will be transferred to Latin America in the form of unfavorable terms of trade, onerous loans and the dominion of the dollar over local currencies through the International Monetary Fund or the North American banks.

If the United States loses its Latin American Commonwealth, a reduction in the North American standard of living will follow. Unemployment will increase and part of its industry will become superfluous, thereby encouraging socialist and revolutionary tendencies within its own frontiers, already convulsed by the black civil war, student protests, attempts against the lives of the leaders of the black and white communities and increasing popular discontent over the war in Vietnam. Should the United States continue fighting in Vietnam until 1972, it may perhaps face a civil-war situation at home. Nonetheless, the revisionists of the Kremlin would have the yanquis pull out of Vietnam in order to save the politics of peaceful coexistence; should the guerrillas defeat the Marines, that politics would be undermined.

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The Malthusians are preoccupied by the population explosion in Latin America: they are ready to make a gift of contraceptive pills, believing that the problem is one of sexology when it is actually a matter of economics and technology. With almost three times as much arable land in Latin America as in North America, there is little reason to become preoccupied about an increase in population. With the virgin river basins of the Amazon, the Plata and the Orinoco, the Latin American subcontinent can feed more than a billion inhabitants; but to feed this many it has more need of a million tractors and harvesters than of personal automobiles, and more need of investments in science and education than

in bourgeois luxuries and an unproductive bureaucracy. During a century in which a single hydrogen bomb has more power than all the Latin American armies put together, nuclear scientists are worth less in Latin America than generals of the cavalry, who belong to a paleolithic era in military strategy. Yet today military strategy is eminently political (revolutionary war) or it is scientific (nuclear war).

In our century the country that does not reach the stage of cybernetics (computerized and programmed automation), nuclear energy (combined economic and strategical power) and astronautics (intercontinental and nuclear capacity of reprisal within minutes), as in the case of Latin America, does not have a right to make history.

Latin America spends only 0.7 percent of its gross product on scientific investigation and education, some 700 million dollars a year, as against 2.5 percent of the gross revenue of the United States, amounting to 20 billion dollars annually. If twenty countries together are worth almost thirty times less than the United States in the areas of science and scientific investigation, then they are destined to be neocolonized; but the blame lies on their leaders, who are politically and intellectually underdeveloped. Until when and where can all this last?

Latin America constitutes a great colony of the republic of the dollar: the Latin American countries depend more today on the United States than they formerly depended on Spain; although yanqui financial colonization is less visible than that under a foreign flag, it is not less onerous or exploitative. The North American trusts completely dominate the key positions in the Latin American economy. In each country U.S. investments have sought the maximum rate of return, thereby producing dependent economies under the law of the international division of labor corresponding to neocolonialism. At the same time, economic alienation has led to the mortgage of the politics, diplomacy and strategy of the dependent countries to the imperialists.

In 1960 a single product represented the following per-

centage of total exports: tin, 65 percent in Bolivia; coffee, 62 percent in Brazil; copper, 71 percent in Chile; sugar, 75 percent in Cuba and 63 percent in the Dominican Republic; bananas, 57 percent in Honduras; wool, 56 percent in Uruguay; petroleum, 92 percent in Venezuela. The currencies of Chile, Brazil, Uruguay and Venezuela, for example, are not gold, silver or paper but rather copper, coffee, wool and petroleum. If the price of these products increases on the world market, the currencies also rise in value; but they also fall together. Thus prosperity or depression in neocolonial countries is a reflection of economic conditions in the imperialist ones. One may say, then, that Latin America faces an immediate dilemma: economic alienation or social revolution. When the alienations and contradictions between the two Americas become insupportable for the Latin American peoples, then a revolution will be inevitable as a condition of changing the economic, political and social regime and of achieving independence from the yanqui plutocracy and native oligarchies.

The tendency for the economic and technological development of the two Americas to be unequal, and for the gap between them to become wider, leads by its own inner dialectic or interplay of forces to a series of mutinies, guerrillas and insurrections throughout the Latin American continent. It begins with a direct attack on the indigenous oligarchies and the pretorianism sustaining them, which tends to elicit North American military intervention in support of a counter-revolution, as in the case of Santo Domingo and Vietnam. The response to a popular revolutionary front is "special warfare": great, inhuman, cruel and not legally declared.

The objective data of economic and political research, dialectically considered and combined, enable us to anticipate the future when we know the dynamic of existing antagonisms among social classes and among nations. Within the interplay of forces in Latin America one may perceive the conditioned inevitability of a war between North and South America, between the industrialized and imperialist North and the neocolonial and underdeveloped South. The dynamic of this

antagonism could have its violent denouement in the decade of the 70's, constituting the drama of universal history as the philosopher Hegel conceived it in the Introduction to his *Philosophy of History*.

Latin America depends more on the United States, economically and diplomatically, than on its respective integrating countries: provinces disunited by the imperialism of the dollar for the purpose of dominating them. Between the Rio Grande, the Caribbean and Cape Horn, the United States has its empire, as Rome had one in the basin of the Mediterranean, the Danube and the Rhine.

Periodically, oppressed peoples rose up against Roman imperialism: in 135 B.C. Eunus mobilized 200 thousand slaves, taking the island of Sicily; during the second civil war from 105 to 102 B.C. the slaves again rebelled in Sicily and, led by the Italian Salvius and the Greek Athenion, defeated three Roman generals; between 73 and 71 B.C. Spartacus at the head of seventy gladiators launched the third civil war, defeating many Roman legions. In these three instances of slave rebellions none of the leaders was a complete revolutionary because none knew, in his ignorance about political matters, how to replace the slave mode of production with a capitalist or socialist one. In order to triumph, a revolution has to have a program with a party and leaders who know how to install a mode of production completely different from the one belonging to the defeated regime. The new economic relations must be capable of developing the productive forces, of providing more liberty and felicity for the popular masses, because if they cannot, a return to the past would be justified either in the course of a long struggle or even after victory.

With regard to Latin America, her liberators must be capable of unifying, industrializing, decolonizing, defeudalizing and federalizing her disunited provinces within the framework of a socialist economy, itself based on cooperativism or collectivism in agriculture and on workers' self-management and comanagement in industry and public services. The West will continue to follow the model of social redemption that unites

socialism with liberty, since socialism without freedom of choice amounts to state capitalism and dictatorship by a bureaucracy.

The struggle against yanqui imperialism must have recourse to the same propaganda as that used by its proletarian rear-guard and oppressed ghetto populations. The leaders of slave rebellions against Roman imperialism knew not how to attract to their liberation front the plebeians and clients of Rome, two classes oppressed by the imperialist aristocracy. In the strategy against imperialism, it is imperative to combine the actions of the "external proletariat" in the colonized world with the "internal proletariat," i.e., oppressed classes within the imperialist nations. There is only one perspective that offers the political, social and strategical possibility of this kind of liberation for the oppressed world: socialism. But the traditional class parties and ideologies have no monopoly over its program. All who are anticapitalists and anti-imperialists can become socialists, all who wish for liberty guaranteed by the public sovereign through the socialism of self-management against the private interests of the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy.

5. *Orchestration of a Revolutionary War* *

In this hour of world history the great powers seek to adjust or conserve the status quo. The nuclear agreement partially banning atomic tests, which was signed in Moscow in 1963 by the Anglo-Saxons and the Soviets, contributes to maintaining in the world three zones: (1) Russia's strategical and economic sphere of influence; (2) the Anglo-Saxon zone of strategical-economic domination; (3) an uncommitted or intermediary zone consisting of various underdeveloped countries and, principally, China. The U.S.S.R. has reached a *détente* with the Anglo-Saxons according to which its own sphere of influence will be respected, provided that it not share its nuclear weapons with China and that it exercise restraint

in Southeast Asia, the Middle East (a combined British and North American preserve) and in Latin America (a North American zone).

The coming wars of decolonization must be made without the assistance of Russia, particularly in Latin America and Africa. Soviet revisionism is a result of Russian nationalism and of the agreements with the Anglo-Saxons. Like any other great power, Russia will not compromise her national interests to defend another country or revolution when it is not clearly in her national interests to do so. Soviet revisionism practices a new form of imperialism inasmuch as China and Albania are treated with disdain and an economic blockade like that which the United States applies to Cuba.

Revolutionary strategy must be carefully planned in order not to expose the masses to the ire of the police and the bourgeois armies, as the Communist revisionists do who use and abuse working-class demonstrations for their own purpose, exposing them as cannon fodder to the repressive forces. Revolutionary war must become the science of the popular masses in the struggle to seize power, but it must not fall prey to terrorism, putschism, Blanquism or myths of the general strike. Pursued in isolation, none of these tactics can win a revolutionary war; they have to be orchestrated, synchronized with the action in depth of an army of liberation operating in the cities and the countryside. Revolutionary war is total war, economic and social, involving strikes, demonstrations, protests against the cost of living, acts of violence, well-directed propaganda, a consistent international politics, but combined with the actions of an army of liberation and a guerrilla force situated in the enemy's rear.

In order to defeat imperialism and the collaborating indigenous oligarchies one has to master revolutionary strategy. Yanqui imperialism relies on the strategy of nuclear deterrence in order to paralyze the Russians and Chinese, and on conventional weapons against the guerrillas in South Vietnam. It is necessary to lure imperialism into ground-fighting deep into the interior of a continent, in zones without communica-

* *Teoría de la violencia*, Conclusion, pp. 229-230.

tions, in order to destroy its infantry and to annul the effectiveness of heavy weapons and atomic arms where there are no easy targets. Man is the active element, technique a passive one; between man and technics the human factor is decisive and the bearer of revolutionary values.

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